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ABSTRACT 
What makes a country continue to function even in the times of severe political crises? My 
dissertation addresses this question by presenting the theory of bureaucratic stability. I argue that 
because of their institutional knowledge and specialized skills, senior bureaucrats are the only 
constant in the governance structure and hence, a major stakeholder in governance. I theorize that 
in cases where the quality of bureaucracy and institutional autonomy are high, the country will 
have stable governance i.e. public service delivery and policy implementation, even in times of 
political crises. I define quality of bureaucracy as professionalized training and meritorious 
recruitment/ promotions while institutional autonomy is defined as. insulation from political 
fallout and independent policy making. Using extensive field work including elites interviews 
conducted in Taiwan, Pakistan and Turkey, I present evidence to support my theory using network 
analyses that map interactions between various stakeholders in the case countries to highlight the 
role of high quality senior bureaucracy who possess high levels of institutional autonomy and 
 ensure governance stability even during dire political crises. Using network analysis during real 
instances of political crises, I also explain how Turkey descended into authoritarian rule while 
Taiwan ascended to become a democracy supported by high quality senior bureaucrats who had 
institutional autonomy. My dissertation provides a causal framework that aids our understanding 
of success and failure of democratization through the contribution of institutions and 
bureaucracies.  
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1 ORDER IN CHAOS 
1.1 How Bureaucratic Quality and Institutional Autonomy Influence Governance 
Stability  
How do countries keep functioning while undergoing political turmoil? How can such 
states manage to provide services to their citizens, albeit limited at times, even during times of 
political crises? This is the question that I intend to address over the course of this dissertation 
project. I argue that the reason countries undergoing political crisis simply do not breakdown 
completely is because of bureaucracy. Specifically, I argue that the governance of the state i.e. 
provision of services, policy generation and implementation are functions dependent largely on 
bureaucracy. Political crises can greatly impact political stakeholders in a country and their 
capacity to exert power and influence, but the role played by bureaucracy even in those crises 
remains unchanged. In fact, I argue, that in such circumstances, the role of the bureaucracy is 
enhanced, and it becomes a stabilizing force in a country by the virtue of being the only constant 
in the government. Explicitly, for the purposes of the argument being made throughout this project, 
bureaucracy refers to the elite bureaucrats i.e. senior civilian bureaucrats. These include 
bureaucrats that hold positions as heads of departments, government organizations and cabinet 
posts. Depending on country, they can be referred to as Federal Secretaries, Administrative 
Ministers/Governors, Chief Executives of state-run entities as well as technocrats1 appointed as 
advisers or assistants to the head of state.  
 
1 Technocrat is a term used for technical experts from the private sector whose skill and abilities 
are at par with senior bureaucracy. In most instances, technocrats are former senior bureaucrats 
who either quit public service to join the private sector or those who simply retired from their 
civil service.  
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So, why do countries keep functioning even when they are facing severe political crises? 
It is because of the role played by the senior bureaucratic elites that provide a steadying hand in 
terms of policy design, implementation and general service delivery. While there is consensus in 
the literature on the importance of capable institutions (Huntington, 1968; Migdal, 1988; 
Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman, 1981; O’Donnell, 1979), the focus has been mainly on institutions 
as some form of unitary actors without much attention paid to those who staff such institutions. 
The core argument of this dissertation project provides nuance to this discussion on institutions by 
focusing those who staff these institutions, especially at the top i.e. senior bureaucratic elites. I 
posit that while all bureaucracy is important for any country to function, it is the “high quality” 
senior bureaucratic elites that enjoy institutional autonomy and independence in their roles that are 
able to play the most crucial role. What I mean by that is, for senior bureaucrats to play the role of 
the steadying hand and figuratively keeps the light on in the country, they need to be of “high 
quality” i.e. professionally trained, inducted via a competitive recruitment process and promoted 
meritoriously. However, such capable bureaucracy would be useless unless they have institutional 
autonomy for the institutions they serve. I refer to autonomy as insulation from political fallout 
and independent policy making. If senior bureaucracy has these two elements, they will be highly 
effective in terms of governance, hence providing the stability in times of political crises. But in 
instances where they lack both or one of these elements, providing governance stability would 
become an uphill task.   
This chapter focuses on defining and explaining core concepts and terms I use to frame 
theory of Bureaucratic Governance Stability. I start with positing the theory clearly by defining 
terms like political stability, governance stability, quality of bureaucracy and institutional 
autonomy. Next, I clearly state the hypothesis I am testing by applying my theory to country cases. 
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By laying out my hypothesis, I also provide the reader a cogent explanation of what the 
independent variables are and what the dependent variable is in this case. When discussing 
concepts on governance vis-à-vis politicking, its crucial to lay out the nuance and definitions as 
they help with theory testing in different circumstances and allow for the theory to be more 
generalizable. I conclude this chapter by explaining how I apply my theory in practice to test my 
hypothesis. I detail the process of case selection and the importance to selection the country cases 
I have chosen for this dissertation. An explanation of how data was collected and then applied to 
test the theory rounds out this chapter.  
1.2 Theory of Bureaucratic Governance Stability 
Most of the literature discusses at length the role of weak institutions staffed with low 
quality bureaucracy that is often politicized as a critical reason for a weak state or outright state 
failure (Huntington, 1968; Migdal, 1988; Bratton & Van De Walle, 1997; Levitsky & Way, 2010; 
Svolik, 2012). The literature contends that without a capable state, whether it is autocratic or 
democratic, the state cannot assert itself and attain stability which in turn is necessary to trigger 
economic growth. Questions like how institutions are important for a state to function (Huntington, 
1968; Migdal, 1988; Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman, 1981; O’Donnell, 1979), how development 
can lead to democracy (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1981; O’Donnell, 1979) and how democracies 
rely heavily on institutions to operate (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Geddes, 1994; Przeworski 
& Gandhi, 2007; Moore, 1966; Schumpeter, 1942) have been addressed to a large extent already. 
What I am addressing throughout this project is something the majority of the literature does not 
address; how bureaucracy can provide stability even in times of political turmoil by providing 
continued governance.  
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What I am interested in expounding on is how the senior bureaucrats with procedural know 
how and control over policy making and implementation can provide the necessary governance to 
help a country function even during times of political crises. A governance failure would mean 
breakdown of the state’s functions and inability of the state to exert control over its citizenry 
exemplified through inability to provide public services and keep control of state territory. I argue 
that in order to undertake this task of providing governance stability, the senior bureaucrats would 
need to be highly qualified in their field of expertise, trained through rigorous system and come 
through well-defined ranks via meritorious promotion structure. Such a senior bureaucratic elite 
would have the right set of tools and experience to then need institutional autonomy to apply their 
skills and knowledge to design policy, implement it and monitor its progress. In simple terms, I 
am arguing that a highly professionalized senior bureaucracy alone is not able to provide the 
necessary governance needed for stability in times of political crises, they need to be able to 
function without fear of political reprisal and intervention within a well-defined policy making and 
implementation process. I theorize that in cases where both these conditions are met, Bureaucratic 
Governance Stability can be achieved that will allow for political crises to sort themselves out 
without the fear of the state breaking down. Because service delivery and policy implementation 
can continue unhindered, political crises of any nature could be dealt with political stakeholders 
without weakening the state.  
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Figure 1. Determinants of Governance Stability 
 
The terminology I use to formulate my theory need to be discussed at length to flesh out 
the theory itself. I do so by addressing the difference between political stability and governance 
stability. This discussion is crucial to my theory to provide context for it. That is followed with a 
discussion about what quality of bureaucracy means and what factors play a part in it being high 
or low. The theory states that a country requires “high quality” senior bureaucratic elites, but what 
goes in to making it “high quality” or “low quality” is a discussion I undertake to provide a clearer 
idea of what I am discussing. In addition to this, I also explicate the concept of institutional 
autonomy in terms of this dissertation project.  
1.3 Political Stability vs. Governance Stability 
Governance stability refers to the concept that a state is able to provide basic services while 
developing and implementing policy effectively. According to United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP), governance stability includes accountability for actions of those in power, application of  
the constitution through well-defined processes and procedures, provision of basic human services 
such as law and order, access to public funds and citizen services. Governance stability also 
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includes mechanisms for conflict management and provision of space for political differences to 
be sorted out without weakening of state capacity. In essence, governance stability ensures that the 
state runs as it should constitutionally i.e. providing services to its citizens and maintaining the 
writ of the states according to the constitution. My theory argues that this sort of stability is 
impossible to achieve without the “high quality” senior bureaucracy that is institutionally 
autonomous. I argue this based on the fact that when it comes to governance in a state, the senior 
bureaucratic elites are a major stakeholder while political and military elites vie for influence of 
governance.  
Political and military elites are not competing for provision of services to the citizens, they 
are competing over the control of institutions and state resources that can provide such services to 
use them to reward or enhance their base of support. At no point, are the political and military 
elites in competition with senior bureaucratic elites in terms of governance. However, these elites 
are interested in influencing policy direction and state resources that senior bureaucrats are 
responsible for (Migdal, 1988; Huntington, 1968). This competition between political elites and at 
times the military elites can plunge the country in to political crises which stem from lack of clear 
leadership. As there is no clear leader in charge, that means there is no clear policy agenda that 
needs to be implemented. As various elites vie for political power to rule, the country faces a 
political crisis.  
Governance stability can exist in times of political crisis because it is fundamentally 
different from political stability. Political stability, as discussed in the literature, refers to the 
presence of a political leadership that has legitimacy to rule (Alesina et al, 1996). The political 
leadership could be a democratic, autocratic or even a dictatorship, but as long as it has the 
legitimacy to rule and asset itself, it provides a clear leadership. In practice this means the political 
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leadership is able to give policy direction, set agendas for development and maintain oversight on 
public resources. Political stability can enhance governance stability by providing long term policy 
directives and diverting more funds for service delivery. Even without political stability, however, 
I argue that a state can have stable governance as long as those tasked with ensuring it are qualified 
to do their jobs (i.e. they are “high quality”), and have the space to do so (i.e. they have institutional 
autonomy). An example of such a scenario is the case of Belgium from 2010 till 2011. For 589 
days, the country had no government because the elected members of parliament could not come 
to an agreement and the state was in midst of a political crises. With no clear political leadership, 
Belgium survived because the senior bureaucracy was professionalized, highly trained and 
technically capable to carry out policy development and implementation. Additionally, with 
independent institutions in place, the senior bureaucracy was able to continue functioning without 
any pressure to ensure public service delivery even when there was no political leadership in place 
(Bouckaert & Brans, 2012).  
So, while Belgium went through a political instability due to continuous political crisis i.e. 
there was no clear leadership to set the agenda and policy direction in the country, the state of 
Belgium kept functioning without a hitch. Public servants got paid on time, public got access to 
government services and public financing while international commitments were also met without 
any issue. I take this conceptualization of governance stability as the main dependent variable for 
my argument. There is significant literature that argues that political stability enhances governance 
stability, hence my contribution to this discussion is focusing on governance stability in times of 
political instability.  
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1.4 Quality of Bureaucracy 
What is a high-quality bureaucracy? Are all bureaucracies the same? What makes them 
distinct from each other? These are the questions I address in this section. In simplistic terms, a 
high-quality bureaucracy is one that is able to effectively undertake the task of policy making and 
implementation utilizing the resources of their institution. To achieve this, the bureaucracy needs 
to be professionally trained, have a merit-based structure promotion structure, and a clear sense of 
purpose. In other words, a high-quality bureaucracy is one that follows the Weberian ideals of a 
bureaucracy as closely as possible.  
Max Weber identifies six core functions of the bureaucracy. For any bureaucracy to 
function effectively there needs to be a formal hierarchy, rule-based management systems i.e. clear 
standard operating procedures in line with institutional intent, specialization of functions at the 
organizational level, clear focus of purpose such as clarity of job description and outputs, 
impersonality that allow bureaucrats to not be biased and lastly technical qualifications that allow 
them to function well on their jobs.  
Recent works have tested whether these factors still hold test of time with varying results. 
Oliveros & Schuster’s (2018) work based on an experiment conducted in Dominican Republic 
supports the notion that examinations for bureaucracy help a positive impact on quality of 
bureaucracy as it supports specialization, technical qualifications and impersonality based on the 
merit-based system of recruitment. Earlier literature also supports this conclusion based on case 
studies and cross-national fieldwork (Muramatsu & Krauss, 1984; Drezner, 2000; Johnson, 1975; 
Allison & Halperin, 1972).  
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Table 1. “High quality” vs. “Low Quality” Bureaucracy 
 
“high quality” Bureaucracy “Low Quality” Bureaucracy 
− Professionally trained and technically capable 
− Merit based system of recruitment & 
promotions 
− Well defined roles and hierarchy 
− Lacking in training & 
professionalization 
− Politicized ad – hoc recruitment 
− Haphazard hierarchy and lack of clarity 
on procedural issues 
 
In essence then, a “high quality” bureaucracy is one that is meritorious in its structure, has 
the technical skills to perform the clearly defined functions of the institution and has the ability to 
successfully undertake the policy design as well as implementation. A “low quality” bureaucracy 
would be a bureaucracy that lacks professionalization, a meritorious structure of recruitment and 
promotions, and technical specialization. A number of countries that formed in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, started with a colonial bureaucratic structure in place. But without the 
colonial bureaucracy overseeing the functioning, the newly independent countries lacked the 
ingredients to create “high quality” bureaucracies. Countries like Taiwan used party structures to 
design bureaucratic structures and provide the necessary human resources to rule the country. 
While in Turkey, the government of Ataturk dismantled the bureaucracy completely and started 
from scratch by modeling it on Italian, French and German bureaucracies. In each case, the 
intention was to create a “high quality” bureaucracy that can aid in ruling the country by providing 
efficient governance through service delivery and policy implementation.  
However, having a “high quality” bureaucracy is one element i.e. that alone does not lead 
to governance stability in times of political instability. The other element is autonomous 
institutions because without that, a capable bureaucracy is unable to carry out their jobs. Even if 
the bureaucracy were to possess immense institutional knowledge and procedural knowhow, it is 
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unable to deliver on its core functions without having the autonomy to function as it needs to in 
line with a country’s constitution. That is why the distinction between ruling and governing the 
country is crucial to understand. Political leadership rules a country, bureaucratic elites govern it. 
Yes, the political leadership sets up the overarching agenda and set up policy preferences, but it 
cannot have those agendas met without a bureaucracy able to execute public service delivery that 
can give the rulers the legitimacy to continue ruling. And for all of this to happen, senior 
bureaucratic elites need institutional autonomy (Muramatsu & Krauss, 1984). 
1.5 Institutional Autonomy 
Institutions are vibrant governance structures that operate within an insulated domain to 
provide implementation for policy ideas. Institutions are what the public refer to as government in 
their daily lives. And the bureaucrats that staff these institutions are the representatives of the 
government that the public most commonly comes in to contact with. So, while the politicians are 
the ones who are elected by the electorate, the bureaucracy are the ones public deals with on a day 
to day basis. This is significant because the behavior and experiences the public has with the 
bureaucracy inform their perceptions of the government at large. This means that irrespective of 
whether the government is elected or unelected, the unelected, impersonal, bureaucrat’s contact 
with public determines the public’s trust and happiness with the government. As long as public 
services are being delivered and state institutions are functioning the public views that as 
governance stability.   
Allison & Halperin’s (1972) painstakingly detail how the government functions. 
Specifically, they map out the processes through which institutions operate and take decisions. All 
institutions operate on three step functionalities; policy design, action/implementation and 
decision making. Senior bureaucratic elites monopolize these functions that are often referred to 
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as the policy making process and this is how they are able to provide semblance of stability even 
in situations where there is a political crisis. For instance, when in 2017, the sitting Prime Minister 
of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif was convicted of corruption and removed from office, the state 
continued functioning without a hitch while the country was plunged into a political turmoil. 
Foreign investments, payments to international creditors and even border security operations 
continued. Similarly, the morning after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, the trains 
kept running, the government kept working. The bureaucratic elites are to thank for keeping the 
state running in both cases.  
Structurally, the bureaucratic elites, who are senior bureaucrats, are responsible for 
overseeing different circuits that culminate into policy suggestions, policy implementation or 
decision making. As the overseers and facilitators of practically all government decision making 
games, the bureaucratic elites have a significant control over what policies and actions make it to 
the decision bargaining stage. Given their influence over the policy process, these elites wield 
power in the government to ensure their interests and status in the system is protected. Depending 
on the country, this could mean everything from no politicization of career bureaucracy to ensuring 
pension plans are secured. Like other elites, the bureaucratic elites’ core constituency are their 
peers. It is useful to view them as an epistemic community. They might not all be specialists in the 
same field, but they have shared experiences in being experts in their respective fields who are 
involved with governmental policy making and institutional management (Rourke, 1976).  
Unlike economic, military or political elites, what makes the bureaucratic elites impossible 
to dispose and discard is their knowledge of the policy channels and circuits, skills and expertise 
to develop and control policy information and the will to keep the organization integrity intact. 
Because their knowledge is so specialized, it is impossible to discard them. Hence, the bureaucratic 
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elites, are the only constant in the government. (Drezner, 2000). They are, however, open to the 
potential for politicization which can have negative impacts on their capacity and ability to deliver 
objectively on public services.  
And this is where the second element to my theory of bureaucratic governance stability 
comes in to play i.e. institutional autonomy. Institutional autonomy is effectively the ability of 
senior bureaucratic elites to perform their duties without outside interference. This means they 
ideally need to be insulated from political ramifications of their actions in order to continue 
providing the governance. Autonomous institutions are also essential for objective policy making. 
While political leadership has the right to set up policy agenda and targets, how those targets are 
achieved and what policy interventions are designed is left to the senior bureaucratic elites that are 
experts in their field and understand the institutional resources at their disposal. Taking away 
institutional autonomy via politicization and corruption hampers the capacity of even “high 
quality” bureaucratic elites to ensure governance stability.  
For instance, in the case of Japan, where the elected government of Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) worked with the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), to 
lead Japan down the path of economic development and growth. It was in LDP’s favor to allow 
bureaucratic elite at ministries like MITI to take policy lead and while LDP just took credit for it 
(Johnson, 1975; Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman, 1981; Muramatsu & Krauss, 1984). The purpose 
of this arrangement was to allow a highly trained cohort of bureaucratic elites to design and 
implement policy that could provide a sustained long-term stability to strategies that were crucial 
for the economy.  This is why scholars have argued that development cannot happen without strong 
bureaucrats i.e. bureaucratic elites that have the policy making, implementing and service delivery 
capacity as that in turn leads to strong institutions. Crucially such a bureaucracy would by default 
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be autonomous in its decision making and agenda setting (Evans, 1995). Consolidation of 
democracy or even autocracy, then requires an autonomous institution in addition to “high quality” 
bureaucracy (Caughney, 2009; Allison & Halperin, 1972).  
Additionally, “low quality” bureaucracies working in institutions with limited autonomy 
are also vulnerable and more likely to be corrupted via politicization. In such cases partisan 
dominance leads to corruption by limiting institutional autonomy (Bersch et al, 2017). But what 
does bureaucratic politicization translate into practice – i.e. the concept is studied and discussed 
but what is the practical implication of politicization? Berang et al (2018) use the case of Argentina 
to explain elucidate on this. According to them, public service delivery failures are the prime 
outcome of a politicized bureaucracy. A smaller but extremely crucial outcome of this 
politicization is politicization of public policy knowledge. This outcome is important for the 
argument I am presenting as it eventually leads to lower trust in institutions and chipping away the 
institutional autonomy. Because policy making is no longer objective, it impacts political stability 
in the long run and worsens political instability. 
Autonomous institutions staffed with high-quality bureaucracies are also crucial in times 
of political crises and political transitions. Especially when a new government takes office, it will 
be forced to rely on the bureaucratic elites to convert their policy ideas into implementable 
interventions. And because new governments often lack policy insights and procedural expertise, 
they are at the mercy of the bureaucratic elites to get their agenda implemented. Hence, we can 
asset that political instability will get worse if the institutions are not autonomous even if they are 
staffed with “high quality” bureaucrats (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Rueda, 2008; Rothestein, 2011).  
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1.6 Research Question & Hypothesis 
As discussed earlier, the main question this dissertation addresses a deceptively simple one; 
How can states manage to provide services to their citizens, albeit limited at times, even during 
times of political crises, political transitions and even political instability? The answer, I argue, 
lies with the senior bureaucratic elites. I theorize that “high quality” senior bureaucratic elites 
working in autonomous institutions provide bureaucratic governance stability that ensures that 
service delivery and policy processes run seamlessly even during the times of political crises where 
there is turmoil of leadership.  
To test this theory my hypothesis is that in instances where there is a “high quality” senior 
bureaucratic elites working in autonomous institutions, the country would not witness any 
breakdown in public service delivery i.e. basic human services, law and order etc. However, in 
instances where either one of these elements is missing the governance stability required to 
potentially allow for a political crisis to end, will not be present. This means for instance if there 
is “high quality” bureaucracy that is forced to work in politicized institutions, it will worsen the 
political crisis and may potentially lead to state breakdown. However, in instances where there is 
lack of independent institutions as well as “low quality” bureaucracy, the country will sink deeper 
in political turmoil due to governance breakdown. Such a situation could potentially lead to civil 
war and breakdown of the state itself.  
In order to rigorously test my hypothesis, I am testing my theory by applying to country 
cases using real instances of political turmoil to provide evidence of how governance stability 
works. In the next section, I explain the necessity of using country cases as well as the selection 
of the cases of Pakistan, Taiwan and Turkey for the purposes of this dissertation.  
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1.7 Theory in Practice 
Testing the theory of bureaucratic governance stability requires application of it on 
instances that offer the greatest variance in political structures, kinds of political crises as well as 
a well-documented record of bureaucratic structures. In this section I explain the choices I made 
with regards to case selection and data collection to test my theory. An extended explanation of 
the process and methodology is detailed in the next chapter. This section presents the line of logic 
I followed to end with the country cases I choose for this dissertation and detail some of the 
limitations of these cases. The current literature on the subject of bureaucracy and institutions, as 
I explain above, discusses the importance of strong institutions and their necessity for 
democratization. The literature also discusses the necessity for governance stability via strong 
institutions for economic growth. This dissertation is not contributing to this literature by revisiting 
importance of institutions and their role in economic growth that can lead to democratization. This 
project contributes to a lesser studied aspect that explores how senior bureaucratic elites play a 
role in maintaining governance during times of political crises. Hence, the country cases selected 
offer diverse situations that allow for theory to be tested thoroughly.  
1.8 Case Selection 
Choosing the right cases to test the theory was the priority for me. Studying the role of 
bureaucracy and autonomous institutions on governance seems straight forward enough but to test 
the theory I am positing in this dissertation requires choosing country cases that offer variation of 
political crises as well as governance models. All countries have a bureaucracy whether its “high 
quality” or “low quality”, same goes for institutional autonomy. But based on the question this 
dissertation addresses, the options are narrowed to countries that have wide variance in political 
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crises as well as changes in quality of bureaucracy and institutional autonomy. This drastically 
reduced the pool of countries I could choose from to test my theory.  
I needed cases with a history of change in the quality of bureaucracy and autonomy of 
institutions. In addition to that, the cases also needed to have real political crises that could provide 
evidence of my theory in action. Simultaneously, I also needed one case that could act as a best-
case scenario i.e. where the quality of bureaucracy has been consistently high, and institutions have 
maintained autonomy under consistent political crises. Based on this very narrow set of conditions, 
I had the option to choose among countries like Turkey, Egypt, Taiwan, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Indonesia and Brazil.  
Out of these cases I chose Turkey and Taiwan as case studies for countries that have seen 
varying trajectories of quality of bureaucracy and institutional autonomy as well as a proven 
history of political crises of different kinds. Between Pakistan and Bangladesh as cases of 
consistently high bureaucratic quality and institutional autonomy, I ended up choosing Pakistan as 
Bangladesh itself was part of Pakistan till 1971 and has identical bureaucratic structures. 
The cases I chose for this dissertation project highlight a variety of roles and trajectories 
taken by elite senior bureaucrats in three different countries. In two of these countries, Taiwan and 
Turkey, the bureaucratic elites are part of the formation process of the country and then are able 
to move towards creation of autonomous institutions in their efforts to consolidate a governance 
system while in Pakistan’s case, the bureaucracy continued the model left by the colonials to enjoy 
institutional autonomy and a “high quality” courtesy of British era rules on recruitment, 
professionalization and promotions. In all three cases, there have been severe political crises be it 
contentious efforts to democratize or repeated coups. For instance, in the case of Pakistan and 
Turkey, there have been regular coups since their creation.  
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In both cases, Pakistan and Turkey, the political space has been contested by military and 
political elites over the years resulting in a back and forth struggle yet both countries have 
witnessed economic growth as well as stable governance. Service delivery has never stopped, and 
state has not faced an existential crisis or a popular uprising. Taiwan’s case is unique as it started 
out with a bureaucracy based on a Leninist party model of the Kuomintang after it took control of 
the island to establish the current Government of Taiwan. The bureaucracy and institutions had to 
be reformed over time to become autonomous and professionalize as opposed to remaining an 
extension of the party structures. Like Pakistan and Turkey, Taiwan has faced political crises, but 
those have originated from transitions to democratization rather than military and political vying 
for political dominance.  
I chose these three country cases because they offered the widest variety of scenarios over 
their history to test my theory. Especially, in the case Turkey, it offered me the opportunity to 
study the governance stability before and after a coup attempt. That provided a unique scenario 
where I could not only witness the altering the senior bureaucratic elite’s status but also the overall 
quality of the civil service. Turkey also allowed me to observe what happens when a democratic 
government becomes autocratic and chooses to politicize institutions to curtail institution 
autonomy.  
Pakistan presented a unique scenario too because no Prime Minister in Pakistan’s history 
has ever completed a full term in office. That means, there has always been a political crisis to 
scuttle the leadership whether it is during democracy or authoritarian rule. Taiwan was ruled by a 
single party till about two decades ago and since then has seen smooth transition to democracy, a 
popular student movement and heightened tensions with China. The pressures of governance in 
Taiwan are fascinating to observe given it is no longer a developing country like Pakistan or 
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Turkey. This spectrum of scenarios and trajectories is why I chose these three cases. The rich data 
I collected helps evidence my argument by not just providing correlations but clearly illustrating 
governance structures.  
1.9 Data Collection and Application 
The dissertation project relies on data collected entirely through field work in Turkey, 
Taiwan and Pakistan. By doing so, my intention was to ensure that the information I was gathering 
was firsthand and nuanced. To study an insular epistemic community like senior bureaucratic 
elites, I deemed it necessary to rely on in person interactions that included formal interviews as 
well as informal discussions with various stakeholders in multiple locations. I also spent 
considerable time at government departments observing the inner workings of crucial departments 
like Ministry of Finance, Internal Affairs and National Security Councils to better understand the 
process of policy formulation, crisis management and the points of contestation.   
My fieldwork was assisted by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Taiwan 
Fellowship that allowed me to be based in Taiwan for a period of three months while I conducted 
interviews and held interactions with senior bureaucrats. In Pakistan, I was facilitated by Forman 
Christian College’s Center for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG) in Lahore. I also arranged 
informal discussions and interviews based on my personal network in Pakistan. Similarly, in 
Turkey, I was based out of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East 
(TODAIE)2, the elite bureaucrat training institution in Ankara. The institute helped me arrange 
 
2 TODAIE has since been shut down by the Turkish Government. As the elite training institution 
for bureaucrats in the country, TODAIE was instrumental in maintaining the high-quality 
professionalism in the Turkish Bureaucracy for decades. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the 
Presidential Elections in 2018, the AKP Government chose to shut down the institution in favor 
of making political appointments and revamping trainings under individual institutions rather 
than a central body.  
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interviews, provided data sources with access to their databases as well as helping me logistically 
travel around the country. Lastly in Taiwan, the Taiwan Fellowship based me out of the National 
Sun Yat – Sen University in the southern city of Kaohsiung. I was simultaneously associated with 
the Center for Chinese Studies at the National Central Library in Taipei. Both institutions assisted 
me in arranging interviews with senior current and former members of the bureaucracy. In addition 
to that, my personal network in Taiwan helped me get access to the National Security Council as 
well as the Ministry of Labor, both of whom are critical points of data for the purposes of this 
project.  
The data I collected through these discussions and interactions was qualitative full of rich 
insights into the interactions between different stakeholders in national governance including 
politicians, military elites as well as business elites. Instead of synthesizing this data in to the 
traditional numeric values and running a correlation test using software like STATA, I chose to 
employ a network analysis approach that turns the information rich data in to visualization that 
illustrated the responsibilities, importance and centrality of the bureaucratic elites in the 
governance structure of the country.  
Based on information collected during interviews and fieldwork, I drew up a list of key 
members in the national governance structure. This included politicians, bureaucrats and even the 
military. Each one of these individuals was assigned numbers based on their connections, for 
instance, the President of Turkey is connected to all ministers and top bureaucrats in each ministry, 
the number assigned to him is the number of connections he has in the system. Using the software 
Gephi, I can map out these connections into a network and analyze that by calculating the centrality 
of the nodes i.e. individual players, based on how many connections they have. This gives me the 
eigen vector centrality number i.e. how central the node is in the system. Without a political crisis, 
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the President would have the highest eigen vector centrality. Similarly, the quality of connections 
i.e. how central the other connections are to a node gives me the HUB Score. For instance, if a 
node in the system has only five connections but all of those connections are people like the 
President, Vice President and Ministers, they might have low eigen vector centrality, but they will 
have a high HUB score. Essentially, that shows how much they matter in the system based on the 
nodes they are connected to. The last measure is that of authority. Similar to the eigen vector 
measure, authority number indicates the kind of information a node holds. For instance, a senior 
bureaucrat in the system holds high authority because they have access to a lot of information by 
the virtue of being well connected and having high level connections i.e. high eigen vector and 
HUB scores.  
The interviews I conducted in each of the three cases allowed me to populate the 
information of who is connected to whom, how many connections and interaction are individuals 
responsible for governance having with each other and how the general policy process flows in a 
country. This meant that when I was discussing things like economic policy in Pakistan, I had to 
take in to account that when it comes to key issue governance like finance in the country, the 
military does have a role in it and it at least provides feedback. I could account for that by 
illustrating how that information is communicated by linking the Chief of Army Staff to the 
Principal Secretary of the Prime Minister. That connection between the two nodes is not 
highlighted in formal documentation or organograms. But I account for it based on the information 
gathered during interviews as those provide nuance beyond formal relationships.   
Doing so allows the reader to see how a country’s governance structure operates and what 
players are involved in figurately ensuring how the lights are kept on. Each country case has two 
network analyses to present a before and after political crisis governance structure to document 
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how bureaucratic governance stability plays out in practice. This is why it was necessary to choose 
country cases that not only provided variance on the independent variables but had genuine 
political crises. 
I detail my methodological choices further in the next chapter along with explanation of 
how the interviews were conducted, how the information I collected was turned from qualitative 
data into empirical data for the purposes of creating network analyses for various country cases. 
Most importantly, the next section describes how to read these network analysis illustrations as 
evidence for the theory being tested.  
2 TESTING THE THEORY: METHDOLOGIES, CASE SELECTION & 
LIMITATIONS 
This chapter addresses the causal arguments and methodologies used throughout the 
dissertation to test the hypothesis laid out in the last chapter. I discussed the case selection logic 
and data collection briefly in the last chapter, I go into much deeper detail regarding that in this 
chapter to provide a detailed context for those decisions. The intention here is to provide detailed 
information to the reader to help them visualize the process I went through to test the hypotheses 
and the conclusions I reach at the end of each case study.  
The theory I am testing in this dissertation is built on two independent variables; quality of 
bureaucracy and institutional autonomy. As mentioned earlier, institutional autonomy refers to the 
insulation from political influence and ability to design policy interventions in an unbiased 
objective manner. Quality of bureaucracy refers to how capable the bureaucracy is based on the 
definitions laid out in the last chapter and highlighted in Table 1. Figure 2 simplifies the causal 
argument; institutional autonomy and quality of bureaucracy impact the stability of governance.  
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Figure 2. Independent and Dependent Variable 
But how does one study this impact of the two independent variables? How can we figure 
out whether an institution is autonomous or at least most of the institutions in a state are enjoying 
autonomy? How can we conclusively state whether senior bureaucratic elites are of “high quality” 
or “low quality”? What kind of data needs to be analyzed in order to provide evidence of for this 
theory and how is that data processed? These are the questions this chapter intends to address 
before taking a deep dive in to the three country cases. I have already explained the logic of 
selecting these three case studies in the previous chapter, but I will provide more details on that as 
a start. That will be followed up by details of the field work I conducted to collect data, what kind 
of data was collected during the field work and lastly I conclude by explaining how that data was 
used and processed to provide evidence for the theory of bureaucratic governance stability in this 
dissertation.  
2.1 Case Studies and Their Relevance 
I chose Pakistan, Turkey and Taiwan as my case countries. As mentioned earlier, the choice 
to focus on these three cases was due to the wide variance they offer in testing of my theory and 
their unique geographical and political realities. Testing a theory out thoroughly on such diverse 
scenarios allows it to be generalizable and robust. This section provides more contextual and 
DV: 
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historical details about the countries, including their trajectories as modern states that have dealt 
with political crises and yet managed to attain governance stability.  
Turkey and Taiwan were created by leaders with significant military experience and 
training. Both, Gen. Mustafa Kemal ‘Ataturk’ & Gen. Chiang Kai – shek, influenced the formative 
period of Turkey and Taiwan respectively. Both relied heavily on parties that were intertwined 
with the military at the time of formation of their respective countries3. Both, the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) in Turkey and Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, were founding parties and 
essentially designed the building blocks such as laws and institutions in each case. Given that both 
parties were ruled by authoritarian rulers, the parties carried out the vision of the leader. Although 
both CHP and KMT were not created by Ataturk and Chiang Kai – shek, both men greatly shaped 
how the parties performed and developed over time.  
Over time, Turkish and Taiwanese bureaucracies have maintained professionalism with 
well-structured recruitment and training (Heper, 1985; Tien & Chu, 2009). While in Taiwan the 
 
3 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was a veteran of the First World War and led uprisings that turned in to 
Nationalist revolutions against the colonial powers and eventually created the provisional 
government that set up the modern Turkish state 1921. His military background impacted how he 
quelled rebellions and consolidated the borders of the Turkish state while setting up series of 
reforms to give the new country a clean break from its past as the Ottoman Empire (Mango, 
2002) 
  
Chiang Kai – shek fought in the rebellion to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and then was made the 
commander of the nationalist army after Sun Yat – Sen took over as the leader of the 
Kuomintang aka KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party. After the death of Sun Yat – Sen, Chiang took 
over as the leader of KMT and fought the Communists as well as the Japanese invaders. He 
successfully defeated the Japanese invaders with the help of the Allied nations but eventually lost 
out the Communists and fled to island of Formosa in 1949 and established a government in exile. 
The island eventually became the current state of Taiwan – Republic of China.  
 
Detailed profiles on both are available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/chiang_kaishek.shtml & 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/ataturk_kemal.shtml  
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bureaucracy began as part and parcel of the KMT, it has evolved into a highly specialized work 
force that has spearheaded Taiwan’s policy development and implementation that is often credited 
for powering the tiny island nation into a global economic player. Although the bureaucracy is 
often accused of siding with the KMT till this day, senior bureaucrats maintain that their cautious 
and conservative approach to reform is misconstrued as support for KMT4. So, in the case of 
Taiwan what we witness is a high-quality bureaucratic elite that was politicized from the very 
beginning but over time they moved to become objective policy makers who enjoy institutional 
autonomy and space to control the policy process.  
  Meanwhile in Turkey, attempts at reforming the bureaucracy have been resisted over the 
years by powerful senior bureaucratic elites aligned with military and the CHP. Throughout the 
80s and early 90s, Turkey was led by bureaucrat turned politician Turgut Özal who is widely 
credited with modernizing and revamping the Turkish Economy and laying down the foundations 
of modern Turkish democracy. Özal’s reforms changed a number of things in Turkey but what 
they enhanced was the public service mechanism through institutional protection for senior 
bureaucracy (Çelenk, 2009). During the 90s and early 2000s, Turkish bureaucracy was viewed in 
a similar manner to the Taiwanese bureaucracy i.e. largely independent but silently leaning 
towards the founding party. However, throughout the 2000s, Justice and Development Party 
 
4 In interviews with the DPP Government officials at the Presidential Palace in Taipei and then 
with the Administrative Labor Minister, there were frank discussions on how DPP government 
officials felt that bureaucracy was trying to slow walk reforms and at times publicly stonewall 
critical policy implementation. In backdrop of discussion on pension system reform, senior 
bureaucrats in multiple interviews stated that as institutional employees, they are conservative 
with undertaking sweeping reforms and wish for sequential change as opposed to the DPP’s 
rapid change policies. They argue that government assumes their cautious behavior to be a 
challenge to DPP’s writ to govern whereas it is just built in institutional conservatism. DPP 
Government officials maintained their position that senior bureaucrats still lean KMT and 
purposely delay DPP initiated policies. 
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(AKP) launched multiple efforts to reform the bureaucracy but most of those were met with 
resistance from within the bureaucracy, specifically by senior bureaucrats heading largely 
independent institutions. Eventually as the discussion on EU accession cooled off, so did debates 
on bureaucratic reform (State Planning Agency, 2007; Çelenk, 2009).  
Things changed in Turkey after the attempted coup of 2010 and took a turn for the worse 
after the failed coup of 2016. At that stage, the AKP changed the system of governance to a 
Presidential system and cannibalized the Turkish bureaucracy through purges in the aftermath of 
the failed coup attempt by Gülenists. Unlike anywhere else in the world, Turkey’s quality of 
bureaucracy shifted in a very short period of time from being “high quality” to “low quality” as a 
large part of the senior Turkish bureaucracy was lost to purges and arrests.  
The government alleged a large number of Gülenists existed in the civil bureaucracy and 
could hurt the national security of the country. As a result, over 100,000 civil servants (teachers, 
engineers, bureaucrats, technical experts, military personnel and Imams) were purged leaving a 
massive hole in the public service delivery capacity in Turkey. That gap was fulfilled by loyalists 
of the AKP, who were recruited based on their loyalty to the party instead of their capability. In 
short, the Turkish bureaucracy’s “high quality” and capacity nosedived as it became politicized in 
response to the failed coup attempt. As a result of that, Turkey now faces a situation where 
economic growth has slowed, the Turkish Lira has lost value and the dominant party is using 
institutions to stay in power even when voted out as in the recent Turkish municipal elections 
(Çagaptay, 2017; Gürakar, 2016). The case of Turkey is fascinating for this project as it had a long 
tradition of highly trained bureaucratic elites who have been policy makers from the very 
beginning. After the demise of the founder, they take upon a purely professional and autonomous 
role to check power of military and political elites. But over time, their professionalism and 
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integrity are directly been challenged and their institutional autonomy threatened. This has 
impacted the governance capacity of the of the government and while there is no longer a political 
crisis in Turkey, service delivery and policy implementation has drastically slowed5.  
Unlike Turkey or Taiwan, Pakistan was created as a democracy from day one. The 
founding father of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah passed away soon after independence and 
barely left an imprint on the nation’s institutions. Unlike Turkey and Taiwan, Pakistan did not have 
an influential leader rule during the formative stages who could influence the development of 
guidelines, regulations and institutions. Instead, Pakistan was quickly forced to deal with a 
breakdown in governance amid political disagreements and provincial strife. As a result, senior 
bureaucracy took over governance after the assassination of the country’s first Prime Minister 
Liaqat Ali Khan and forced out his successor Kh. Nazimmuddin6 in 1954. Senior bureaucratic 
elites took over positions like the Governor General (President) and Prime Minister and ruled till 
1958 when they were ousted in a coup by the military. In their time in power, the senior 
bureaucratic elites introduced the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956. After the coup, the next 
constitution was written in 1962 also by senior bureaucracy under the patronage of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator, General Ayub Khan. This time period is also viewed as the beginning 
of a powerful alliance that has facilitated multiple coups in Pakistan. The alliance between senior 
civilian bureaucratic elites and the military elites will eventually design three constitutions and 
heavily influence the only politically accepted constitution passed in 1973 under the Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto Government.  
 
5 As Turkey braces for recession, government services have been greatly impacted along with the 
policy implementation as detailed in https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/business/turkey-
recession.html  
6 Detailed historical timeline available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12966786  
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The senior bureaucracy’s role in Pakistan has traditionally been to be the peacekeepers 
between the political and military elites. As they are the only group with technical and policy 
knowledge, they have successfully leveraged to maintain high levels of institutional autonomy 
irrespective of what kind of governance system Pakistan was going through. This is evidenced by 
at least four major attempts by civilian and military governments to reform the bureaucracy and 
change its structure to better suit the needs of the new governments. Each round of these reforms 
has failed due to the sheer influence of the bureaucratic elites in formulating and implementing 
policy. This has led to an interesting situation where the senior bureaucracy is seen as an 
accomplice in every attempt at a coup as well as any effort to democratize. And the reason for that 
is whether it is the Generals in power or the Politicians, both of them rely exclusively on the senior 
bureaucracy to fulfill all governance needs of the country. Public service delivery as well as policy 
making is left with the bureaucratic elites especially during political crises.  
Pakistan’s case is a contrast to Turkey and Taiwan. But what it has common with the other 
two cases is the influence of the bureaucracy and how it has had a big hand in direct as well as 
indirect governance of Pakistan. While in Turkey’s case the bureaucratic elites started out as 
political i.e. pro CHP, they became apolitical during the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s only to be 
gutted after the failed coup of 2016. In the aftermath, Turkey’s bureaucratic quality has gone down 
as I recruiting practices are changed and the number of political appointments has also increased 
significantly. Taiwan’s bureaucracy also began its journey as a subset of the Kuomintang but over 
years of reforms and steady leadership, it was able to transform itself into a highly technical 
apolitical set of elites focused on providing governance stability to boost economic growth. And 
unlike Turkey, they have managed to maintain institutional autonomy due to the tapered nature in 
  
 
28 
which their role has been refined. In contrast, Pakistan’s bureaucratic elites wrote themselves in to 
the constitution in 19567 and since then their influence has not waned off.  
In essence, the three cases I have chosen here to provide the wide variation of scenarios 
that the theory can be applied to. Most importantly, because of their diversity, they give the theory 
legitimacy to be more generalizable.  
2.2 Method Choice 
Unlike recent studies on bureaucratic quality and politicization (Bersch et al, 2017; Berang 
et al, 2018), I did not want to rely on collecting survey data to analyze. If the purpose is to 
understand the quality of bureaucracy in a country, then it is necessary to understand the 
recruitment process, career progression, institutional identity as well as professionalism at the 
service level. Unfortunately, most of this cannot be converted into numbers. Similarly, observing 
institutional autonomy is not manageable in survey format. Using numeric values guts the nuance 
of whether institutions in a country are independent or not.  
To aptly address the research question I am exploring, I chose to work with a mixed method 
approach whereby the qualitative work informs the quantitative work. Instead of using existing 
data sets and relying on generic measures, I decided to conduct extensive fieldwork in Taiwan, 
Turkey and Pakistan over a period of fourteen months. I spent considerable time in each country 
talking and interacting with not just the bureaucratic elites but also with military and political elites 
as well as academics to appreciate the context of the information I was gathering. I held formal 
interviews along with numerous informal discussions with various stakeholders. In Pakistan’s 
case, I was also allowed to conduct immersive research i.e. I was allowed to sit through process of 
 
7 An archived version of the 1956 constitution is available online at 
http://pakistanspace.tripod.com/archives/56_10.htm  
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policy making and implementation to get an idea of how the government works and what kind of 
interactions the elites have with each other.  
All the information I collected during my fieldwork is the basis of my quantative analysis 
which employs a social network analysis. The conversations helped me map out relations and 
power dynamics at the national governance levels in each of the three cases, thereby providing the 
data to conduct a social network analysis for each case The social network analysis, as I explain 
in detail in the next section, is an approach mostly used in computer sciences to understand 
networks and their interactions. It translates well to studying governance at the bureaucratic level 
as well, since the government itself is a network with power nodes i.e. players who have differing 
relationships in terms of different intensity, closeness and importance, with others. This 
dissertation thus adopts a social network analysis approach to illustrate power dynamics and 
governance patterns in each country.  
2.3 Data Sources 
The data used throughout this dissertation for theory and hypothesis testing comes mainly 
from two sources. Firstly, I use data from existing sources i.e. existing literature that use in the 
previous chapter to formulate my theory and situate my argument. In addition to that, I also rely 
on official documents and guidelines provided by the governments in each of the three cases. The 
need of relying on formal government documentation is that it helps me illustratively map out the 
official nature of relationship between different stakeholders. Those formal relationships are what 
the constitutions in each case aspire the government to be. The data that I gain from this literature 
helps me then place the right elite actors in the right position based on the information gathered 
via interviews.  
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The official literature and reports provide me the basic structure of governance and decision 
making in each country while the fieldwork I conducted in each of the three cases allows me to 
add nuance and context to that structure to show how the relationships can shift and how the 
bureaucratic elites slip in to a central role to ensure stability even in the times of political crises. 
For this project I specifically relied on the documentation provided by the Governments of 
Pakistan, Taiwan and Turkey regarding the structures and organograms of various departments. 
Specific references to reports and official literature are made in each of the country case study 
chapters. It is pertinent to mention that specifically in the case of Turkey, the formal structure of 
the government has changed but the change is not drastic at the fundamental service delivery and 
policy design level. The changes made however have had a devastating impact on the quality of 
bureaucracy and institutional autonomy. I acknowledge those changes in the Turkey case study 
chapter, chapter five, and explain how those changes are in line with my overall argument.   
2.4 Fieldwork and Data Collection 
By conducting fieldwork, my intention was to ensure that the information I was gathering 
was firsthand and nuanced instead of being secondary in nature. I held formal interviews as well 
as informal discussions with various stakeholders in multiple locations, spent time in government 
departments and spent time observing the inner workings of crucial departments like Ministry of 
Finance, Internal Affairs and National Security Councils to better understand the process of policy 
formulation, crisis management and the points of contestation.  
To conduct this fieldwork, I was assisted by Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
Taiwan Fellowship that allowed me to be based in Taiwan for a period of three months while I 
conducted interviews, collecting data and working on other aspects of my dissertation. In Pakistan, 
I was facilitated by Forman Christian College’s Center for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG) 
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in Lahore. I also arranged informal discussions and interviews based on my personal network in 
Pakistan. Similarly, in Turkey, I was based out of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey 
and Middle East (TODAIE)8, the elite bureaucrat training institution in Ankara. The institute 
helped me arrange interviews, provided data sources with access to their databases as well as 
helping me logistically travel around the country. Lastly in Taiwan, the Taiwan Fellowship based 
me out of the National Sun Yat – Sen University in the southern city of Kaohsiung. I was 
simultaneously associated with the Center for Chinese Studies at the National Central Library in 
Taipei. Both institutions assisted me in data collection efforts as well as arranging interviews. In 
addition to that, my personal network in Taiwan helped me get access to the National Security 
Council as well as the Ministry of Labor, both of whom are critical points of data for the purposes 
of this project.  
2.5 Interviews and Informal Discussions 
In each country I conducted interviews with politicians, senior bureaucracy that I refer to 
as bureaucratic elites, retired military officials, retired judges and academics. The idea was to 
interview as many stakeholders as I could to get a holistic insight in to how a country functions 
not just at the policy level but in practicality on a day to day basis. I also wanted to get a nuanced 
understanding of what spaces are contested among military and political elites historically. This 
helped me place the bureaucratic elites in those situations and figure out their role. Doing so was 
important in the case of this project as that provides context and paints a picture of governance and 
 
8 TODAIE has since been shut down by the Turkish Government. As the elite training institution 
for bureaucrats in the country, TODAIE was instrumental in maintaining the high-quality 
professionalism in the Turkish Bureaucracy for decades. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the 
Presidential Elections in 2018, the AKP Government chose to shut down the institution in favor 
of making political appointments and revamping trainings under individual institutions rather 
than a central body.  
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its tensions that most of the earlier discussions lack. Most survey or interview-based studies like 
the ones done recently by Berang et al (2018) focus on perception of the bureaucracy of other 
bureaucrats. This study uses a slightly different approach and maps out those perceptions of power 
and influence with additions of military as well as political elites.  
Table 2 details the number of interviews conducted in each country. Each of the interviews 
was based on a set of identical questions structured in an informal manner. For instance, all 
respondents were asked the question who did they view as the critical player in the day to day 
running of the country? The answer choices being military, politicians or the senior bureaucracy. 
Based on their answer, they were inquired why they chose that followed by an unstructured 
discussion based on their views. Doing so allowed me to put the puzzle of governance together in 
a more comprehensive manner rather than simply tabulating their responses without context.  
Table 2. Number of Primary Interviews Conducted by Country 
 Taiwan Turkey Pakistan 
Politicians 7 3 20 
Senior Bureaucrats9 12 15 35 
Military Officials 4 1 2 
Judges 1 4 4 
Academics 15 10 4 
    
Total 39 33 65 
 
9 Senior Bureaucracy refers to bureaucracy that is leading teams to develop policy and/or 
implementing its policy. The interviews I conducted were with people on the upper rung of 
public service and had significant years of experience on the job. The average experience in 
government service was at least 15 years. Irrespective of their department of service, I wanted to 
interview bureaucrats who had worked through different tenures of governments and had been 
on the jobs to have a holistic outlook on the process of governance.  
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Other questions included discussions about the makeup of the bureaucracy, its operations, 
its recruitment, organizational culture and its historical background. Interviews were conducted 
mostly in English except for 6 instances in Turkey, 10 instances in Taiwan and 15 instances in 
Pakistan. In these instances, in Taiwan and Turkey, there was a native speaker with a PhD. in 
Political Science present to help with translations and getting the terminology right. I relied on 
snowball sampling technique i.e. I started by building initial contacts in each of the countries and 
then relied on those contacts to help set up further interviews. Because I was trying to study a 
tightly knit group, senior bureaucratic elites, I had to rely on this technique to get access and then 
collect information. Without doing so, given the insularity of elites in most countries, I would not 
have been unable to aptly test my hypothesis. It is also pertinent to mention that through this 
technique the interviews were less formal and included off the record discussions that may not be 
helpful with quantification of data but provide insights into the system and its operations. Most of 
those off the record discussions were contextual and provided lesser known details about formal 
workings of these countries. For instance, one piece of information that was shared explained that 
while approving the budget is formally the task of the Ministry of Finance in Pakistan, it is actually 
done by a committee headed by the Chief of Army Staff with members of the political elites and 
senior bureaucracy included. Chief of Army Staff takes the final decision but, in most cases, he 
sides with the policy proposals put forth by the Secretary of Finance and Secretary of the Economic 
Affairs Divisions, both of whom are career bureaucrats who report to the Principle Secretary. 
Hence, when I map out the power dynamics of Pakistan’s governance structure, the people with 
significant power are the Principle Secretary and the Chief of Army Staff who conducts his 
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business via the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief. On paper however, the PM is 
supposed to take the decision on the advisement of the Minister of Finance.  
Given that I was discussing extremely sensitive material in countries like Turkey and 
Pakistan, the snowball sampling method allowed me to have those conversations because I was 
introduced by people who had a level of trust with the interviewees. That assisted with 
conversations we had during interviews as they were informal in nature and included information 
not easily accessible. Specifically, in the case of Turkey, some of the most critical discussions I 
had that helped with my understanding of the nuance of bureaucratic influence were over lunch at 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Deputy Governor (Admin) Ankara introduced me to his 
colleagues who were visiting from other towns. They narrated their own experiences and explained 
in greater detail how interactions happen on a day to day basis. Just like in Pakistan, these 
interactions garnered not just basic information that could help me test my theory, it helped me 
paint a more holistic picture of power players and their interaction in Turkey and how the eventual 
cannibalization of professional bureaucracy in the country has undone years of democratic 
consolidation.  
2.6 Immersive Research  
In addition to conducting interviews, another approach I was able to utilize to gather data 
for this project was immersive research during fieldwork. Immersive research in this case refers to 
the unique access I was provided to sit in on committees formulating policies in Pakistan and 
Turkey. The access I gained was due to my appointments as a technical appointee to the Planning 
Commission of Pakistan’s Five-Year planning committee, as a Taiwan Fellow in Taiwan and as a 
visiting researcher to TODAIE in Turkey. I could observe the meetings in Taiwan and Turkey 
while in Pakistan I was able to take part in them as an active member. As a result of this, I was 
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able to witness the process of policy formulation firsthand and take notes on salient norms during 
such sessions. More importantly, being allowed to sit in meetings, I was able to observe firsthand 
how information flowed during meetings, what players presented arguments, who resisted whom 
and who oversaw the process.  
In addition to this kind of immersive research, being provided access to these meetings and 
discussions allowed me to gain insights into the historical context of decision-making processes 
and unwritten duties that are divided up among the stakeholders at the national level. For instance, 
in Turkey it is assumed that the local Governors or Mayors are the ones calling the shots and hence 
their representatives are given the freedom to opt into national level polices or choose to go their 
own way. Especially, Istanbul’s mayor holds third most sway in the country after the President 
and Vice President even under the new system. This means even though the political elites have 
local level, the policy implementation and ideas they have to be routed through the central 
bureaucratic elites for implementation purposes. This allows the bureaucracy to maintain a sense 
of stability even when different parties held local and national offices.  
2.7 Social Network Analysis 
In this section I explain how I use the data collected during fieldwork is applied to create a 
social network analysis which essentially illustrates the power dynamics of the governance system 
in each of the three cases. To understand relationships, connections & decision making among a 
group of people, one must look at it as a network. Decisions and plans get developed not in a 
vacuum but based on interactions and discussions within a network of people. In that sense we can 
view a government of a country as a network of people involved in the process of governance.  
Network analysis has long been used in other domains of research such as computer 
science, epidemiology, math and biology (Watts, 2003). Management and Business studies have 
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used network analysis since the 1960s in the study of organizational behavior (Katz & Kahn, 1966; 
Tichy, Tushman & Fomburn, 1979) and in understanding decision making patterns (Polsby, 1963; 
Presthus, 1965). Even though other social sciences like sociology and economics have recently 
been relying more and more on social network analysis, political science has yet to take a shine to 
this method (Wasserman and Faust, 1997; Jackson, 2014).  
Maoz (2010) provides a thorough explanation of the social network analysis from a 
political science perspective in his book Networks of Nations: The evolution, structure and impact 
of international networks, 1816 – 2001.Based on the classification outlined in the book, the 
network analysis I am conducting is of a relational nature rather than an affiliation network. In 
each of the networks I am analyzing in this project, the relationship between two units has a 
direction, weight and rule. For instance, the relationship between the Minister of Trade – a political 
appointee – and Secretary Trade – a career bureaucrat – is directional and weighted. The minister 
on paper can overrule the secretary, has more weight than the latter’s opinion and the rule is the 
secretary cannot outrightly say no to a policy decision. But based on my fieldwork research, I can 
add nuance to the relationship and draw out the network where the Secretary Trade can bypass the 
Minister of Trade by opting to communicate technical aspects directly to the Principle Secretary 
who holds direct sway over the Prime Minister or the President.  
The measures that I use for the social network analysis are Centrality, Clustering and 
Weight. Centrality simply means how connected one node is to other nodes in the network. Node 
is the technical term in network analysis for a player. For example, the President is one node and 
his relationships with other nodes such as the Principle Secretary is one edge i.e. one relationship. 
A President or PM of a country would have very high centrality score because they have 
relationships with other well-connected nodes such as the Chief of Army Staff and the Principle 
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Secretary. The principle secretary also has high centrality scores by the virtue of aiding the head 
of state on governance.  
Clustering looks at how many smaller networks exist within a larger network. How many 
nodes are connected to each other and in what capacity, gives us as sense of clusters that exist? 
Bureaucracy itself is one cluster with sub clusters that may be completely devoid of political 
linkages. Weight simply refers to how important that node is apart from its centrality and 
clustering. Consider the role of the Chief of Army Staff in Pakistan who has significant weight but 
does not have high centrality and clustering score as they are on the sidelines of the network and 
have no active role in day to day governance. But the decision they do contribute to are of high 
value and their connections to highly centralized players – nodes – gives them high weight in the 
system.  
On a larger scale, the social network analysis that is employed throughout this project 
analyzes social networks of governance in different case studies before and after key events to 
highlight how the network changes and alters the directions, centrality, rules and weights of 
relationship in lieu of the situation. According to my theory, in times of governance crises, the 
bureaucratic elites, if they are apolitical, will steady the ship and ensure stability for the country to 
continue function with services being provided along with consistent policy implementation.  
The illustrated networks change their power dynamic based on key events and the new 
networks highlight altered relationship between elites. The changes between the original dynamics 
before a critical political crisis in contrast to the new network with altered dynamics will highlight 
the shift in roles by looking at centrality, weight and clustering of the key elite stakeholders. What 
this means is that the network will see different players move into central roles and their centrality 
and importance within the governance network will increase. For instance, if there are no political 
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crises, the Prime Minister and Principle secretary would be the two most important nodes in the 
network. But if there is a political crisis, the most important node becomes the senior most 
bureaucrat in the country given there is a crisis of leadership. This would also mean the centrality 
of the bureaucrat in the network would go up along with the number of relationships they manage 
with other stakeholders.  
In the next three chapters, I apply these methods to test my theory and hypotheses. Each 
chapter starts with a brief history of the country, the governance dynamics and power players in 
each case. This is followed by discussion on critical elite players like the bureaucracy, politicians 
and the military. These discussions highlight the role of these elites in historical context of the 
cases. After that I present two instances; One event is a situation without political turmoil how 
governance happens in the country while the second one is governance in times of political turmoil. 
The compare and contrast between the two network analyses highlights the new roles of elites in 
times of political crises. Based on my theory, I hypothesize that in each case, as long as the quality 
of bureaucratic elites remains high i.e., they are professionally trained, enjoy institutional 
autonomy, have clear institutional identity and have merit-based recruitment, the senior  
bureaucratic elites will take over critical functions of the state i.e. they will call the shots and make 
decisions on policies as well as their implementation while the governance crises are sorted out 
among political and military elites. The stabilizing role they play would confirm my theoretical 
argument.  
3 PAKISTAN: BUREAUCRACY IN CHARGE 
Pakistan’s case is interesting and relevant to this dissertation due to a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the country presents a unique scenario whereby there are patches of genuine democracy 
and institution building followed by long periods of authoritarian rule. There is a practical ten-year 
  
 
39 
cycle of democratic and authoritarian rule in Pakistan that is unique in its consistency. In essence, 
Pakistan can be considered a near perfect case of a country moving from one political crisis to 
another. In its 72 years of independence, no Prime Minister has ever completed their five-year 
term of office. That means even during dictatorships, the Prime Minister, who is the head of state, 
was never able to complete their tenure due to political turmoil.  
On an average, every ten years, Pakistan moves from one cycle to the next i.e. from 
authoritarianism to democracy. While there has been significant discussion on democratization in 
Pakistan as well as the strength of the military that keeps seizing power, little work has been done 
on studying how Pakistan keeps managing to survive these shifts and still have governance 
structures intact. There has also been little to no discussion in recent literature to understand how 
Pakistan manages to survive and even thrive at times as a country that seems to be stuck in a state 
of constant political crisis. The theory presented in this dissertation argues that is due to the fact 
that Pakistan has a high-quality bureaucratic elite that has managed to maintain significant 
institutional autonomy under different governments.  
This chapter fleshes out this argument by initially presenting a short history of Pakistan and 
its institutions. This by no means is an attempt to discuss the history of Pakistan in depth, the 
purpose is to simply lay out the context for the argument being made. That is followed by a 
discussion on bureaucracy and why it has a special status in case of Pakistan. That is followed by 
examples of bureaucracy under different regimes since in the 1970s and their changing 
interactions. Network analyses of two situations are presented to compare governance structures 
in times of no political crisis as opposed to during a political crisis. The intention is to show how 
no matter what happens politically, the governance structures remains functional due to the “high 
quality” bureaucracy and institutional autonomy enjoyed by these senior bureaucratic elite sin 
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Pakistan. I end the chapter by summarizing how the bureaucratic elites are able to maintain their 
status as stabilizers in an otherwise volatile state to ensure economic growth as well as semblance 
of stability.    
3.1 Historic and Political Background 
After the Second World War, a number of former British colonies sought independence. 
The biggest of these colonies was the Indian Subcontinent that reached an independence agreement 
before the British formally left. The result of this agreement was creation of two independent 
countries in 1947; India and Pakistan. Both countries took over British institutions and assets left 
by the departing colonizers and since then have made little changes these. Both countries use 
common law jurisprudence while department structures are practically identical to the ones in the 
UK. Even the concept of councils, districts/counties and provinces is distinctly British.  
However, the most critical asset that both countries inherited from the British was the 
system design and bureaucracy. The British East India Company, the representative of the British 
Empire in Indian Subcontinent, had developed detailed and intricate civil service structures to 
ensure control over local population as well as service delivery mechanisms to meet the needs of 
such a vast colony. There were proper recruitment mechanisms in place with quota systems as well 
as qualification exams that had to be completed before being recruited into the Indian Civil Service, 
as it was called back then. When Pakistan finally became independent in 1947, it took over existing 
institutions, staffed with Pakistani bureaucrats who had spent years in the Indian Civil Service and 
were now catapulted to higher positions that were previously only reserved for British citizens.  
India went through a similar fate, where most of the assets left by the British as well as top 
staff was inherited, and minimal changes were made initially. The difference, however, was that 
in India’s case, one of the founders, Jawaharlal Nehru, ruled from the day the country got 
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independence till 1964. While in Pakistan, the founder of the nation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 
passed away in 1948, less than a year after the country’s independence. This had a major impact 
in the case of Pakistan and its future.  
While India had Nehru steering the ship after independence, creating civilian supremacy 
through institutional change and writing that into the constitution, Pakistan was left in flux after 
the loss of Jinnah and the assassination of his successor, Liaqat Ali Khan, in 1951. At this point, 
Pakistan still did not have a constitution, was struggling to maintain political control after the brief 
conflict with India in 1947 and faced serious tests with newer parties challenging the founding 
Muslim League for control. Between 1951 and 1958, Pakistan went through two Governor 
Generals (President) and six Prime Ministers before the military coup that brought General Ayub 
Khan to power. Out of the six Prime Ministers that were dismissed, four of those and one Governor 
General were senior bureaucrats who were thrust into politics. Even in this disarray, the senior 
bureaucracy pushed through the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956. Since then Pakistan has 
rewritten the constitution twice, in 1962 and 1973. While the current constitution was written and 
implemented in 1973, it shares similarities with the original 1956 constitution with regards to 
institutional design and structure of systems in the country. For instance, the role of the Parliament 
and process of laws to be implemented are still the same as the one from the 1956 and 1962 
constitution.  
In essence, even though the current constitution of Pakistan was written during a period of 
democracy and put in to practice after a lengthy public debate, it is mostly based on the original 
constitution of 1956 that was basically designed by senior bureaucratic elites in a time of political 
turmoil. In this chapter, I argue that the bureaucratic elites by the virtue of having technical 
knowledge of governance and overall high quality due to meritorious recruitment practices as well 
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as ingrained professionalism as result of the British Colonial period have remained a grounding 
force in the country while maintaining institutional autonomy by writing those into the 
constitution. I argue that because the bureaucratic elites have been given the task of ensuring 
stability from the very start, they have fashioned not just the constitution but the status quo of the 
republic whereby they maintain a position that allows them to offer consistent policies irrespective 
of the government in charge. In fact, the senior bureaucracy has thrived over the years because 
they have had the space to create their own procedures and structures independent of public debate. 
Any attempt to change that via reforms is viewed as anti-constitutional because there is no mention 
of a method to reform the bureaucracy in the constitution.  
This hazy space has provided bureaucratic elites the leverage to operate without the 
limitations for instance military or politicians have to deal with. Even the judiciary has detailed 
procedures explained in the constitution that need to be followed for everything from renumeration 
to appointment. Hence, at any time there is a discussion on bureaucratic reforms i.e. to change 
their role in governance, it gets torpedoed in infancy because there is no agreed upon method and 
limits on that. The status the bureaucratic elites have is acknowledged by the military and political 
elites who view them as crucial allies when either of them come to power as they ensure 
governance stability.   
3.2 Bureaucratic Necessity 
In any country the government functions through institutions. Whether the government is 
elected or unelected, the institutions are what the make things work. Be it ensuring people have 
access to water, clean air and food or something more abstract like guaranteeing human rights for 
all citizens, it is the institutions that implement and provide these services. Given this critical nature 
of institutions, it is natural for ruling coalitions to want to control them and utilize them to benefit 
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their loyalists and supporters. Much has been written about how elites vie for control of institutions 
and why democracy is essentially an agreement over sharing institutional wealth among elites. The 
one common thread throughout the literature, as discussed in the earlier chapters, is the necessity 
and sheer scale of institutions. The focus of this dissertation is not to rehash the accepted 
importance of the institutions but to understand how those who staff these intuitions are themselves 
elites with their own set of preferences and stakes in the system. Furthermore, by understanding 
that, this dissertation argues we can understand why they can act as the stabilizing force in times 
of a political crisis.   
It is pertinent to understand that the importance of service delivery and institutional 
efficiency is higher in times of democracy because that performances translates into the support 
for government. Political parties or for that matter even autocrats, may have their own agendas and 
policy proposals, but they need to rely on senior bureaucracy for converting those ideas into 
tangible implementable programs. For example, the elites in power may wish to cut down the cost 
of doing business but how that is achieved depends on the institutional capacity and capability. 
The policy guideline is communicated to the institution responsible for domestic commerce and it 
is up to them to come up with proposals they can realistically implement. The government chooses 
from those options designed by the bureaucracy for implementation. The efficient implementation 
of the chosen option will ideally contribute towards achieving the desired result of cutting down 
the cost of doing business. Hence, no matter how much public support a political party might come 
to power with or no matter how ruthless the dictatorship is, they both need the bureaucratic elites 
to deliver on those promises.  
Specifically, in the case of Pakistan, because the bureaucracy is critical to running the 
country and delivering on political promises, it has a leverage not observed in many other 
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countries. And even though, India shares the same bureaucratic structure, the difference is the 
constitutional limits for institutional elites like senior bureaucrats.  
3.3 Bureaucratic Structure 
As mentioned earlier, the Pakistani bureaucracy is laid out on the same model as the British 
service. It is a professional service with guaranteed lifetime tenure for officers. Officers in this 
case refers to those individuals who are inducted into the civil service via the Central Superior 
Service (CSS) exam held annually. For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus is on federal 
bureaucracy only i.e. only individuals who have been inducted via the CSS exam. Federal 
bureaucracy in Pakistan is divided in to 12 service groups as illustrated by Figure 3. The 
bureaucracy functions under the Civil Services Act of 1973 that clarifies the rules of service and 
hiring procedures for the federal bureaucracy. The Civil Service Act was added to the constitution 
as an amendment later on but lacks any detail on the scope of work and limitations of senior civil 
servants.  
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Figure 3. Service Groups of Civil Service in Pakistan10 
 
3.4 Recruitment and Training 
To understand the consistently high quality of bureaucracy in Pakistan, one has to 
understand the recruitment and training mechanisms in place. Federal Public Service Commission 
(FPSC) is in charge of recruitment of bureaucrats. The civil service itself is divided in to 12 
occupational groups mentioned in Figure 3. By law, the FPSC designs and executes the Central 
Superior Service exam annually. Any Pakistani citizen under the age of 30 with an accredited 
Bachelor’s degree is eligible to take the exam. Any citizen can take the exam as many times as 
they want till, they age out of it.  
 
10 Sourced from Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) website http://www.fpsc.gov.pk/  
Pakistan Customs Service
Commerce and Trade Group
Foreign Service of Pakistan
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The FPSC recruits about 150 candidates each year through the CSS exam and sends those 
candidates to the Civil Services Academy (CSA) in Lahore, Pakistan. There the candidates are 
given a 10-month specialized course in government service and sent on attachments with all of the 
12 service units within the civil service. The ten-month program is called the Common Training 
Program and the graduates identify themselves within the civil service based on their ‘Commons’ 
i.e. their batch year11. 
Towards the end of the 10-month course at CSA, the students are assigned their permanent 
service units based on their merit i.e. how well they have done during the course. It is pertinent to 
mention here that students are supposed to submit their top three preferences and if they have a 
high enough merit, they are assigned their choice but, in most cases, the candidates are assigned 
to a service that was not within the priority three.  
Once the candidates graduate the CSA, they are sent to the headquarters of their service 
units where they are given service specific training. This training, depending on the service unit, 
takes anywhere between four to nine months. At the end of that training, the candidates are 
formally assigned a department and a position within that department.  
This rigorous process of recruitment, training and then assignment helps the FPSC recruit 
the top candidates from a vast candidate pool. These candidates are immersed into the working of 
the government from an early stage and because the service operates on seniority basis, they are 
encouraged to reach out to seniors and maintain contacts. Think of the civil service in Pakistan as 
 
11 Information based on interviews conducted with the Secretary of the Planning Commission, 
Secretary of Commerce and Trade as well as the Cabinet Secretary who heads the Civil Service 
Reform Committee. Interviewees explained the process in detail in each interview and references 
the Civil Services Act of 1973 as the official guiding document.  
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essentially an elite fraternity where all new members are automatically brought into the inner 
circle, taught the inner workings and told to protect the sanctity of the group. 
3.5 Governance Roles 
There are six tiers of the federal bureaucracy. These tiers are referred to as Basic Pay Scales 
(BPS). Civil servants recruited by the FPSC join the federal bureaucracy in BPS 17, also referred 
to as Grade 17. Based on performance and seniority, a federal bureaucrat can potentially achieve 
Grade 22, the highest level in the civil service which is equivalent to the rank of a three-star general 
or minister of state. At any point of time, the Government of Pakistan does not have more than 100 
Grade 22 officers, most of whom head service units, government departments and government 
owned enterprises. Figure 4 illustrates the different grades and titles that correspond to them.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, the elites I am referring to are those officers in the 
civil service who are over Grade 20 and have immense influence on policy making in Pakistan. 
Given they head departments, institutions and ministries, they are critical to policy design and 
implementation. In times of a political crisis, as the ones I provide examples of later in the chapter, 
these bureaucratic elites are tasked to maintain the governance stability at the state level while 
political and military elites sort out the crises among themselves. Especially in instances when 
Pakistan democratizes, the bureaucracy takes center stage as under the constitution before elections 
are to happen, a government must resign and hand over power to a ‘caretaker government’ that is 
supposed to hold elections.  
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Figure 4. Basic Pay Scale Grades and Corresponding Titles12 
 
 ‘Caretaker Governments’ in Pakistan are traditionally made up entirely of 
technocrats/technical experts and senior serving or retired bureaucrats. Normally they last for 
about 90 days as that is the allotted time for elections to happen once a ‘caretaker government’ is 
instituted. But beyond their formal role of holding elections, historically the ‘caretakers’ are also 
assigned the task of taking deeply unpopular policy steps and decisions. The logic being that any 
other government would have to live with the blowback of taking such harsh decisions that are 
necessary for the country and the economy, so a 90-day government would be better suited to take 
these steps as they face no long run consequences. General Musharraf after coming to power in a 
 
12 Sourced from Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) website http://www.fpsc.gov.pk/ 
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coup in 1999, also constituted a two-year transitional government to take difficult economic 
decisions before he formally elevated himself as the President of Pakistan via a referendum. In 
theory and largely in practice, this approach has worked out for Pakistan but what is often ignored 
is that this enhances the power of the senior bureaucracy even further when in absence of ministers, 
senior bureaucracy is running and approving budgets for their institutions. That level of sweeping 
power is unheard of in other countries and is unique to former British colonies13. With jobs 
guaranteed for life, the system also insulates the bureaucracy, especially at the senior levels from 
political meddling. This mean no matter how difficult the situation, a bureaucrat need not concern 
themselves with political retribution that might impact their pension or retirement. And this 
contributes to the readiness of the bureaucratic elites to step in to stabilize the country in times of 
political crises ranging from coups to attempted transitions to democracy. They are the only ones 
who know how to govern and have the power to do that unhindered. And given that they operate 
like an epistemic community with their own set of rules and regulations on everything from 
discipline to promotions, their autonomy is nearly impossible to impede on by political 
stakeholders like the military and the politicians. 
3.6 Bureaucracy and Governance: A Recent History 
The earlier section established the quality aspect of senior federal bureaucracy in Pakistan. 
This section focuses on understanding the kind of role the bureaucratic elites have played over the 
years in Pakistan. As explained earlier, Pakistan limps from one 10-year cycle of democracy to 10 
years of authoritarian or semi authoritarian rule and vice versa. Understanding how the 
 
13 Bangladesh and Sri Lanka also share the same structure. Because the constitutions are similar, 
the end result is roughly the same too. Especially in the case of Bangladesh, as it was East 
Pakistan till 1971, their trajectory has been practically identical to that of Pakistan for similar 
reasons.  
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bureaucratic elites act and survive to continue providing governance stability is key to the 
argument I am making.  
In this section, I explore the recent history of governance changes Pakistan has faced 
where bureaucracy has maintained its stabilizing role. From being involved in Afghan War of the 
early 1980s to the Afghan Invasion of the early 2000s, from becoming a nuclear nation with 
severe international sanctions in late 1990s to becoming one of the fastest growing economies in 
the world in mid 2000s, the bureaucratic elites have managed to maintain stability while the 
country swung from democratic rule to authoritarian and then back to democracy. Exploring this 
history provides specifics regarding how the bureaucrats managed these changes and while 
carrying out policy implementation. 
3.6.1 Zia Period 
In 1977, Chief of Army Staff, General Zia ul Haq successfully came to power through a 
coup d’état. The elected leader of the country at the time, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was arrested, tried 
and executed in what many historians have since called a judicial killing. Gen Zia proceeded to 
become the Chief Martial Law Administrator and eventually the President of Pakistan after 
suspending the constitution of Pakistan.   
Before Gen Zia coming to power, Pakistan had undergone six tumultuous years since the 
last military dictatorship that had led to loss of East Pakistan during the 1971 war with India. 
Traumatized by loss of a big chunk of the country, Pakistan elected Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to power 
in a landslide victory as he promised to bring about a socialist revolution and improve the lives of 
ordinary Pakistanis. Once in power, Bhutto set out to rewrite the constitution of Pakistan but this 
time with public feedback and dialogue. That resulted in the 1973 constitution that is still used in 
Pakistan. This was also the only time the Civil Service was reformed renamed and relaunched.  
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Till 1973, Pakistan’s bureaucracy was operating on the pre – independence Indian Civil 
Service model which was renamed Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). This model was exclusive and 
had guaranteed positions to the CSP officers at top levels of the governments. To reform this and 
build more equality among the bureaucracy, the Civil Service Act of 1973, abolished the Civil 
Service of Pakistan and created the Central Superior Services. CSP was broken down and merged 
with other service groups to become just one of twelve service groups. It was renamed District 
Management Group (DMG) with the same tier and title structure as the other 11 service groups. It 
is pertinent to mention here that to this day, the DMG group remained the dominant group in the 
bureaucracy, controlling most of the high-profile positions. Bureaucrats from the DMG group are 
viewed as more political and willing to negotiate with their political counterparts. This is due to 
the role of the DMG service i.e. they control the administrative elements of a district. For all 
effective purposes then, they head a district which might have three to four Provincial Assembly 
members, at least two National Assembly members along with multiple mayors and county council 
members. All of these political entities have to work with the DMG officer in charge to push 
through their policies and electoral promises. This immense power allows the DMG officer, 
especially in the role of District Coordination Officer (DCO) to effectively run a district as they 
please and have their own policy agenda that might be distinctly different from politicians. This 
also gives them the opportunity to work with political parties who often appoint DMG Officers 
who are viewed as friendly to top positions when they are elected to power.  
So, when General Zia took over in 1977, the civil service was still reeling from the reforms 
and was still in flux. As with any dictator, General Zia sought to create legitimacy through public 
service delivery. He relied heavily on the civil service to carry out his agenda of Islamization of 
the country along with basic service delivery efforts. In this period of time, the Afghan War was 
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waging as the US was supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan through Pakistan. With the 
military focused on the Afghan War, policy making and day to day operations fell to the senior 
bureaucracy along with handpicked technocrats. From 1977 to 1988, Pakistan’s economy got back 
on track and service delivery improved since the days of Mr. Bhutto mostly because there was no 
political turmoil and Western nations like the US were heavily subsidizing Pakistan’s imports 
through financial aid packages seen as payment for fighting the Afghan War. General Zia even 
held ‘elections’ in 1985 where chosen candidates were ‘elected’ to the National Assembly. The 
idea was the new crop of hand-picked politicians ‘elected’ on non-party based elections will form 
a party in the parliament that will nominate the General Zia as its leader and formally elect him to 
the post of President again to transform his dictatorship into competitive authoritarian regime. Mr. 
Bhutto’s party, the Pakistan People’s Party was kept out of the election process throughout this 
time.  
Throughout this period of time, the policy making process was completely under control 
of the senior bureaucracy, mostly DMG, and the handpicked technocrats. People like Wasim 
Sajjad, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Vaseem Jaffery and Roedad Khan along with technocrats like Shahid 
Javed Burki and Mehboob Ul Haq, were responsible for running the economy. Even after 
‘elections’ for the National Assembly, members stayed away from policy making and 
implementation. It was not until, 1988 when General Zia was assassinated in an airplane explosion 
that Pakistan made its second serious shift towards democracy (Weiner, 1994; Talbot, 2012).  
With the dictator gone, the Election Commission of Pakistan announced general elections 
on party basis. Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under the leadership of his daughter, 
Benazir Bhutto won a land slide election and was swept to power. But as Ms. Bhutto swept to 
power, she had to deal with a new President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who had the power to dismiss 
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her government if at any time she fell out with the powerful bureaucratic/technocratic status quo. 
This amalgamated power structure that came to power under General Zia is often referred to as the 
‘Establishment’ in most literature on Pakistan. ‘Establishment’ simply refers to intertwined 
relationships between bureaucrats, technocrats and military that originate during the Zia period as 
a result of interdependence and deep distrust of politicians as well as democracy. The relationship 
the ruling coalition had with the bureaucracy throughout the Zia years is reciprocal. Because this 
period gave birth to the ‘establishment’ as we know it in its current shape and form. The 
relationship, hence, can be seen as symbiotic i.e. they were two sides of the same coin. This is a 
critical juncture in the modern history of Pakistan as successive democratic governments will 
blame the ‘establishment’ for their demise which basically means senior bureaucrats and 
technocrats in alliance with the military purposely start to sabotage elected governments if 
threatened with a change in status quo i.e. the relationship.  
So, as Pakistan moved to democracy in 1988, the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
Ms. Bhutto was faced with a powerful establishment armed with the power to dismiss her 
government in case of any drastic departures from the status quo. 
3.6.2 Post Dictatorship 1990s 
Before his assassination in August 1988, General Zia was gearing up to bring to fruition is 
long term plan of creating his own political party that would give credence to his dictatorial rule. 
The chosen government via the 1985 non-party elections was dissolved and most of its members 
were instructed to form a political group that would take part in elections set for second half of 
1988. Given that the parties were formally banned under the dictatorship, the political group was 
supposed to get elected independently and then become a party once the ban was lifted.  
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After General Zia was assassinated, the caretaker government set elections for November 
1988 and the Supreme Court reversed the ban on political parties14. With the ban now reversed, 
Pakistan saw a flurry of political activity. It is important to take in to account the context of why 
this was a major breakthrough for democracy in Pakistan. Since 1947, Pakistan only had a truly 
democratic government for less than 4 years (1972 to 1977). The rest of the time, Pakistan was 
ruled by bureaucrats and technocrats with the backing of the military. So, for all effective purposes, 
when the Supreme Court reversed the decision to allow parties in 1988, it was the first time that 
old and new parties could come together to compete in elections. Among the older parties, the 
most influental were the Pakistan People’s Party and the Jamaat – E – Islami, both of whom had 
strong grassroots structures and support base.  
After Zulfiqar Bhutto’s government was overthrown, his party, the Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP) was brought to its knees through crackdowns and arrests of its workers. After her father’s 
death, Benazir was appointed as the head of the party and was promptly taken in to custody along 
with her mother. Benazir was in prison from 1977 till 1984. Eventually she was released under 
international pressure and was sent to the UK to join her mother. But after the 1985 non-party 
elections, that were a formal end of the Martial Law, Benazir decided to come back and take her 
campaign for a return to democracy to the people. After receiving a hero’s welcome at home, 
Benazir was still battling the crackdown on political activity instituted by the Zia regime.  
 
14 The court judgement is referenced from 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/file/const.p.87of2011.pdf and is often used in 
cases as precedent on right to gather.  
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So, when in 1988, General Zia was assassinated, and Supreme Court of Pakistan reversed 
its decision on banning political parties, Benazir and PPP were in the prime position to contest 
elections in November 1988 and form a government.  
Nearly simultaneously elsewhere in Pakistan, the handpicked leadership that the Zia 
regime had groomed since early 1980s was fighting for their young political careers. These figures 
included children of generals, industrialists and bureaucrats who had gained through years of 
autocratic rule and stable economy it provided for the chosen few. As most of these leaders had 
gained position and stature due to their closeness to the ‘establishment’, they had no formal party 
structure or ground operation to compete with the likes of the PPP. In 1988, faced with the 
juggernaut of PPP, these leaders with significant help from the ‘establishment’ formed political 
parties who then formed an alliance called the ‘Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI or Islamic Democratic 
Alliance) to compete against the PPP. That alliance was largely made up of the Pakistan Muslim 
League led by Zia’s protégé and former Chief Minister of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif and the Jamaat – 
e – Islami (JI or Islamic Party).  
In the story of Pakistan’s engagement with democracy, the two protagonists that play a key 
role are Benazir Bhutto, the legendary leader of the PPP and daughter of Pakistan’s first 
democratically elected leader and Nawaz Sharif, the handpicked golden boy of the Pakistani 
‘establishment’ for decades who turned on them and led a successful transition to democracy 
against a dictator in late 2000s. Both their journeys begin on the national stage from the 1988 
elections.  
Benazir led PPP won the elections and formed the government. Unfortunately, the winding 
down of Afghan War and demise of the Soviet Union meant that the economic support Pakistan 
was receiving from the US and allies fell drastically. This meant an ailing economy that had to 
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figure out how to sustain itself without foreign aid while dealing with over two million afghan 
refugees who had Pakistan their home in the last decade. To add to this, Benazir was dealing with 
an ‘establishment’ that was hostile to her and refusing to push through her agenda. For instance, 
Benazir was not allowed to change the Finance Minister who had served under Zia, Mehboob Ul 
Haq, or even nominate new governors in the provinces. The breaking point came when Benazir 
tried nominating a PPP stalwart to the position of the President when the elections were due but 
was overruled by the ‘establishment’ and forced to accept Ghulam Ishaq Khan for President again. 
After fighting multiple no confidence movements brought against her by the opposition led by 
Nawaz Sharif, her government was eventually dismissed by the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan for 
being ‘corrupt’ in 1990.  
Months after her dismissal, new elections were held and IJI came to power with a simple 
majority and Nawaz Sharif was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In just 9 years, Nawaz 
Sharif, the son of an industrialist from Punjab, had gone from being a political novice to the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan backed fully by the ‘establishment’. But as with Benazir, Nawaz Sharif 
quickly realized that he did not have as much control as he assumed and started having differences 
with the ‘establishment’ figures as well as the military generals. In a repeat of 1990, Nawaz 
Sharif’s government was dismissed by the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who had grown weary 
of Zia’s protégé. But unlike Benazir, Nawaz Sharif refused to quit and challenged the decision in 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court sided with Nawaz Sharif, ruling that the only time a 
government could be dismissed was if it was involved in treason or in rampant corruption (Dutt, 
2000). This created an unusual constitutional crisis where the Prime Minister refused to leave, and 
the President refused to acknowledge the authority of the Prime Minister. Eventually the military 
leaders stepped in to adjudicate the situation and forced Nawaz Sharif to resign. He agreed to do 
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so under the condition that Ghulam Ishaq Khan also resign. By September1993, both Nawaz Sharif 
and Ghulam Ishaq Khan had resigned, and elections were announced for October 1993.  
This period is also crucial because it is at this point that Nawaz Sharif finally splits with 
the IJI as well as other factions of the Pakistan Muslim League to form the Pakistan Muslim league 
– Nawaz (PML – N). This is also the starting point of Nawaz Sharif as a democratic leader instead 
of a military protégé. After being forced to resign, Nawaz Sharif’s political world view shifted in 
the sense that he agreed with Benazir that the establishment is the problem and that military 
interference in form of establishment control needs to end. But concurrently, Benazir reached a 
different conclusion i.e. there is no coming to power without caving into the establishment and 
being on good terms with the military. In essence, what Benazir realized was part of the argument 
I am making in this dissertation i.e. for the country to remain stable, she needed the support of the 
bureaucratic elites and remain on good terms with the military elites. 
By the time, the 1993 elections came, Benazir swept back into power and was finally 
allowed to nominate her own Presidential candidate. She nominated a party loyalist, Farooq 
Leghari to the top position. For the purposes of this discussion, it is pertinent to mention that 
Farooq Leghari was a former senior bureaucrat who had joined the government of Pakistan as CSP 
officer in the 1960s and later resigned to pursue politics. Fearing a repeat of 1990, Benazir 
appointed her mother and husband to the cabinet while appointing military generals to critical 
posts as well. The one thing Benazir learned in her second tenure as the Prime Minister was that 
in order to remain in power, she had to pander to the establishment and allow them the space they 
needed. Keeping that in mind, Benazir gave the military free hand to create and then launch Taliban 
in Afghanistan and expand business interests in the country while pursuing a Jihadi operation in 
the Indian held Kashmir. During this time, Benazir’s government was tainted by accusation of 
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rampant corruption and patronage (Allen, 2016). Eventually in 1996, her handpicked President, 
Farooq Leghari dismissed her government. Benazir went to the Supreme Court but this time the 
Supreme Court decided to side with the President given the evidence of rampant corruption in her 
tenure. However, unlike 1990, the military did step in to help Benazir as she had backed military 
in their causes throughout her time as Prime Minister. Eventually though, in November 1996, the 
weight of corruption charges was heavy enough for her second and last term as Prime Minister to 
end.  
Farooq Leghari promptly put in place a caretaker set up and announced elections in 
February 1997. Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz, led by Nawaz Sharif won a land slide victory 
winning 136 out of 207 seats in Parliament. He was elected with 177 votes as Prime Minister 
versus the 16 votes for his opponent. The margin of victory was widely seen as a rebuke to the 
powers that be for putting the average citizen through political turmoil consistently. Bitter about 
his removal from office in 1993, the first thing Nawaz Sharif did was to alter the constitution to 
remove the powers of the President to dismiss a democratically elected government. Given that he 
had more than a two thirds majority in parliament, Nawaz Sharif quickly stripped the President 
Farooq Leghari of his powers and left the position as a mere figurehead. Stating that the 
overwhelming mandate was public’s way of saying they needed stability, Nawaz Sharif delved 
into economic reform aimed at privatization and introduction of free markets. While Nawaz Sharif 
was focusing on the economy, he was faced with a pressing situation of dealing with India. India 
formally tested its nuclear weapons and there was intense domestic pressure on Nawaz Sharif to 
do the same. Eventually in May 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and formally became a 
nuclear power. This led to economic and diplomatic isolation for Pakistan that badly hurt the 
economic revival Nawaz Sharif was hoping to achieve. But in 1999, with a renewed focus on peace 
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with India, Sharif invited the Indian Prime Minister to visit Pakistan that led to the historic Lahore 
visit of then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee. This was viewed as a significant 
thawing of ties and was supposed to lead to a long-term peace agreement between the two 
neighbors.  
Unfortunately, the establishment along with the military did not appreciate the changing 
tone with regards to India and the economic policies that were being introduced by the PML – N 
government. There were fears that Nawaz was trying to consolidate power and would attempt to 
weaken the military hierarchy after he had replaced Farooq Leghari with a loyalist as President. 
The fear of Nawaz Sharif becoming the most powerful leader in Pakistan’s history was real and 
eventually led to his downfall. Afraid that he was going after the military next, the military 
instigated a low intensity conflict with India on the border at Kargil. The secret war that Prime 
Minister was kept in the dark about eventually led to sinking of peace talks and threat of a bigger 
war. After US brokered peace talks curtailed the Kargil conflict, Nawaz Sharif swiftly moved to 
remove his handpicked Chief of Army Staff, General Pervaiz Musharraf. Seen as a power grab, 
the establishment blocked the implementation and defied Prime Minister’s orders to arrest General 
Mushrraf upon landing back in Pakistan from a foreign trip. This triggered the 1997 coup that saw 
Nawaz Sharif overthrown for the second time and sent to prison on treason charges.  
It is important to understand that without the ‘establishment’ playing their part of 
disobeying order of the Prime Minister, the coup of 1997 would have never happened. Much has 
been written and discussed about the nature of the coup and its causes, but the glaring omission 
seems to be the role played by the state-run airline, Pakistan International Airlines and Civil 
Aviation Authority played in allowing General Musharraf to first board the plane and then landing 
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that plane at a military controlled airport15. What happened in 1997 was not just a coup by the 
military, it was a reaction by the bureaucratic establishment that was witnessing declining fortunes 
and an attempt to change the status quo.  
3.6.3 Dictatorship Redux: Musharraf Years 
On 12th October 1999, General Pervaiz Musharraf seized power and overthrew a 
democratically elected government. A junior officer who was handpicked by Nawaz Sharif to be 
the next Chief of Army Staff had systematically dragged Pakistan into a conflict in Kargil to dent 
Nawaz Sharif’s authority and upon being fired from his job, he instigated a coup with the help of 
the bureaucratic/autocratic establishment. Lacking any governance experience, the first 2 years of 
Musharraf rule were dogged by international condemnation and severe economic hardship for 
Pakistan. Throughout this process, Musharraf relied on establishment bureaucrats and technocrats 
to help him rule but with heavy international sanctions as a result of the coup. 
Things changed dramatically within 24 hours in 2001. In the aftermath of the September 
11 attacked in the US, Pakistan found itself in a critical geopolitical location. US, desperate to 
exact any revenge for the September 11 attacks, brushed aside the sanctions and differences it had 
with the Musharraf regime. Moreover, the US signed an agreement for Pakistan to be used as a 
staging base and logistical route for the Afghan War. With US changing its tone on Pakistan, 
General Musharraf was longer viewed as a pariah globally. With money rolling in for the war 
effort in Afghanistan, Pakistan was back to the good old dictatorship days of the 80s. With status 
quo coming a full circle and establishment reclaiming their sweeping powers from back in 1980s, 
 
15 The details of the coup are well documented. This story from the day of the coup details most 
of the details as they happened https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/17/world/countdown-to-
pakistan-s-coup-a-duel-of-nerves-in-the-air.html the rest of the details i.e. role of the Civil 
Aviation Authority and other civilian institutions are documents in Pervaiz Musharraf’s memoir, 
In the Line of Fire.  
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Pakistan had a stable government and saw rapid economic growth that averaged between 6 to 7% 
per annum between 2002 and 2007.  
Unlike the democratic period from 1988 to 1999, the dictatorship of General Musharraf 
survived because of external support that came through for the Afghan War. And with political 
turmoil of the 1990s behind them, people supported the notion of a stable government. In 2002, 
General Musharraf ordered general elections after getting himself voted as President of Pakistan 
in a national referendum. General Musharraf learned from General Zia’s mistake and before 
announcing elections, he put together his political party that would eventually reelect him as 
President via a parliamentary vote.  
Given that status quo players were still in position of power since the 1980s, Musharraf 
carved out a new party from the PML – N and labelled it Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid (PML 
– Q). PML – Q was made up of politicians who had gotten their start under the last dictator and 
had since then aligned with Nawaz Sharif during the 1990s. Seeing a return to the dictatorship era, 
these politicians came back to power through PML – Q. The result was a competitive authoritarian 
regime that ruled Pakistan till 2008.  
However, like every dictator, General Musharraf did make a mistake. While he kept most 
of the establishment on board with his policies, he attempted a power grab against the Supreme 
Court and that backfired when the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Choudhary refused 
to resign in General Musharraf’s office. He was promptly suspended from his post pending inquiry 
but instead of staying shut, he fought back and launched the ‘lawyer’s movement’ in 2007 that 
eventually saw the fall of Musharraf regime and a return to the democracy for Pakistan in 2008.  
With elections announced for 2008, General Musharraf, under pressure from the lawyer’s 
movement and the US, was all set to strike a deal with Benazir Bhutto and her People’s Party to 
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form a government that would keep Musharraf on as a President after he formally retired from the 
military. Unfortunately, before the elections were to be held, Benazir was assassinated by Al Qaeda 
terrorists in a gun and bomb attack on 27th December16, just two weeks before the January 2008 
election date. Her assassination led to elections being moved to February 18th and her party, led 
by her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, forming the government.  
Throughout this period of dictatorship, the establishment underwent a renaissance. 
Musharraf promised civil service reforms that ended up merely being a name change of the District 
Management Group to Pakistan Administrative Services. Apart from that the role of civil servants 
in policy making, especially at the federal level, was expanded given that the country was being 
run by a technocrat Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz. And while politicians were ‘elected’ to 
parliament, most of the policy making, economic revamping and planning was being conducted 
via technocrats like Dr. Ishrat Hussein, Dr. Ashfaq Hasan Khan, Dr. Hafeez Pasha, Dr. Salman 
Shah, Dr. Hafeez Sheikh and Shaukat Tareen17. Similar to the Zia government in the 1980s, these 
technocrats never worked with politicians but in fact directly with the establishment to design and 
implement policy agendas. For all effective purposes then, Pakistan’s economy has mostly been 
designed and planned by the bureaucratic elites who retire and become technocrat advisers to the 
government.   
 
16 Multiple detailed accounts of Benazir’s assassination have been compiled. All of them agree 
that Al Qaeda terrorists working with Pakistani Taliban factions were responsible for her 
assassination.  https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2017/12/day-benazir-bhutto-killed-
171227060649509.html  
17 Information gathered via interviews held in Pakistan. Specifically, interviews with current and 
former Secretaries of Planning Commission of Pakistan elucidated on the scale of influence these 
technocrats, most of them now former senior bureaucrats, had during the Musharraf era. At least 
six interviewees, including former Minister of Planning and Development, names the persons 
mentioned here.  
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3.6.4 Transition to Democracy – 2008 to 2017 
In the aftermath of Benazir’s assassination in December 2007, the elections were moved 
to February 2008. With Musharraf still holding the office of the President, the elections were seen 
as a make or break for democratic transition in Pakistan.  
Led by Benazir’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistan People’s Party managed to secure 
enough seats in the parliament to form a government. But more importantly, in the most populous 
province of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif’s PML – swept to power with a simple majority. Initially, 
Nawaz Sharif’s PML – N aligned with the PPP to form the government, but that arrangement 
ended soon afterwards. While Asif Zardari waited till Musharraf’s term came to an end to choose 
himself the President, he refused to reinstate the suspended Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar 
Choudhry. Once in power Asif Zardari was reluctant to rock the boat set up by the establishment 
but eventually after Nawaz Sharif threatened a long march from Lahore to Islamabad, the military 
intervened to diffuse the situation, taking back their concerns on reinstatement of Chief Justice 
Iftikhar Choudhry. Eventually he was reinstated to the Supreme Court of Pakistan and would come 
back to haunt the PPP’s government by directly challenging their authority to govern through Suo 
Motu18 notices (Waseem, 2012; Cheema, 2018).  
The threat of launching a long march did highlight the complexity of the relationship 
between the two largest political parties and the establishment that was having a redux of the 1988 
transition to democracy. Establishment exerted its control on everything from policy on Foreign 
Affairs, Finance and even appointment of diplomats while PPP focused on clinging on to power. 
While there were two attempts made to reform the bureaucracy, both failed due to bureaucratic 
 
18 A common law practice whereby the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court can choose to take 
notice of any issue or policy and direct the government to follow its will. The court does not to 
have direct jurisdiction over the issue to take a Suo Moto notice.  
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elites refusing to push through the implementation. PPP government, drawing on their previous 
experiences, did learn to play ball with the establishment and work accordingly. For instance, the 
PPP was happy to grant extension of tenure to Chief of Army Staff, General Kiani so he could stay 
in charge of the forces. This kind of flexibility from a democratically elected coalition was unheard 
of in Pakistan’s history.  
Meanwhile in Punjab, a different trend was taking place under the PML – N. Instead of 
working senior bureaucracy, the PML – N Chief Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, promoted junior 
officers he viewed as loyalists to higher positions of power in his inner circle forcing the senior 
bureaucrats to either retire or transfer to the federal bureaucracy. Shehbaz Sharif, being Nawaz’s 
younger brother, chose to run the province as a semi dictatorship where he only worked with 
handpicked bureaucrats while ignoring his fellow party members and even his cabinet ministers. 
This approach was inspired by Erdogan, who continues to be a close personal friend of Shehbaz 
Sharif. To tackle the issue of establishment, Shehbaz Sharif decided to short circuit the seniority 
system of the bureaucracy. His argument was that if younger loyal officers were promoted, their 
loyalty would be to the person promoting them rather than the institution. The younger Sharif built 
his core team that would come in handy when he was disqualified from holding public office in 
February 2009 before being reinstated in April 2009 by the Supreme Court19. In the stopgap, Sharif 
ran the Punjab government through his team, often referred to as Super Bureaucrats, alongside a 
caretaker Chief Minister loyal to the party. This was the first instance of attempted politicization 
 
19 The disqualification is detailed in this news report https://www.dawn.com/news/955501 and 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/pakistan-sharif-brothers-disqualified-from-
contesting-election/ - Both the Sharif brothers were convicted under a Musharraf era politically 
motivated case that was eventually dismissed when the court reviewed the case and ruled in their 
favor so they could become candidates for elections again. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/asia/27pstan.html  
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of bureaucracy in Pakistan and so far, the only one. While the bureaucrats that Shehbaz Sharif 
chose to work with were junior officer, they were recruited through the proper channels and were 
trained as career bureaucrats. Their association with Shehbaz Sharif and his politics was 
discouraged by senior bureaucracy at the federal level. Since the controversial 2018 elections, 
nearly all bureaucrats who were closely aligned with Shehbaz Sharif or were considered to have 
political leanings were reprimanded, demoted and faced disciplinary action20.  
Even with severe limitations throughout their tenure, the PPP government completed its 
full tenure and held peaceful elections under a caretaker government on May 2013. As a result of 
those elections, Nawaz Sharif’s PML – N won a landslide victory at National and Provincial levels. 
After returning as Prime Minister for the third time, Nawaz Sharif chose to work closely with 
bureaucracy and upscale the model his brother, Chief Minister of Punjab had utilized in Punjab, 
i.e. promoting junior bureaucrats to higher level positions for loyalty reasons. This politicization 
of bureaucracy irked the establishment senior bureaucrats who saw these out of turn promotions 
as an attack on the institutions.  
But with the economy improving courtesy of large-scale Chinese investment and fall in 
terror attacks, Nawaz Sharif’s first three years went well. But he started butting heads with 
establishment on issues like peace with India, budget for the military and most importantly, 
military’s refusal to cut support for militant religious organizations within the country. Nawaz 
blamed these organizations for torpedoing any peace measure he took with India and blamed the 
establishment for using these organizations as pressure tactic against him. It was also during this 
 
20 Two of the most powerful bureaucrats at the provincial level under Shehbaz Sharif have since 
2018 been sent to prison or are awaiting trial in multiple corruption cases. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1418132 and https://www.dawn.com/news/1439928 
  
 
66 
time that bureaucratic elites at the federal level chose to refer to courts regarding promotions and 
challenged the PM’s discretionary power over appointments in the bureaucracy21. 
Meanwhile, the establishment started fighting back through tacitly supporting Imran Khan, 
whose Pakistan Tehrik – e – Insaf (PTI or Pakistan Justice Party) was widely seen as a third 
political alternative. Having failed to secure even 12% of the seats in parliament, Imran Khan 
accused that the 2013 elections were rigged against his party. With growing disagreements with 
Nawaz Sharif that spilled over in to public domain through what is referred to as ‘Dawn Leaks’22, 
the establishment effectively started supporting Imran Khan to launch marches and protests against 
the existing government. Simultaneously, the Panama Papers23 story broke in the international 
media and upon investigation it was found that Nawaz Sharif’s sons were part of the Panama 
Papers investigation. Seizing this opportunity, the establishment backed groups led by Imran Khan, 
took the case to court and to the public through protests. Eventually in July 2017, the court decided 
to disqualify Nawaz Sharif because he did not declare an income of zero rupees from a company 
 
21 During interviews at least 12 senior bureaucrats explained how they were party to at least one 
case against the Nawaz Sharif government regarding promotions. They explained that the 
government wanted to supersede them and appoint their juniors who the political elite saw as 
friendly to the cause of the government. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/396535-serving-
bureaucrats-superseded-retired-promoted-to-bs-22 and 
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/396492-bs-21-officers-superseded-denied-promotions 
22 ‘Dawn Leaks’ refers to the content of this article https://www.dawn.com/news/1288350 
published in the largest English daily in Pakistan. The exclusive story gave details of a closed 
doors meeting between PML – N cabinet, Senior Bureaucrats and Military high Command in 
which the PML – N cabinet categorically demanded military drop its support for religious 
militant organizations as they were hurting peace efforts with India and international reputation 
of Pakistan. Traditionally such exchanges were never made public and the military accused 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s daughter of orchestrating these leaks to make the military look 
bad. https://www.news18.com/news/world/dawn-leaks-pak-army-takes-on-nawaz-sharif-govt-
slams-ispr-tweet-as-poison-1387393.html  
23 While the Prime Minister at the time, Nawaz Sharif, was not named in the Panama Papers, his 
children were. The case formulated against Nawaz Sharif used this is the pretext and convicted 
him of corruption by the way of his children. https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-
papers/former-pakistan-pm-sharif-sentenced-to-10-years-over-panama-papers/ 
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owned by his son, in which he was on the board of directors. On his third attempt as Prime Minister, 
Nawaz Sharif again failed to complete the five-year constitutional tenure.  
Due to political volatility, Pakistan’s economy suffered dwindling fortunes and with a new 
party loyalist at the helm as Prime Minister, the PML – N continued to rule but was blocked from 
taking drastic actions as establishment refuse to play ball. Specifically, on the issue of referring to 
the IMF for a structural adjustment program in early 2018, PML – N government faced resistance 
from the bureaucratic elites and eventually shelved the idea. The consensus among the senior 
bureaucracy was that any IMF program or structural adjustment could not be conducted while the 
politicians were in power as the politicians would be unwilling to take the stringent action needed 
to save the economy.  
After calling for elections on 25th of July 2018, the government was handed over to a 
bureaucratic elite heavy caretaker set up that oversaw the controversial July 2018 elections that 
saw Imran Khan’s PTI sweep into power backed by the establishment. Imran’s victory featured 
about 80% of the candidates that were present in PML – Q while it ruled from 2002 to 200724. 
Independent observers saw this is an effective return to establishment rule this time under a fully 
competitive authoritarian regime. 60% of the current PTI cabinet is identical to the Musharraf 
cabinet and has roots in establishment roles.  
The discussion on bureaucratic elite’s control of governance in the previous sections is 
important to understand how Pakistan is still standing as a country. Consider the fact that during 
 
24 The July 2018 elections were widely panned by international observers and anti – 
establishment parties as rigged and unfair. Anti – establishment candidates were forced to switch 
parties or drop out completely while those that contested accused the organizers of rigging 
elections at a large scale. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/26/pakistan-election-in-
disarray-as-incumbent-rejects-result, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/pakistans-election-unique-
for-all-the-wrong-reasons/ and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44924384  
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the 90s, when the average tenure of a government was less than 22 months, Pakistan managed to 
successfully become a nuclear power in addition to growing at a sustained growth rate of in excess 
of 4%. Point is, be it a dictator like Musharraf or a democrat like Nawaz Sharif, they were both 
forced to rely on the bureaucratic elites to ensure they remained in power for as long as they did. 
Importantly, due to the origins of both bureaucracy and military in Pakistan, they have marked out 
their domains of influence when it comes to governance. Their alliance, often referred to as the 
establishment, has played a significant role in shaping Pakistani politics but it is the bureaucratic 
elites who have always been handed the responsibility to bring order in chaotic situations and 
transitions.   
3.7 Testing the Theory  
To test my theory of bureaucratic governance stability on Pakistan, I am choosing two 
instances from the recent past to highlight how governance stability is maintained with and without 
a political crisis. In the first instance, I analyze the governance structures during the democratic 
government of 2008 that came to power after 10 years of dictatorship. I chose this specific instance 
to highlight how governance in Pakistan looks under perfectly ideal conditions as prescribed by 
the constitution of Pakistan. The second case I chose is the beginning of the most recent and current 
political crisis in Pakistan in which a sitting Prime Minister was taken to court and convicted on 
politically motivated target to bring down a government in 2017. The reason I wanted to analyze 
this case was that it presented the most recent political crisis that is still ongoing in Pakistan. With 
no head of state and the majority party severely weakened, Pakistan did not witness a lack of 
governance or service delivery. It was as if nothing happened to the lives of ordinary citizens by 
the head of state being pushed out of office. The network analysis of this situation illustrates how 
the senior bureaucratic elites take over the governance roles more centrally in times of crisis. 
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Comparing both network analyses, the reader can clearly notice the change in centrality and 
importance of the bureaucratic elites during times of political turmoil25.  
3.7.1 Democratic Transition – 2008  
The first case I analyze is the of the 2008 transition to democracy. After 9 years of 
dictatorship, elections are held with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) returning to power at the 
federal level. While PPP is back in power, it is faced with a situation like 1988 where it must work 
with the establishment and system in place. Which in this case means, it has to work with the 
military and its ongoing commitments with regards to the Afghan War as well as fight against 
terrorism on the western border. It needs to own up to the financial situation Pakistan is in as a 
result of constant bombings and deteriorating economic situation as a result of those. While PPP 
has its own agenda, it would like to pursue at a policy level, it must work within the confines of 
the reciprocal relationship.  
What happens in that circumstance is that the PPP cedes space on issues like foreign policy 
and appointment of ambassadors. Famously PPP’s initially appointed Hussain Haqqani as the 
Pakistani ambassador to the US was fired on the insistence of the military and when PPP tried 
appointing one of its senior members as the new Ambassador, the establishment in return ensured 
career diplomats would get posted to other high-profile posts like India, China, EU, WTO, 
Germany, France and Russia26.  
 
25 The data I am using for the network analysis for this chapter was gleaned from series of 
interactions with key personnel such as ministers, generals, senior civil servants and academics. 
These interactions included structured and unstructured conversations focused on the question of 
how bureaucracy plays a part and how it can step in. 
26 This information is based on interviews conducted with senior politicians and bureaucrats 
involved in foreign policy making including the senior government adviser on foreign affairs as 
well as the former Additional Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the time. Both interviews were 
conducted in Islamabad in 2017.  
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The network mapped out in figure 5 illustrates the relationship dynamic after the 2008 
elections which stayed intact till the 2017. The network has two clear nodes of power with nearly 
equal amounts of influence attributed to them. These nodes are the Prime Minister (PM) and the 
Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (PSPM). PSPM is the highest-ranking bureaucrat in the 
government who coordinates the Prime Minister’s office. While the PM is the face of the 
government, making PM’s policy preferences a reality is the responsibility of the PSPM. PSPM 
works with Federal Secretaries who are administrative heads of ministries and government 
departments. The third most critical node is Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief that is 
connected to ruling coalition, bureaucracy and the opposition groups. The ISI Chief heads the 
largest intelligence agency in the country and in effect carries out the agenda of the military as an 
institution in domestic politics. Alongside the Director General of Inter Services Public Relations 
(ISPR), these two persons are the public face of the military alongside the Chief of Army Staff. 
Meanwhile, the ministers in the network are neatly clustered to one side with connections to their 
respective federal secretaries.  
The connectivity of the different nodes with each other highlights visually the balance 
between political elites in power, the military elites and the bureaucratic elites. In this scenario 
there is political stability with a newly elected government in office ready to rule the country after 
years of dictatorship. The political stability is supported with governance stability provided by the 
senior bureaucratic elites who ensure the day to day affairs like service delivery and policy 
implementation is done in a timely manner. The government in this case ceded space on most 
issues of governance to the senior bureaucracy while focusing exclusively on keeping a political 
peace between the military and politicians.  
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Figure 5. Pakistan After Transition 
2008 
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3.7.2 Democratic Backsliding and Political Crisis – 2017  
In contrast to the 2008 democratization, the 2017 case offers a different scenario but a 
similar placement of the bureaucratic elites in the network analysis of governance. After the PML 
– N government came into power in the 2013 elections, it set out to work on its own agenda of 
improving the economy and stabilizing security situation. Most importantly, what the PML – N 
government did was to scale up the model that had been perfected at the provincial level i.e. out 
of turn promotions for junior bureaucrats to senior positions based on their loyalty. This 
politicization of bureaucracy continued once Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister for the third 
time in 2013. He promoted at least 4 junior officers seen as hardcore loyalists to the party and 
assigned them the role of running the Prime Minister’s office.  
Unlike the PPP, PML – N had largely stayed intact over time and kept most of the 
experienced team it had through the 90s. Since 2008, the party recruited former bureaucrats and 
technocrats in the party fold in anticipation of coming to power. When in 2013, the party did come 
to power, it had an economic team made up of party old guard along with newly recruited party 
members who understood the system’s nuances better than any other political party. Like the 
strategy to promote junior officers to top positions based on loyalty, this concept was also largely 
inspired by Erdogan and AKP in Turkey. As I detail in the next chapter, one of the reasons Erdogan 
was able to fend off multiple opposition challenges as well as coup attempts was that he 
successfully recruited former bureaucrats and technocrats in to the AKP fold, only to appoint them 
back to their positions but this time as politicians. So, while this strategy allowed PML – N to push 
through their agenda from the get-go, they received push back from the military as well as the 
bureaucratic elites especially over the budgetary issues as well as foreign policy. The situation 
came to head with ‘Dawn Leaks’ as discussed in detail earlier. Soon after that, Panama Papers 
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were made public and the investigation into those led to the eventual dismissal and disqualification 
of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.  
Figure 6 illustrates how the power dynamic changed once Nawaz Sharif was convicted. 
The conviction threw his party in to disarray and created a national political crisis. The critical 
thing to notice here is that while at the time of investigations and dismissal the Principal Secretary 
of the Prime Minister was a party loyalist, he was soon arrested in a separate ‘corruption’ case 
from his time at the provincial government in Punjab. This meant that the next Principle Secretary 
was appointed based on seniority rules and was the senior most bureaucrat in the country who had 
been sidelined by the PML – N as a result of out of turn promotion.  
The figure also paints a stark picture with regards to the role played by the ISI in this 
scenario which is clearer once we take a look at Table 3.1 also. The role of the ISI as military’s 
formal spokesperson in matters of governance signals military’s willingness to support a return to 
status quo instead of allowing for democratic consolidation.  
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Figure 6. Democratic Backsliding and Political Crisis 2017 
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3.8 Analysis and Conclusion 
The two network analyses presented above paint starkly different pictures. In the first 
instance, 2008 transition to democracy, the newly elected democratic coalition led by the PPP, 
lacks the experience and knowledge of running a government while in the second case the ruling 
coalition, led by PML – N, is fully capable of short circuiting the existing bureaucratic structures 
to rule effectively.  
But in both cases, the senior bureaucracy is needed and expected to provide governance 
stability to the new government and a government in flux. The most important policy issue PPP 
was able to push through during their five-year tenure was a new formula for devolution of funds 
and more provincial autonomy. PPP secured the passage of the 18th amendment by letting go of 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development and Foreign Affairs. In those areas, it left the 
space for bureaucratic elites in alliance with military to take the lead. As a result, Figure 5 
highlights the split responsibilities between the Prime Minister and the senior most bureaucrat 
working with him. While PML – N brought its loyalist bureaucrats with them to the federal 
government, the PPP government relied on existing senior bureaucracy throughout their five years 
in power. So much so, that the PPP even gave extensions to senior bureaucrats and generals to 
ensure the status quo felt no jolt. This level of accommodation resulted in PPP being the first 
democratically elected coalition to complete its tenure in 70 years27 albeit it took different Prime 
Ministers to do so.  
 
27 This was such a unique event that even the international media was surprised at this actually 
happening https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/17/world/asia/pakistan-politics/index.html and while it 
is true that no democratically elected Prime Minister has ever completed their term, this is a 
major step for a country like Pakistan.  
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In the second case, the PML – N government ruled successfully and even tried to politicize 
parts of the bureaucracy but when they lost their leader under a court conviction, the senior 
bureaucracy moved swiftly to take over the running of the state and punished the bureaucrats that 
had become politicized by either convicting them of political crimes like corruption or demoting 
them for disciplinary reasons. Figure 6 maps out the aftermath of these decisions and highlights 
how the senior bureaucracy struck back, taking complete control of running the government and 
isolating the new Prime Minister and his cabinet members. Unlike Figure 5, the ministers are 
clustered on the side with limited links to their respective ministry’s secretary, additional secretary 
and Joint Secretaries. Essentially, they are ministers in name but have practically no interaction or 
control over the policy design, decision and even implantation phase. Table 3 details how the 
dynamics change based on data behind the network analysis. Using Eigen Vector Centrality28, 
HUB29 and Authority30 scores in both cases, the data shows how the system reverts itself back to 
status quo i.e. senior bureaucracy in charge of governance.  
 
 
 
 
28 Eigenvectors Centrality is a measure to calculate the centrality of actors in a network i.e. how 
close that node is to all other notes. The measure runs 0 to 1, 1 being the highest a node can be in 
terms centrality based on the number of nodes it is connected to. 
29 HUB is a measure of the quality of connections originating from a node i.e. what is the 
importance of the other nodes connected to this node. For instance, in case of this study, the 
Prime Minister’s node connected to any other node makes that node have a high HUB score. As 
with earlier measure, this has a 0 to 1 range, with scores closer to 1 being high. 
30 Authority measure like the Eigenvector centrality measure accounts for the importance of the 
node. In this case, the measure is originally use for page ranks i.e. the quality of the page that 
other pages are connected to. When using the measure for nodes, it signifies the quality of the 
node i.e. how many connections originate from it and node’s value in the network. As with 
earlier measure, this has a 0 to 1 range, with scores closer to 1 being high. 
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Table 3. Post 2008 and Post 2017 Network Changes 
 
Pakistan Post 2008   Pakistan Post July 2017 
Job Title 
Eigenvector  
Centrality  
Authority HUB  Job Title 
Eigenvector  
Centrality 
Authority  HUB 
PM  1 0.384 0.384  
Principal  
Secretary 
1 0.389 0.389 
Principal  
Secretary 
1 0.384 0.384  PM  0.781 0.317 0.317 
Minister 0.44 0.176 0.176  ISI 0.434 0.164 0.164 
Minister 0.435 0.175 0.175  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
ISI 0.425 0.162 0.162  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.409 0.164 0.164  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.394 0.159 0.159  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.394 0.159 0.159  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.393 0.158 0.158  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.393 0.158 0.158  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.393 0.158 0.158  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.393 0.158 0.158  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.393 0.158 0.158  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.386 0.156 0.156  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.386 0.156 0.156  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.385 0.155 0.155  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Minister 0.385 0.155 0.155  Minister 0.411 0.179 0.179 
Opposition  
Leader 
0.287 0.103 0.103        Opp Leader 0.344 0.125 0.125 
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Table 3 mentions twenty most influential persons with regards to governance and how their 
importance changes based on political changes. While the Principal Secretary replaces the Prime 
Minister as the most critical link in the network in 2017, the number three most important person 
becomes the ISI Chief who is representing the military. This points to the fact that while the 
military might be extremely influential in the political sense, governance stability wise, it still has 
to rely on the bureaucratic elites to ensure stability.  
What these two instances highlight in the case of Pakistan is that my theory regarding high 
quality bureaucracy operating in autonomous institutions being central to governance stability 
holds true in the case of Pakistan. As observed in both scenarios, the focal persons who effectively 
govern the country are bureaucratic elites. In one case they do so out of the need of the politicians 
while in the other scenarios the military elites require their support while they find someone to be 
their face i.e. Imran Khan’s PTI during the 2018 elections.  
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4 TAIWAN: THE BUREAUCRATIC ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY 
So far this dissertation project has presented the case of Pakistan to support my argument 
that a professional, high quality bureaucracy that operates in autonomous institutions acts as a 
stabilizing force in times of political crisis. While the case of Pakistan presented in the last chapter 
is unique as it highlights what a perfect case scenario for my theory is i.e. governance stability 
even during political crises, Taiwan’s case is markedly different. In Taiwan’s case, the 
bureaucratic elites start out as part of the founding party, Kuomintang, but over time through 
tapered reforms evolve into a professional high-quality bureaucratic elite with advanced technical 
knowledge that operates under autonomous institutions that have clearly defined purpose and 
domain.  
Taiwan came into its current status after a World War. Taiwan was led by a charismatic 
ruler, Chiang Kai – shek, whose party, the Kuomintang (KMT), ruled Taiwan for years as a one-
party state. Like Pakistan, Taiwan already had decent infrastructure in place as well as functioning 
institutions of revenue collection and law enforcement. And just like Pakistan, there were already 
elite cadres of bureaucrats left over from days of colonialism. In Taiwan’s case, the colonial power 
was Japan who ruled the island for years and saw it as a prized colony that provided goods and 
services to the Kingdom of Japan. So, just like Pakistan, the bureaucracy at least knew what to do 
when the country came in to being albeit its scope was altered once the new rulers came to power. 
This is why Taiwan is such a crucial case study to explain the importance of a capable bureaucratic 
elite, because it helps us understand how things go right i.e. how “high quality” bureaucracy that 
has institutional independence can provide governance stability that can eventually facilitate 
democratization and survive political crises.  
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This chapter details Taiwan’s bureaucratic elite’s shift from being politicized entities 
without “high quality” technical abilities working in institutions that fell under party structures 
into professionalized actors who enjoy significant policy design and implementation space in the 
governance structure of Taiwan. I explain how the Taiwanese bureaucratic elites have been 
instrumental in providing governance stability even when Taiwan went through political changes, 
reforms and foreign policy shifts. Just like previous the chapter, I present two instances within the 
recent history of Taiwan to highlight the crucial stabilizing role the bureaucratic elites have played 
in consolidating Taiwan into a democracy. The first example I present is the post 2000 scenario 
wherein Taiwan elects its first non KMT leader to the role of President. Democratic Progressive 
Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000 and was faced with numerous 
challenges including delivering to his progressive base while maintaining a status quo situation 
with People’s Republic of China (China), navigating an economic slump while the legislative 
Yuan (National Legislature) was still under the control of the KMT.  
The second case I present is that of the post 2016 Taiwan, where DPP is back in power 
after eight years in the form of President Tsai Ing-wen. This time around, China is more aggressive 
and influential than before, the economic situation is still tricky and urgent reforms are needed to 
improve the growing disillusionment among the country’s youth.  
Comparing both cases, I argue that President Chen Shui-bian was able to effectively rule 
and even stabilize the economy of Taiwan because of his willingness to cede space on policy issues 
to the bureaucratic elites who took a more pragmatic approach to governance than DPP. But in 
post 2016 scenario, the Tsai government has had a harder time working with the bureaucratic elites 
and their attempts at pushing through progressive agenda and policies have failed largely as they 
do not take in to account concerns of these try to alter the policy independence enjoyed by the 
 81 
 
81 
senior bureaucratic elites. This leaves DPP in a situation where their agendas are left largely 
unimplemented as the senior bureaucracy steps in to block anything that could impact the 
governance stability in Taiwan.  
The chapter starts by discussing the historical background of Taiwan from 1949 to 1988 
and then from 1988 to 2016. That is followed by discussion of key players in Taiwanese politics 
and their importance in the system. I then explore the role of bureaucracy and its crucial role in 
Taiwan’s economic miracle during the 1980s and 1990s. That is followed by the two instances I 
use for theory testing; post 2000 and post 2016. I end the chapter with concluding remarks and 
lessons from Taiwan.    
4.1 Historical Background 
In this section I explore the history of modern Taiwan (Republic of China). I explore the 
historical events that led up to the creation of Taiwan as a separate country and its development 
since that period of time. In order to understand the nuances in the case of Taiwan, historical 
context is critical for any analysis. In this section I focus on the history of Taiwan in two phases; 
From 1949 to 1988 and the post 1988 transition to democracy period. It is pertinent to mention 
here that the following is by no means a comprehensive history of modern Taiwan, neither is it a 
detailed anthology of events that shaped modern Taiwan. This is a brief exploration of history to 
provide context to the argument being made in this chapter.  
4.1.1 From 1949 to 1988 
Until 1945, the island of Taiwan was ruled by Empire of Japan. Japan took possession of 
the island in 1895 as a result of the treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the first Sino Japanese War 
(Morris, 2002). During this time, the island of Taiwan was governed as a necessary appendage to 
the Empire of Japan with heavy investment from Japanese private businesses as well as the 
 82 
 
82 
Imperial government. With Japanese state and businesses investing heavily into making Taiwan 
an industrialized region to support the global Japanese imperial ambitions, the island became one 
of the most advanced societies with access to electricity and infrastructure development in Asia.  
To maintain imperial control over the prosperous colony, Japan set up sophisticated set of 
institutions that included a civil service, domestic security force, central bank and a justice system. 
All of these institutions were replications of the Japanese institutions and were designed 
independently as the island was supposed to self-sustain. This meant that Taiwan was run like a 
province with the government and top tier bureaucracy made up of Japanese, who relied on the 
local Taiwanese population for support roles.   
In 1945, after the end of World War Two (WW2), the defeated Empire of Japan was forced 
to hand back its possessions across Asia. Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China led by 
Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang (KMT). During this time, the Kuomintang was embroiled in 
a full-scale civil war with the Mao Zedong led, Communist Party of China (CPC). But after the 
end of WW2, the civil war took center stage. From 1946 to 1949, KMT and CPC were involved 
in a brutal civil war that saw hundreds of thousands of people perish. Initially, it seemed that KMT 
had the upper hand and would beat back CPC to maintain control over the country. It is relevant 
to mention here that in 1946, Republic of China government was led by KMT and CPC were the 
insurgents.  
However, by 1949, CPC had gained a foothold that saw KMT abandoning mainland China 
entirely and moving to the Island of Taiwan with the government of Republic of China in exile. 
Having taken control of Mainland China, Mao declared the creation of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949. KMT’s intention was never to abandon the mainland entirely, but to regroup and 
reequip the Republic of China forces to launch a campaign to retake the mainland. Chiang Kai – 
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shek reached out to the Americans for support in this venture but was politely turned down 
(Maclay, 2006).  
But as the Korean war began in 1950, Taiwan’s fortune changed. The international 
community that had refused to initially get involved in the civil conflict in China was now firmly 
supporting Taiwan (Republic of China) through international diplomatic support and weapons to 
ensure Mao led communist China did not attack to retake what they viewed as a breakaway 
province. Over time the status quo remained the same i.e. the international community accepted 
Taiwan as the true Republic of China and Chiang Kai – shek as its leader.  
While these political maneuvers were being conducted at the international level, the 
domestic level of politics was drastically different. On the international stage, Taiwan represented 
the capitalist educated elite of China that had taken refuge on the island waiting to take back the 
mainland. Internally though, for the local Taiwanese population, KMT was an occupying force 
that brought over two million refugees who effectively took over all business, government and 
intellectual discourse. The island was under martial law and all civic rights of the citizens were 
suspended during this time. Fearing dissent and rebellions after their retreat to Taiwan, KMT was 
brutal in its tactics to shut down any form indigenous Taiwanese protest. In what is now known as 
White Terror, the KMT regime cracked down on Taiwanese and indigenous leaders it viewed a 
threat to the government. Approximately over a 100,000 Taiwanese were detained and imprisoned 
while 3,000 to 5,000 others were executed during 1949 and 1986 (Chen, 2008).  
Chen (2008) explains the KMT’s actions during this time as means of controlling and 
dominating the society to a point where it could be potentially reprogrammed. Like Imperial Japan, 
KMT was an outside force that took over Taiwan without regard for local customs, language and 
culture. And like the former colonizer, KMT needed to extend its influence and quash dissent in 
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the initial phases of control. It is crucial to understand why KMT was committed to quashing 
dissent and exerting complete control over the island. Having lost the civil war and retreated to the 
province of Taiwan, the KMT as a party was in a mess. The party had no local support, had lost a 
war and was unable to maintain a sense of common goal. At this stage, Chiang Kai – shek was 
chalking out a revamping plan for the party and by extension the country that would take the KMT 
back to its Leninist roots, with presence in every walk of life through organized cells and structures 
of members overseeing the society.  
KMT realized by mid 1950s that there was no going back to Mainland China and that the 
Island of Taiwan was its permanent home. With the Korean War not formally ending and US 
expanding its presence in North Asia, there was no going back to reclaim the mainland for KMT. 
With this clarity and a commitment to revamp the party, Chiang Kai Shek set upon the task of 
fundamentally altering the society in to a one-party state with series of reforms such as controlling 
the language, relocating over two million mainlanders across Taiwan via extensive land reforms 
and establishing control through educational institutions (Dickson, 1993).  
Additionally, the KMT government also understood that the US Economic Aid would 
completely end by 1968 and Taiwan had to set up an economic structure in place to sustain itself 
without the external support (Ho, 1987). That meant that the party had a short window in which it 
had to industrialize, organize the society, focus on building a sustaining economy while 
maintaining control of the government.  
For KMT, an outside power, its survival and political control depended on getting the local 
population to buy in to the narrative of greater China and how Taiwan was a key part of it. Chiang 
Kai – shek allowed local body elections to get the local Taiwanese population to become part of 
the local politics and the KMT. It is pertinent to understand that during the 1950s and 1960s, when 
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Taiwan is undergoing these rafts of changes, the party is going through them too. With the party 
expanding its base, recruiting new members while setting up a system of parallel economic and 
administrative bodies for governance, both the party and state had a symbiotic relationship 
(Dickson, 1993).   
While KMT was undertaking this political and social engineering in the society, the 
economy was booming. Private enterprises mostly owned by local Taiwanese were reaping the 
rewards of a stable economy and lack of government intrusion in private business. The KMT 
government itself was investing heavily in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that were staffed 
largely with party loyalists and bureaucrats. The government’s focus was driving economic policy 
through SOEs and provide crucial services like electricity, gasoline and healthcare via these SOEs. 
This also allowed the government to create a massive bureaucracy, mostly staffed with 
mainlanders and loyalist KMT cadre, that helped not only deliver services but also create a 
presence of the party throughout the society (Cheng et al, 1998; Maclay, 2006).  
With economic growth came a middle class of native Taiwanese who wanted access to 
power as well as service delivery. Access to power issue was addressed by the KMT early on 
through local government elections that provided the local Taiwanese population a chance to enter 
the political system and the party (So, 2013). And with rise of this middle class came the problem 
of service provision and service delivery. KMT originally relied on the Japanese institutional 
blueprints and even maintained the governance structures in Taiwan, choosing to staff them with 
mainlander bureaucrats and elites loyal to the KMT. By 1970s the KMT was actively recruiting a 
new generation of Taiwanese civil service members while the military continued to be staffed 
mostly by the mainlanders. For all effective purposes, the bureaucracy, secret police and the 
military were all on the same page as they all were part of the KMT. KMT continued to shape the 
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new Taiwanese identity using education, economy and service delivery. During the 1960s and 
1970s, as the country was stabilizing its economy, KMT bosses focused on creating a clean cut 
image of service delivery ability to keep law and order in control especially after the de – 
recognition of Taiwan as the true Republic of China at the international level  in the 1970s (Maclay, 
2006; Chen, 2008). The government’s focus was to maintain the economic stability that had 
generated a new class of Taiwanese who had enjoyed benefits of the KMT regime in the last two 
decades and helped the country modernize. Most of these people were based in urban centers like 
Taipei, Taichung, Tainan and Kaohsiung. And with a growing middle class, came the issue of 
rising demands for government service.  
After Chiang Kai – shek passed away in 1975, his son Chiang Ching – kuo took over as 
the President of Taiwan in 197831 with an understanding that the long-term survival of the party 
depended on opening up the system and creating public feedback loops i.e. eventually easing up 
on political restrictions to provide space for public to vent their frustrations. Chinag Ching – kuo 
understood the changing dynamics of Taiwanese society and focused on economic progress over 
all else.  Simultaneously, he realized that as the world was opening up to People’s Republic of 
China and allowing to take the UN Security Council seat that Taiwan had held till 1979, the 
external pressure would need to be neutralized through easing local political restrictions. It can be 
argued that one important reason for opening up of local political space came down to the 
assumption among KMT leaders that once the world normalizes its relationship with China, 
Taiwan would need something to differentiate itself in a manner to maintain its unique identity 
 
31 Chiang Ching – kuo served as Prime Minister from 1972 to 1978. He wielded immense power 
even as Prime Minister and Commander of the Taiwan General Command (TGC). In essence, 
Chiang Ching – kuo had been running the show behind the scenes from as early as mid-1950s. 
As he was one also the Chief of the General Political Work Department that was designed to 
train party cadres and commissars to be placed across the government.   
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rather than being seen as the more sophisticated cousin of the China. Whether it was domestic 
pressures or the external constrictions, Chiang Ching – kuo moved ahead with opening up the 
political space in Taiwan32.  
To achieve opening up of local political space in Taiwan, President Chiang Ching – kuo 
launched a series of reforms in the economic, political and institutional arenas. Taiwan underwent 
extensive industrialization efforts backed by anti-graft and efficiency reforms in the Taiwanese 
bureaucracy. In a society where there were no political outlets to influence policy making, 
government bureaucracy was seen as a way to influence policy making by interest groups. Native 
Taiwanese citizens and interest groups saw the opportunity to become partners in power by 
engaging with the bureaucracy. It made sense to join the bureaucracy as it meant societal prestige 
and political power for the person and their family. By the time Chiang Ching – kuo took over as 
President, a large number of older mainland transplant bureaucrats and technocrats had passed 
away or were near retirement. Sensing an opportunity, President Ching – kuo embarked on 
Taiwanization of institutions i.e. inducting, promoting and giving responsibility to native 
Taiwanese officers. The logic behind these moves as Maclay (2006) explains was to create a cadre 
of loyal KMT native Taiwanese bureaucrats and politicians who would remain loyal to the party 
as they viewed it as their ticket to ascend to higher positions in the societal order. Throughout this 
time, the party structure was still in place with party cadre holding crucial positions across the 
government. The change, however, came in how the party started using its power to build itself 
assets. As Taiwan was moving towards democratic change, Chiang Ching – kuo and KMT realized 
 
32 It is pertinent to clarify here that these changes were far more complex and deserve more 
discussion but unfortunately, they do not concern directly to the crux of this dissertation process. 
Process of reform in any country is deeply complex and deserves a detailed discussion that is not 
manageable within the framework of this dissertation project. 
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the importance of building assets that could help the party contest elections in the future. KMT 
had the structure and societal penetration to win elections but it needed assets, businesses and 
corporate entities that were loyal to it to sustain the future.  
It is also important to understand why KMT did not embark of Taiwanization early on 
because it had not altered the society in a fashion where it was a replication of the party ethos. 
What I mean by that is when KMT initially took over Taiwan, the party and society were at odds 
about they wanted to proceed. The party was in disarray and had to go through bouts of 
reorganization itself before it could seek control of the society that was made up mostly of native 
Taiwanese who viewed the mainlanders and KMT with suspicion initially. But with a booming 
economy through the 60s and 70s, the native Taiwanese population bought in to the vision of the 
KMT and were more likely to become loyalists. By this time the party had also completely 
penetrated the society through government agencies, military, policy and even education 
institutions. So, by the time the effort of Taiwanization began, a significantly large number of 
Taiwanese were not only supportive of KMT, they credited it for their economic success and 
stability, they also viewed the party as a fast track for stable government job and other 
opportunities.  Taiwanese who joined the party and went through the cadre system could leapfrog 
others and move up the ranks based on their loyalty and commitment to the party (Painter, 2004). 
This was a route to power that had been limited earlier on and was seen as a secure way to 
economic stability33.  
 
33 Government jobs – of any kind – are considered stable career choices in Taiwan. Even though 
over time, the benefits and compensation has not improved in comparison to the private sector, 
for middle and lower middle classes, it still remains a reliable route to economic stability and 
social status. This is common not just in Taiwan, but in Pakistan and Turkey too.  
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It is also important to consider the regional context of this time period. The 1980s were a 
tumultuous time for mainland China which was dealing with multiple crises in leadership and 
economic survival even before the Tiananmen Square massacre. For Taiwanese comparing 
Taiwan’s trajectory to that of People’s Republic of China, the contrast was stark. As part of his 
series of reforms, President Chiang Ching – kuo eased up restrictions on travel and interaction 
with Mainland China while launching a concentrated effort to turn Taiwan in a constitutional 
democracy34.For him, creating a clear contrast with China was fundamental to the Taiwanese 
identity and the future of KMT.  
With this in mind, in 1986 opposition parties were allowed for the first time since 1949. 
Pro – Independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formally established soon after the 
ban was lifted on political parties and instantly became the main opposition group in Taiwan. But 
it would be 14 years before the DPP would come to power at the national level even though it 
existed for years in form of Tangwai35. Also, during this time an important effort was made by 
President Chiang Ching – kuo to reform state institutions in phases to become more amenable to 
democracy in Taiwan36. As part of this, before his death in 1987, President Chiang Ching – kuo 
 
34 During the 1970s and 1980s, Taiwanese students were among the top three foreign student 
groups studying in the US. This kind of interaction with established democracies as well as 
cultural interactions with the West, encouraged a norm change when these students went back 
home. Not only were these students coming back with cutting edge skills, they wanted more 
freedoms and better governance that was only possible through a participatory democracy.  
35 Tangwai means outside the party. Given that Taiwan was a single party state that still held 
relatively regular local government elections, no actual party was allowed to contest elections 
against the KMT. So, critics of the government ran as independents as part of the opposition and 
referred to as Tangwai (Ho, 2005). The infamous Kaohsiung Incident involved Tangwai 
members who were arrested by the security forced for holding a meeting without a permit and 
imprisoned. The movement formally created a party in 1986; that party is the DPP.    
36 At least in five separate key personnel interviews with Administrative Ministers in Taiwan, 
this point was raised. There was a consensus that had Chiang Ching – kuo not provided a sort of 
a masterplan for democratization and reform, democracy would not have survived in Taiwan. It 
was also mentioned multiple times that a key element of the reform was the tapered nature or the 
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lifted Martial Law across Taiwan, that had been in force since KMT took over. This allowed for 
formation of political groups, civil society organizations and even union groups.  
As part of the Taiwanization process, President Chiang Ching – kuo appointed Taiwanse 
born bureaucrat/technocrat, Lee Teng – hui as his vice president. Lee Teng – hui came up through 
the KMT ranks in the previous decades and was educated in the US. His prior roles as Mayor of 
Taipei and eventually Vice President made him a legitimate candidate for Presidency when Chiang 
Ching – kuo passed away in 198837.   
4.1.2 1988 to 2016 
KMT was now led by a local Taiwanese and had delivered decades of political and 
governance stability to the island. With Lee Teng – hui becoming President, KMT set out on a 
series rapid reforms brought about dramatic changes within a 4-year period of time. (Chao & 
Dickinson, 2002; Yeh, 2014). The most drastic of the changes was moving away from the previous 
KMT ambition of retaking China. The communist rebellion was considered over, and the focus 
shifted to defining the Taiwanese identity and focusing on how the Island was unique member of 
the international community (Tien & Shiau, 1992; Maclay, 2006; Yeh, 2014).  
Domestically, these changes by Lee Teng – hui were concrete steps towards political 
democratization; limitations on opposition parties were lifted and they could contest upcoming 
elections of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan set for 1991 and 1992. KMT easily won 
both elections but for the first time an opposition party in the form of DPP made it to the parliament 
 
phased-out process in which they were launched. I discuss this in greater detail in the 
bureaucracy section but to summarize, the bureaucracy was given 15 years to change how it 
works on policy making and interactions with the ruling coalition by changing the curriculum of 
civil service training, on job discussions as well as changes in reporting.  
37 It is important to mention here that Lee Teng – hui’s accession to power was challenged within 
KMT but eventually with the support of Chiang Ching – kuo loyalists, Lee became President.  
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(Maclay, 2006; Yeh, 2014). More reforms followed that saw the strengthening of the Presidential 
system, dissolution of the powerful Taiwan Garrison Command i.e. Taiwanese Secret Police and 
the uncoupling of Taiwan’s existence with that off China. The focus during this period of time was 
on economic growth and ensuring that Taiwanese people had a united national identity that did not 
differentiate between whether you were ethnic Taiwanese or a mainlander. This change in 
approach created rifts within the KMT that eventually led to the creation of the New Party38 by a 
splinter group of conservatives that viewed Lee Teng – hui with suspicion. But unlike the DPP, 
the new group had minimal impact on KMT’s position in power. As part of the reforms, Lee Teng 
– hui also cut the term of the President from six years to four years via direct elections.  
It is important to understand how KMT continued the bureaucratic phased reforms to 
maintain service delivery to an economy that was booming and a political environment that was 
opening up. This included improving the bureaucratic pay scales, benefits and pensions. The logic 
was that with a vibrant economy, the private sector was attracting the top talent in the country. 
That meant the bureaucracy was at risk of not attracting top tier candidates in the long run. To 
make it more competitive with private sector careers, Lee Teng – hui made a concentrated effort 
to improve the status of bureaucrats and providing institutional autonomy for them to continue 
performing. As a technocrat turned politician, much like Turgat Özal in Turkey, Lee understood 
and appreciated the role bureaucracy played in policy formation and implementation. Hence, it 
was necessary to maintain a steady supply of top-quality recruits to join the civil service as 
Taiwan’s future depended on this.  
 
38 The New Party (NP) is not to be confused by the New Power Party (NPP). While NP is a 
right-wing group, the NPP is a left-wing group that originated out the of the DPP’s reformist 
wing.  
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It was also during this time that various ad hoc bodies such as committees on special issues 
like planning and development as well as trade and economics were merged into the formal 
bureaucratic structure. During Lee Teng – hui’s time, specifically starting in 1993, there was a 
clear effort to make the bureaucracy administratively neutral. Even though the final law creating a 
neutral bureaucracy eventually passed in 2009, it is noteworthy that such an attempt was instigated 
by the KMT while in power in 1993 (So, 2013). I discuss the detailed impact of these efforts in 
the section discussing the bureaucracy. Senior bureaucrats that I interviewed, during my fieldwork 
in Taiwan, acknowledged how important President Lee’s tenure was for Taiwan. Senior 
bureaucracy attributed major reforms to President Lee’s commitment to protect the bureaucracy 
from political meddling and ensure that it was insulated enough from politics to continue 
functioning without compromise.  
In 1996, the first direct elections for the Presidency were held and President Lee was 
elected to a four-year term in office. He continued his policies and eventually at the end of his term 
left office. The second Presidential elections were held in 2000. The election resulted in a three-
way competition with DPP nominating Chen Shui – bian, KMT opting for Lee Teng – hui’s Vice 
President, Lien Chan while ex – KMT stalwart and former Governor of Taiwan, James Soong ran 
as an independent. With the KMT vote split between Soong and Chan, DPP’s Chen Shui – Bian 
won the elections with 39.3% of the popular vote (Yeh, 2014). In under 15 years, the party the 
party that was formed by members of the Tangwai movement had won an election for the 
Presidency. But with the legislature still under KMT control, this set up a situation which was a 
first for Taiwan. 
As President Chen Shui – bian took power, he focused on upscaling the successes he had 
as Mayor of Taipei in mid to late 1990s. These included heavy investments in infrastructure 
 93 
 
93 
projects, uplifting the southern part of the country, a traditional DPP stronghold, through series of 
investments in port development, connectivity and support for industries. DPP also focused on 
pushing forth the idea of independence and reorganizing the relationship with China. After the 
Asian economic crisis, Taiwan was dealing with a slowing economy while the Chinese economy 
was just starting to take off.   
Simultaneously, DPP made a concentrated effort to recruit and appoint activists, to 
government positions, who had spent years working in the opposition to KMT. In interviews with 
key personnel in Taiwan, this was viewed as a major step taken by DPP to cut down the influence 
of the bureaucracy on policy making issues. DPP aligned leaders clearly stated that the DPP lacked 
the understanding of running the government and practicality of its policy proposals after it came 
to power in 2000. While President Chen had governance experience from his role as Mayor of 
Taipei, the party did not have experience or inroads within the bureaucratic elite. Similar to how 
the AKP in 2002 lacked the understanding of policy making and implementation, the DPP was a 
novice too. And just like AKP who considered bureaucracy to biased against them, the DPP 
considered bureaucratic elites and senior technocrats to be pro – KMT and was suspicious of them 
throughout the 2000 to 2008 period.  
The DPP tenure in power was not smooth to say the least. Multiple corruption scandals 
rocked the government, biggest of those coming during 2005 – 2006 period. President Chen Shui 
– bian’s wife and close confidants were accused of corruption charges and pocketing state funds 
under false pretenses. The President’s wife and allies were charged and convicted but as the 
President enjoyed immunity as a serving President, his prosecution was delayed. The corruption 
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scandals kicked off mass protests against the President and hurt his support while in office39. With 
its leader’s reputation tarnished, the DPP also suffered a fall in its support. 
The corruption scandal hurt the DPP at the polls, both during the 2006 local government 
elections and the 2008 Presidential and Legislative elections. KMT’s Ma Ying – jeou, beat out the 
DPP candidate, Frank Hsieh, by nearly 20 percent while KMT won 52% of the seats in the 
Legislature. Controlling both the executive and legislature, President Ma’s tenure focused on 
stabilizing relationship with China which had worsened off under the DPP rule. The 2008 to 2016 
period was marked by a focused effort to consolidate the status quo under which Taiwan could 
function as a separate state albeit it was not formally accepted to be a state by majority of the 
world. A smoother relationship with China allowed Taiwanese companies to further invest in a 
Chinese economy that was starting to boom and register double digit GDP growth rates. Taiwan’s 
economic growth improved along with this improvement in relationship with China. The KMT 
government proceeded to agree to a free trade agreement with China called the Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement (CSSTA)40 which met with political resistance at home. President Ma’s 
government assumed that there would be local support to improving ties with China in a manner 
that could benefit the economy but attempts to ratify the CSSTA were met with fierce resistance 
and led to mass protests by students and civil society organizations in 2014. These protests are 
referred to as the Sunflower Movement (Ho, 2015). The Sunflower Movement helped stop the 
signing of CSSTA and gave birth to the New Power Party, a party that allied with the DPP as part 
of the left wing Pan Green Coalition.  
 
39 For more insight on this https://www.ft.com/content/a6703cc2-4149-11db-827f-0000779e2340 
and https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/world/asia/10taiwan.html 
40 A nuanced and detailed look at the CSSTA is available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-economics-of-the-cross-strait-services-agreement/  
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The Ma presidency eventually ended in 2016. Term limited Ma could not contest elections 
again for the KMT. As a result of the Sunflower Movement and resistance to the CSSTA, the KMT 
had already suffered a defeat in the local elections. So, by the 2016 presidential elections, KMT 
lost out to the DPP residential candidate Tsai Ing – wen and also lost its majority in the Legislative 
Yuan41. With a strong public mandate, President Tsai set out to implement the DPP agenda to 
address the changing economic and political realities facing Taiwan. Issues like youth 
unemployment, unsustainable pension schemes and ageing infrastructure were key election issues 
along with revising the Taiwanese identity according to the popular will. While former President 
Ma oversaw years of closer relations with China, President Tsai wanted to pull away from that and 
went on a diplomatic charm offensive to rebrand Taiwan’s unique identity by launching the New 
Southbound Policy (NSP) the lynchpin of the revised Taiwanese approach to foreign policy. In 
response to this Taiwan centric foreign policy, President Tsai has faced tougher Chinese response 
including, a large drop in Chinese tourism to the island and official recognition of Taiwan dipping 
down to only 17 countries from 21 since 201642.  
In the next section I provide brief profiles of the major political players in the political 
system of Taiwan. As this section provided the historical context for the discussion of bureaucracy 
and its interactions with democratization efforts, the intention in the next section is to spell out the 
players, it’s their interests and their relationship with the bureaucracy and other state institutions.  
4.2 Major Political Players 
Be it the political parties like KMT or DPP, or technocratic institutions like the Council for 
United States Aid or bureaucratic institutions like National Development Council, or civil society 
 
41 Tsai’s victory was seen as a rebuke to the pro – china stance taken by her predecessor 
https://www.ft.com/content/b1375b14-bc45-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf 
42 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/world/asia/taiwan-south-pacific-tsai-ing-wen-china.html 
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organizations like the Tangwai and the Sunflower Movement. Each one of them has played a part 
in the political journey of Taiwan. While all these players are important, this dissertation is focused 
on exploring the central role Taiwanese bureaucratic elites have played in providing political 
stability that has allowed the economy to thrive for long periods of time and under different regime 
tupes. For that purpose, the players that I focus on are the KMT, the DPP and the Taiwanese 
bureaucracy.  
These three players have effectively ruled Taiwan since the late 1980s. As Taiwan was a 
one-party state run by the KMT between 1949 and 1988, I believe it is important to understand the 
impact that political regime had on the bureaucracy as well as understanding how the military was 
consciously never made a factor politically. Understanding KMT as a political player is also 
helpful in charting the democratic trajectory Taiwan takes and why it chose to do that. The 
discussion on KMT also assists in laying down the support to my larger argument that 
consolidation in Taiwan was possible because of the stability provided by the highly trained, well 
qualified high-quality bureaucracy.  
Similarly, a discussion on DPP explains how the party was formed, how it evolved its 
agenda and adapted itself to the changing political environment while dealing with state 
institutions that once blocked its operations. As part of my theory testing, DPP’s current tenure 
and the 2000 tenure are of special interest to me. How the DPP reacted to, a hostile KMT led 
legislature in 2000 while making policy retreats on major campaign promises due to bureaucratic 
pressure, is important to understanding how the DPP has ruled in its second tenure in the executive 
office since 2016. 
Lastly, and most important, I explore the Taiwanese bureaucracy and the bureaucratic 
elites. Doing so requires a detailed understanding of the KMT, the party cadre and its leader’s 
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vision for Taiwan. I cover those while analyzing the KMT. My focus with regards to the 
bureaucracy is the recruitment processes, the functionality, its neutrality and its ability to adapt to 
changing situations while maintaining what Geddes (1986) calls ‘veto points’ i.e. bargaining chips. 
By understanding how and why the bureaucratic elites use bargaining as a tool to insulate 
themselves from political pressure and interference, I lay out the support for my theory of 
bureaucratic elites as being the stabilizing force when they are high quality and apolitical.  
4.2.1 Kuomintang (KMT) 
The Kuomintang (KMT) was the founding party of the Republic of China. Under the 
leadership of Chiang Kai – shek, the KMT ruled parts of China under the banner of Republic of 
China throughout the late 20s, 30s and 1940s. During this period of time the KMT was involved 
in conflict with the Communist Party of China (CPC), who under the leadership of Mao Zedong 
wanted to bring about a communist revolution, and the armies of Imperial Japan. By the end of 
World War Two (WW2), Chiang Kai – shek was still in power and committed to rooting out the 
CPC completely.  
Between 1946 and 1949, a civil war raged across China that saw CPC and KMT fight brutal 
battle after battle to gain control of territory. Eventually by 1949, Chiang Kai – shek was defeated 
and he fled to the Island of Taiwan along with the government of Republic of China as well as two 
million of his supporters. Meanwhile, Mao declared the foundation of People’s Republic of China 
on the mainland and declared Taiwan to be a breakaway province led by a rebel government. 
However, Western countries acknowledged the Republic of China to be the true government till 
late 1970s.  
After fleeing to the island of Taiwan, the KMT was in tatters. The party had just lost a war 
against the Communists that it should have won. A large number of its members and elites had 
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deserted the party and moved to Hong Kong and the United States. Those who did move to the 
island along with the KMT leadership included over two million people who were in desperate 
conditions43. But among these two million people were professionals and bright minds who had 
been left no other choice but to follow KMT to the island of Taiwan to start over. For the party, it 
was a moment of somber reflection and reorganization. Chiang Kai – shek spent time exploring 
what had led to the defeat at the hands of the communists. This soul searching led him two answers; 
organization and societal control/capture.  
To address the misgivings that led to the defeat on the mainland, Chiang Kai – shek set 
upon the task of reforming the KMT along its original manifesto founded on the ‘Three People’s 
Principles’ of Sun Yat Sen. The part was supposed to be nationalistic, a believer in democracy and 
committed to welfare of the citizenry. Moreover, the party structure was supposed to be functional 
in its nature rather than administrative. The party had to be redesigned in accordance with its 
Leninist roots. So, instead of top-heavy structure of leaders running a political party, the KMT was 
supposed to become the basis of the society by having cells of party cadre across all walks of life. 
That meant there was always party cadre in small cells operating as oversight in the community, 
be it a small village or a factory or an educational institution or even the military (Dickson, 1993). 
The idea behind this was twofold; control of the society through constant oversight and better 
understanding of societal demands that could be addressed via service delivery.  
Chiang Kai – Shek’s son, Chiang Ching – kuo led the General Political Work Department 
(GPWD) under this system. Additionally, he also controlled the Taiwan Garrison Command 
 
43 During one of the interviews with an Administrative Deputy Minister, they narrated a story 
about how the island’s locals were deeply disappointed at the KMT and its allies when they 
moved to Taiwan. The local elites in Taipei assumed that those moving to the island were some 
of the cultural and social elites who were highly sophisticated. Instead what they saw were two 
million desperate and battered refugees who landed and assumed automatic privilege.  
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(TGC).  Between these two organizations, Chiang Ching – kuo, the future president of Taiwan and 
KMT, controlled the secret police, the organization that oversaw all elements of the society 
including the military. And because the party was given such a dominant role in the society, one 
third of the 600,000 armed forces were active KMT members. There were political commissars 
appointed by the GPWD to posts in the military as well as in the bureaucracy to ensure the ‘Three 
People’s Principles’ were being implemented.  
Career growth in military and especially in the bureaucracy depended on party loyalty as 
well as commitment to the core ideals of the KMT. Younger officers interested in career 
progression and economic security found it necessary to become members of the party and report 
on their colleagues and departments as and when required. In essence, by seizing control of the 
state through this intense level of penetration, the KMT was not only able to reshape the society 
as it wished but it was also able to push through societal transformation such as land reforms that 
would be impossible under a weak government (Painter, 2004; Dickson, 1993). The land reforms 
served a purpose as well. Most of the land was owned by local Taiwanese, reforming ownership 
of the land and giving ownership to mainlanders and other groups dislodged the established 
Taiwanese landed elite in favor of a newer elite that owed its status to the KMT.   
During the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT successfully set up institutions and structures that 
deeply penetrated Taiwanese society and ensured complete state capture. With this kind of 
presence in every walk of life, KMT was able to rely on loyalist cadres in the military and 
bureaucracy. And as economic growth was on top of the agenda, party leadership gave much more 
leeway to the technocrats and economic bureaucratic elites. To give the perception of 
professionalism and continuity, the party allowed for policy delegation to specialized committees. 
Hybrid organizations i.e. institutions made up of technocrats and career bureaucrats like the 
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Council of United States Aid, were given the task of navigating the economy towards 
industrialization. Similarly, large State-Owned Enterprises, controlled by KMT loyalists, were 
tasked with targeted investment in sectors that the government saw as having potential (Cheng et 
al, 1998; Clark, 2000; Chen, 2008; Rigger, 2011; Yeh, 2014).  
With regards to the military, Chiang Kai – shek’s KMT did not view the military as the 
guardians (Chen, 2008; Rigger, 2011; Yeh, 2014). In fact, the KMT viewed the military warily 
and was concerned of the risk of being infiltrated by Communists or another anti – KMT element. 
Having witnessed numerous occasions in mainland China where KMT soldiers on the frontlines 
defected to the CPC because of Communists infiltrating the ranks, the party was reluctant to give 
the armed forces a complete free hand. So, from day one, they set up a system of checks in balances 
in the military that appointed party commissars, under the command of the GPWD, within the 
armed forces. The purpose of these appointments in addition to KMT’s control of the Taiwan 
Garrison Command (TGC) was to ensure the military had a narrow purpose and ensure it was not 
to play a part in politics. Under the leadership of Chiang Ching – kuo, the KMT established and 
empowered the TGC, which was the secret police they used to crack down on any dissent until it 
was disbanded by President Lee in 1992. The result of this was that while KMT was in complete 
control of the island, it utilized the secret police and police force to maintain domestic order while 
the military had a limited local role if any.  
 This meant that for KMT to implement its agenda and rule Taiwan, it relied on a 
different kind of troops; an army of bureaucrats and technocrats. It is important to differentiate 
between the two terms as bureaucrat refers to the career bureaucrats that were recruited through 
the Examination Yuan’s annual entrance examination since 1931 while the technocrats were 
technical experts recruited by the party to serve as subject matter experts in organizations like the 
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Economic Stabilization Board or the Economic Planning Council. As Taiwan was a one-party 
state, the technocrats could move laterally to take up positions often staffed by career bureaucrats. 
Plus, the technocrats could be political while the career bureaucrats were supposed to remain 
focused on administrative tasks and were insulated from politicking (Cheng et al, 1993; So, 2013; 
Painter; 2004).  
As mentioned above, President Lee was at one time a bureaucrat/technocrat who turned 
into a politician. Taking cue from Japan, KMT strongly believed that in order to have national 
development, there was need for policy stability along with a growing economy. This meant that 
like Japan, Taiwan trusted its bureaucratic elite, who were technical experts within their issue 
areas, to formulate policy with a long-term view to maintain economic growth. The government’s 
job was to maintain law and order while ensuring the policies were implemented. If done right, the 
country would witness development and growth consistently (Clark, 2000) but if the policies 
backfired, the leadership of the KMT had plausible deniability by the virtue of policy delegation 
to technocrats and bureaucrats. In interviews senior bureaucrats, serving and retired, largely 
endorsed this point of view and credited the Japanese way of doing business as being the main 
driver of economic boom during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. They also agreed that given the elite status 
bureaucracy had in the society, it was a prestigious career choice and provided people with a 
meritorious path to becoming the elite. This is also how the KMT was able to attract talented local 
Taiwanese to join its ranks by the way of bureaucracy. Such initiatives eventually helped KMT 
recreate its image so that it was no longer viewed as the occupying force but instead the face of a 
new Taiwan. This was especially the case under the leadership of President lee Teng – hui.  
 The KMT is credited with democratizing Taiwan with a structured set of reforms that 
aimed to not only change the nature of the political system to become a multiparty democracy 
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but also aimed to re – educate the society on the need for democracy for continued growth. 
Previous literature argued that the turn to democratization for KMT was based on its selfish 
instinct to survive (Chen, 2008; Rigger, 2011; Yeh, 2014). But that does not take away from the 
fact that the way KMT instigated the democratization effort is largely why Taiwan is a vibrant 
democracy now. 
4.2.2 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
DPP finds its roots in the decades of resistance to the authoritarian one-party rule of KMT44. 
Made up of Tangwai activists who were averse to the KMT mantra and approach, DPP formally 
came in to being in 1986 after the softening of political restrictions under President Chiang Ching 
– kuo. Consisting of Taiwanese locals and indigenous people, the party relied on Southern Taiwan 
as its support base and from the beginning advocated for an independent Taiwan.  
Unlike Turkey or Pakistan, the main opposition party did not originate from within the 
founding party. In fact, the main opposition party came about as a culmination of organic alliances 
among both native and non – native Taiwanese activists and political detractors of the KMT regime 
who wanted political space to vent their frustrations with the one-party rule. The tangwai origin 
of the party gave it the unique ability to function as a catch all for all anti – KMT forces. This 
allowed the party to have a wider base that not only relies on ethnic Taiwanese but also pro – 
independence activists of all colors and stripes.  
Since its inception in 1986, DPP was KMT’s main rival. Anti – KMT sentiment drove the 
support base of the DPP. Even before it became a party, its founding members contested elections 
 
44 White Terror and Kaohsiung Incident are just some of the things that resulted in a 
counterculture of activism and human rights in Taiwan that consolidated itself in to the 
Democratic Progressive Party.  
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as independents and won seats in the legislature. However, it was not until 1992 that the party 
appeared in the legislature as a genuine force, winning 51 of the 161 seats. It had earlier secured 
21 seats in the 1989 elections/byelections.  
The party won its first major election in 2000 when the party’s candidate Chen Shui – bian 
won the presidency in a three-way contest. Benefiting from a split in the KMT, DPP was able to 
gain the Presidency with 39.3% of the vote. The following year, the party proceeded to win its first 
majority in the Legislative Yuan elections with 36% of the vote, again benefitting from the 
conservative vote split between KMT and New Party. But even though the DPP was the biggest 
party in the legislature, the pan blue coalition led by the KMT, with support from New Party, 
maintained its control of the legislature. This impacted how much of his agenda President Chen 
was able to implement. 
When the party first came to power in 2000 via the Presidential elections, there was a 
serious concern with regards to how the military, but more importantly the bureaucracy would 
react to DPP in power. Although the bureaucracy had undergone reforms for over 15 years to 
retrain and redesign the institutions to facilitate democracy, the bureaucratic elites were assumed 
to be overwhelmingly pro – KMT with conservative values (Ho, 2005; Rigger, 2011; Yeh, 2014). 
The DPP leadership, faced with a hostile legislature, chose to build working relationships with the 
bureaucratic elites so that the business of governance could continue unhindered. The working 
relationships dependent on informal understanding between political appointees at the ministerial 
level and their administrative counterparts. The policy design process was divided and initially left 
with the bureaucratic elites like it had always been (Berman, et al, 2012). While DPP further 
reduced the role of the army by placing it under the Ministry of Defense and handing even more 
powers to the police, it left the bureaucracy largely to its own devices on issues of economic and 
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social policy. In the arena of foreign affairs, President Chen initially pushed for the hardline DPP 
stance of independence but eventually retracted to the status quo position preferred by his 
predecessors.  
DPP won the 2004 Presidential elections as well, with President Chen continuing till 2008 
as President of the country. Under pressure from corruption scandals that plagued the Presidency, 
the party lost significantly, winning just 27 sears out of 113 seats. In 2008, the party also lost the 
presidential election handily to the KMT. From 2008 to 2016, the party set forth on a path of 
restructuring to learn and change based on the lessons learned from their first governance stint. 
Under the leadership of Tsai Ing – wen, the party went through series of reform and ideological 
clarity to contest the 2012 Presidential election. With Tsai as its nominee, the party lost the 
elections again but was able to win control of majority of the municipalities in city governments 
in the 2014 elections. With control of 13 of the 22 municipalities across Taiwan, the DPP 
strengthened its grassroots movement to comprehensively win the 2016 Presidential election. With 
Tsai in power, DPP entered office with a clearer agenda in light of the Sunflower Movement of 
2014 i.e., the party wanted to establish a clear Taiwanese identity at home and abroad. This irked 
China as it saw Tsai and her DPP government trying to deviate from the agreed upon status quo.  
Importantly in their second term in power, the DPP stuck to their guns when it came to 
issues of reform. Unlike 2000 when they first came to power, the DPP in 2016 took power with a 
clear idea of what changes they wanted to conduct in policy. Not only was the party prepared, it 
spent the last eight years grooming experts and party personnel in policy areas so once the party 
was back in power, it could have its own policy making expertise to work alongside the 
bureaucracy that the party strongly believed to be siding with the KMT. In words of one senior 
DPP member of the National Security Council I interviewed, “Even when we (DPP) are in power, 
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we are competing with KMT interests. It might not be at the ballot but in conference rooms and 
governmental meetings”. The implication being, that bureaucracy was pro – KMT and to get 
anything done DPP had to bring in its own policy people rather than relying on the existing 
bureaucratic elites. This tussle for control of policy is what I discuss in greater detail later on in 
this chapter. 
4.2.3 Bureaucracy  
While there is significant literature on Taiwanese democratization from the perspective of 
political parties, elite capture and authoritarian regime transitions, little attention has been paid to 
the significant role played by the Taiwanese institutions in the successful transition and 
consolidation of democracy in Taiwan in the last three decades. The literature that does exist on 
bureaucracies focused on effectiveness of the bureaucracy and their role in the Taiwanese 
economic miracle (Clark, 2000; Cheng et al, 1993; Rigger, 2011). But for the purposes of this 
dissertation project, the bureaucracy is the key player in ensuring governance stability that led to 
economic growth that eventually was able to facilitate a successful transition and consolidation of 
democracy in Taiwan. Unlike previous literature, the intention here is to not view bureaucracy as 
an instrument of societal control, but instead to explore the role of bureaucratic elites in providing 
stability in times political crisis.  
To figure out this puzzle, of how the Taiwanese bureaucracy helped with maintaining 
governance stability over the years, I start by examining the bureaucracy and its evolution. In 
addition to relying on extensive literature (Cheng et al, 1998; Geddes, 1986; So, 2013; Painter, 
2004; Cheung, 2002; Berman et al, 2012; Dickson, 1993), I utilize the interviews I conducted with 
senior bureaucrats and politicians during my extensive fieldwork in Taiwan.  
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The Taiwanese bureaucracy is recruited through a competitive exam offered under the 
auspices of the Examination Yuan. Since, 1931, the Examination Yuan has conducted a 
competitive civil service exam that candidates must take in order to be inducted into the Civil 
Service. After KMT fled to Taiwan in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war, the party went 
through a complete reorganization. As mentioned earlier, in doing so the party extended its 
influence across all walks of life. This included the bureaucracy too. As a one-party state, 
bureaucracy was aligned with the party’s vision and approach. It was beneficial for bureaucrats to 
join the party cadre to secure promotions and benefits as those relied heavily on party ties and 
loyalty (Dickson, 1993; Painter, 2004). But while the party membership and influence in 
bureaucracy was visible, the bureaucracy was also given significant leverage via policy delegation 
and insulation from politics. Both bureaucrats and technocrats – who were also KMT members – 
were free to create policies that could help economic growth in the country as well as ensure apt 
service delivery to the citizens (So, 2013; Cheng et al., 1998). Essentially, the bureaucracy was 
insulated from the politics of the policies being implemented and were not answerable to anyone 
other than the KMT leadership.  
In Taiwan, the bureaucratic structure was a mixture of KMT technocrats recruited from 
abroad and elite universities within Taiwan and career bureaucrats. From the very beginning the 
bureaucratic structure was divided in to political and career. The career bureaucrats were the 
administrators while the political appointees were supposed to undertake party tasks. The parallel 
structures were put in place to create initiatives that could bypass the system to implement policy 
quickly. To help the reader visualize this, consider the parallel structure of the bureaucracy as a 
way of passing a law. In most circumstances, a bill must be debated, then edited, debated, passed 
through committees and congressional votes to eventually end up becoming a law pending 
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presidential approval. This is what administrative bureaucracy was supposed to do; follow the 
book. The ad hoc organizations staffed by party technocrats and bureaucrats are like executive 
orders, they get the job done without actually going through the process of getting the law passed 
first. During a time when the economy needed quick decisions and policy implementation, Taiwan 
opted to rely on the parallel model (So, 2013; Cheng, 1998).  
 Over time this allowed the bureaucracy to operate autonomously without fear of 
interference as it crafted policy, worked according to the laws defined under the constitutions and 
remained insulated from political meddling. The bureaucracy got its first exposure of public 
questioning and democracy in 1977, when for the first time tangwai became members of the 
legislature. Before this, the bureaucratic elites were only answerable to the executive but now they 
were expected to respond back to queries and requests of legislators (So, 2013). This was also the 
time when President Chiang Ching – kuo had started to initiative the process of democratization 
in Taiwan. To achieve this, the party was slowly backing away from its penetration of the society 
and state capture by giving more space to the administrative bureaucracy and relying on economic 
bureaucratic elites as well as party technocrats.  
 Throughout this period i.e. 1950s, 60s and 70s, the bureaucracy consisted mostly 
of mainlanders. It was only in late 1970s that the bureaucratic recruitment started targeting local 
Taiwanese under the Taiwanization drive of the President Chiang Ching – kuo.  It was this effort 
that eventually allowed Lee Teng – hui to make it to the Presidency. But throughout, the 
bureaucratic elite was squarely pro – KMT and loyal to the regime.  
 By early 1980s, as President Chiang Ching – kuo was setting up the country down 
the path of democratization, the bureaucracy was given formalized structures with ad hoc 
committees and organizations merged into the regular bureaucratic structure. The party adopted 
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the technocrats into the political ranks and appointing them as political appointees in ministries 
(Cheng et al, 1998). The consolidation of the multiple parallel systems in to formalized 
bureaucratic ministerial structures was an important step in laying down the groundwork for 
democratization. When in 1985, Chiang Ching – kuo decided to move towards democratization, 
he started with reforming the bureaucracy with a fifteen-year phased out plan. Phase one of this 
plan was what I mention above; formalizing bureaucratic structures and dissolving all ad hoc 
organizations.  
Unlike other countries where democratization is agreed and then elections happen within 
a short period of time, in Taiwan, before the transition was formally announced, a blueprint for 
bureaucratic reforms was agreed with a tapered roll out as not to shock the system via reforms and 
elections all at once. In nearly all interviews I conducted in Taiwan, there was a unanimous 
agreement that allowing the bureaucracy to reform over a long period of time was crucial for 
Taiwan to consolidate as a democracy. In fact, it was pointed out at numerous occasions that the 
reforms that bureaucracy went through allowed the bureaucratic elites to formulate the purpose 
and role they had in the society. Their job was technical in nature and focused on ensuring political 
stability that would facilitate business activity along with efficient service provisions for the 
citizenry. The reforms meant that the bureaucratic elites had time to consolidate their institutions 
and learn to work under political pressure and public scrutiny that was slowly introduced via local 
government and legislature elections. Even under these circumstances, the bureaucracy was 
answerable truly to the President. Think of this period of time as a practice match. It helped the 
bureaucratic elites understand the political pressures and possible points of interference and 
allowed them to time to figure out strategies on how to deal with them using bargaining chips like 
policy proposals and implementation mechanisms.  
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Figure 7. Waves of Bureaucratic Reforms45 
 
From 1986 to 1996, the bureaucracy changed its hiring practices and training to include 
pro – democracy topics with the view of training the bureaucrats from day one on the importance 
of democracy and what their role would be in those interactions with elected representatives. By 
the time Lee Teng – hui was elected to the Presidency for the second time, the bureaucracy had 
gone through election cycles for the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly and the Presidency. 
Given that KMT won all the elections, there was no major policy changes, but this gave the 
bureaucracy experience of dealing with elections, policy continuation as well as working with 
more involved leadership. Figure 7 illustrates the reforms and changes that bureaucracy went 
through years before democratic consolidation in Taiwan.  
A pertinent point to note during this time is how the bureaucratic elites come up with a 
working relationship. Even though the ruling coalition is still the same party, as part of the 
transition process, the bureaucratic elites lose their political insulation that allows them policy 
autonomy under previous tenures. Especially after 1993 when the administrative neutrality bill is 
presented in the Legislature to create a legal framework that requires a neutral bureaucracy, the 
 
45 Figure 6.1 is based on the information provided during key personnel interviews as well as 
literature such as Ho (2005), Rigger (2011), Painter (2004), So (2013), & Tan (2000).  
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bureaucratic elites are left to focus on their administrative duties. Additionally, with political 
appointees to ministries at parallel stature to career bureaucrats becoming a norm during the 1990s, 
the bureaucratic elite found it necessary to form informal understanding with the political 
appointees whereby they shared the responsibilities of ministry’s operations (Berman et al, 2012; 
So, 2013).  
In 2000, when the DPP’s Chen Shui – bian was elected as President, there were serious 
concerns about how state institutions, that were viewed as pro – KMT, would react. There was no 
major tussle when the DPP came to power, the bureaucracy provided support and advice as it was 
supposed to. The DPP ceded the space on policy issues in return for placing its supporters in 
ministries. The bureaucratic elites ensured that in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis, the 
change of government at home went smoothly while the policy focused remained to jumpstart the 
economy (Ho, 2005; Rigger, 2011). DPP continued working successfully with the bureaucracy 
and even won reelection in 2004. Eventually in 2008 as the DPP lost elections and KMT came 
back to power, the bureaucracy continued working in the same exact manner i.e. KMT rules while 
the senior bureaucratic elites governed.  It is important to mention that in the first tenure of DPP, 
it did not enact policies or measures that took away any of the powers of the bureaucracy or limited 
their benefits. In fact, it was not till 2009 that the legislature passed the administrative neutrality 
law that ensured that the bureaucracy could not take party in partisan politics.  
However, when the DPP came to power for the second time in 2016, it was skeptical of the 
bureaucratic elites and their commitment to helping out the DPP implement its agenda. DPP 
government members I interviewed strongly believed that the bureaucracy had piled on the DPP 
during the corruption scandals of 2005 and 2006 that eventually led to DPP being voted out of 
power. Additionally, they believed that the bureaucracy was slow to act on policy prescriptions 
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provided by DPP and was slow walking those initiatives tying them up in procedures. For the DPP 
faithful, the bureaucratic elites had too much of central role in governance and that had to change. 
The party had to bypass the bureaucracy, but the issue was that doing so was nearly impossible. 
So instead of delegating policy design to the bureaucratic elites to ensure a governance status quo, 
DPP recruited policy experts in preparation of 2016 and came to office with a clearly thought out 
and well-planned agenda in 2018. That agenda along with approvals was given to the bureaucracy 
for implementation with stricter oversight in the form of political appointees at the Deputy Minister 
level. Figure 8 highlights how this change was a departure from previous practices. The next 
section analyzes how the changing role of the bureaucracy and bureaucratic elites impact Taiwan’s 
transition.  
As established in earlier parts of this chapter, the bureaucracy in Taiwan is professional 
and is merit based. While the KMT allowed a small number of loyalists to join the bureaucracy 
through the back door of loyalty and commitment to the party or as highly skilled technocratic 
party members, the vast number of bureaucrats were recruited via competitive exams. In fact, it is 
well documented that the Taiwanese bureaucratic system is highly legal, and any changes need to 
be instigated by the Examination Yuan, passed by Legislative Yuan and then signed off by 
Executive Yuan. This kind of extensive legal structure insulates the bureaucracy from political 
meddling and preserves its quality. Additionally, as mentioned previously, the competitive exam 
to induct bureaucrats has been regularly given since 1931, guaranteeing a stable quality of 
recruitment.  
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Figure 8. Changing dynamics and responsibilities of relationship between ruling coalition 
and the bureaucratic elites in Taiwan46 
 
4.3 Testing the Theory  
My theory argues that Taiwan’s trajectory to becoming a vibrant democracy with 
exceedingly high standards of public service delivery and stable governance is due to the high 
quality of bureaucracy Taiwan has been able to build, as a result of years of reform, and the 
institutional autonomy given to the senior bureaucratic elites. As I clarified earlier, this dissertation 
 
46 This chart is based on my own analysis that is built on key personnel interviews and 
immersive research. The literature I cover throughout this chapter also aids in formulating this 
illustration. The purpose of this figure is to simplify for the reader the changes in the relationship 
between the ruling coalitions and the bureaucratic elites. The collaboration ends in favor of DPP 
short-circuiting the system to get their policy agenda off the ground in their second term.  
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is not focused on democratization, but good stable governance in the case of Taiwan led to 
democratization.  
In this section, I apply my theory of bureaucratic governance stability to two recent 
incidents of political change in Taiwan. According to the theory, the reason Taiwan was able to 
smoothly transition to democracy as a result of the 2000 presidential elections was because the 
bureaucratic elites were in charge of governance and there was no change to institutional 
autonomy. In fact, the DPP government that came to power, quickly realized that in order to push 
their drastic agenda, they would need governance stability to make it easier to implement their 
own policy prescriptions.   
During this period, the DPP placed its members and activists in roles within government 
departments to gain experience of policy design, implementation and trains its own cadre that 
could assist in policy design in the future. What the party does in essence is to professionalize and 
improve its capacity to not just rule but also become an active participant in governance.  
When the party returned to power in the 2016 presidential elections, it had its own cadre 
of technocrats that it placed as political appointees in ministries alongside the career bureaucrats 
to ensure the DPP agenda is implemented. But unlike 2000, these attempts were seen as DPP 
impeding on institutional autonomy.  
In the next two sections, I present two instances of political change in Taiwan to illustrate 
how consistent governance firstly helped opposition parties’ rule after coming to power in the 2000 
presidential elections. Secondly, I discuss DPP coming to power again after the 2016 presidential 
election but this time contesting the governance space with senior bureaucratic elites while dealing 
with a foreign policy crisis.  
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4.3.1 Post 2000 Taiwan 
President Chen Shui – bian won a surprise victory in the 2000 presidential elections. In just 
fourteen years, DPP had gone from activists coming together to form a political party to push for 
Taiwanese independence to ruling the island of Taiwan. The popular consensus was that DPP 
would bring about series of changes that would be drastically different from the status – quo 
developed by the KMT. Given the support base of DPP, which was mostly left leaning activist 
groups from all walks of life, the party was expected to push for policy changes that were more in 
line with its left-wing agenda.  
For instance, there was the matter of name change for government run organizations like 
Chunghuwa Telecom and China Airlines. DPP wished to change those names to Taiwan Telecom 
and Taiwan Airlines. Then there were larger policy issue areas where the party had made promises 
to its base. Issues like Nuclear energy and educational reform were crucial items on the agenda for 
the 2000 elections. But as soon as the party came to power, it realized the political limitations it 
faced via the Legislative Yuan which was still controlled by the KMT and policy limitations due 
to the fact policy making was still controlled by the bureaucratic elite (Ho, 2005; Yeh, 2014).  
In addition to political and policy limitations to the agenda of the DPP, there was the matter 
of economic downturn in the Taiwanese economy. After years of boom, the economy was moving 
towards recession by late 2000. The ruling coalition made a strategic choice at this stage to build 
a reciprocal relationship with the bureaucracy to continue governance and build its internal 
capacity in the process. Much like AKP in Turkey, when DPP first came to power it lacked the 
policy know how to push forth its own policy agenda. However, unlike AKP, instead of forming 
an alliance with another partner to gain technical knowledge of policy processes, the DPP opted 
to build in house capacity on matters of policy making. This meant placing pro DPP activists and 
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academics in government departments as aides to the politically appointed ministers. By 
shadowing ministers and working closely with administrative deputy ministers, the younger cadre 
of DPP gained critical insights into governance and reduced the mistrust of bureaucracy among 
DPP faithful.  
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Figure 9. Taiwan After 2000 
Figure 9.  highlights interactions between DPP and bureaucracy during this period of governance. For the purposes of this argument, I am focusing on 4 major 
ministries that were crucial for the DPP agenda and the economy. These are the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor 
and Ministry of Finance. As shown below, the President appointed the Prime Minister and other Ministers to their positions. Under each minister for a 
permanent administrative deputy minister. Policy design and implementation stayed with bureaucrats, highlighted in yellow, while the decision making moved to 
the politicians, highlight in blue.  
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Under pressure from the Legislative Yuan, still controlled by KMT, President Chen Shui 
– bian worked to find policy prescriptions that could be implemented to support his base. He 
appointed loyalists and activists to Ministerial positions but when the economy in 2001 suffered 
heavily, the DPP’s focus shifted towards revamping the economy and at least sustaining economic 
progress. This change of focus saw DPP revert to the bureaucratic elites to come up with tried and 
tested infrastructure development policies that KMT had implemented during their tenures. 
Lacking economic and development policy experience, DPP relied exclusively on the bureaucracy 
to design interventions, some of which ran counter to the environmentalist agenda of the DPP. For 
instance, the DPP was determined to wean Taiwan off nuclear energy but with a slowing economy 
and lack of alternative for affordable power, they backed off the issues and allowed it to continue 
(Ho, 2005). The softening approach of the DPP and willingness to work with the bureaucracy on 
parsimonious policy options helped the economy stabilize and DPP win another election in 2004 
all courtesy of the bureaucratic elite taking the lead in stabilizing the country through crises. Figure 
5.3 represents the network map of how the government operated throughout the first tenure of 
DPP. The following KMT tenure would be identical to this as well.  
Slight changes start happening in 2016, when the DPP comes back to power but having 
done their homework and with an uncompromising leadership at the helm.  
4.3.2 Post 2016 Taiwan 
Having lost the 2012 Presidential election to incumbent President Ma, Tsai Ing – wen led 
the DPP to a comprehensive victory in the 2014 local elections and eventually the 2016 presidential 
and the Legislative Yuan elections. In the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement, the DPP adopted 
the demands of the students and concerns of the activists regarding proximity and dependence on 
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China. In eight years between 2008 and 2016, President Ma’s policy towards China had helped 
the economy sustain a stable, albeit a low, growth rate. Relying on Taiwanese investments and 
exports to China, Taiwanese economy and foreign policy was China centric to the point that 
signing a trade agreement was deemed necessary. The backlash of the proposed trade agreement 
was what triggered the Sunflower Movement.  
When the DPP came to power, one of the crucial tasks was to reorient Taiwan’s economy 
and foreign policy with immediate effect. President Tsai set about doing so by aggressively 
advocating for pension and work reform as well as pushing forth her signature New Southbound 
Policy47. The most controversial of these reforms was the pension reform which the DPP argued 
was necessary to save the economy. Former KMT governments had set up expansive and lavish 
pension structures for government workers, bureaucrats and military. Over time, because of 
economic growth and social changes, more people chose to go into the private sector and people 
started living longer. The result of this was a ballooning pension bill for the national government 
that DPP wanted to slash. The problem was, cutting down benefits for civil servants, teachers and 
military would seem like a political attack on KMT’s support base as well as an attack on the 
autonomy of institutions that were allowed to set up these rules themselves. Secondly, there was 
severe backlash on such a reform from within the government and the general public.  
In addition to this, the DPP government that came to power in 2016 was significantly 
different from President Chen’s 2000 government as this was a more left-wing group of candidates 
with stronger activist roots and clearer policy prescriptions. For instance, President Tsai has a PhD 
from London School of Economics, has worked under the KMT government of President Lee Teng 
 
47 Articles like https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/governing-taiwan-is-not-easy-president-tsai-
ing-wens-first-year/ and https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,23,180&post=3867 detail the 
kind of challenges President Tsai was expected to address as she took office.  
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– hui as Taiwan’s Chief World Trade Organization negotiator as well as advisor on state to state 
relations. Similarly, her cabinet members were either former advisors in previous governments or 
highly regarded independent activists on issues like green development and urban renewal. In 
essence then the government that came to power in 2016, was better prepared to not only rule 
Taiwan but also become a stakeholder in governance.  
President Tsai was not as pragmatic and willing to cede space on matters of policy. This 
meant that the new DPP government viewed the role of the bureaucratic elites differently than its 
predecessors. It did not want the bureaucratic elites to act as a stabilizing force with regards to 
governance, instead they wanted them to work under the DPP government’s policy agenda. But 
instead of altering the role of the bureaucratic elites in the system, by gutting the quality and 
politicizing state institutions, like in the case of Turkey, DPP dealt with the situation in a unique 
manner. According to DPP officials interviewed, the party staunchly believes that the bureaucracy 
leans KMT and will always view the DPP as leftwing activists who lack pragmatism to understand 
the capacity of institutions. Given this view, the DPP fears that their policy agenda cannot be 
implemented unless the party takes an active role in not just crafting the policy but also on 
implementation. The bureaucracy moves slow and is behind the times on picking up newer trends, 
hence there is a need to update them. The problem is, bureaucratic elite are career bureaucrats with 
specialty in one specific area of governance. Replacing them is next to impossible and convincing 
younger people to join the civil service in a time where the private sector pays significantly more 
is difficult. 
The workaround to this the DPP came up with was to appoint political Deputy Ministers 
or Vice Ministers in each ministry. Instead of inducting large numbers of new people at junior 
levels, DPP chose to pass laws that would allow them to make more political appointments at the 
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top level. This means at the helm of each ministry, there are now three political appointees and 
one career bureaucrats. The purpose of doing so was to get a greater role in crafting policy and 
then implementing it while diluting the power of bureaucratic elites without wrecking the whole 
system or politicizing the bureaucracy.  
Figure 10 highlights the new structure of governance that DPP introduced in Taiwan after 
coming to power in 2016. It is a more sophisticated version of Figure 9 with major difference in 
dilution of authority and importance of career bureaucrats by simply appointing qualified political 
technocrats alongside them. DPP leaders point to the successful implementation of the New 
Southbound Policy as one of the major victories of this redesigned reciprocal relationship. A pro 
status quo bureaucracy initially resisted the implementation but with DPP adding foreign affairs 
specialists to implement the policy at ministerial levels, the policy has rolled out, albeit slowly, 
but without the kind of compromise that President Chen had to face during his tenure.  
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Figure 10. Post 2016 Taiwan’s Governmental Structure
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4.4 Conclusion  
Based on the evidence presented throughout this chapter, the case of Taiwan is a fascinating 
example of how bureaucratic elites can carve out a central role for themselves that focuses on 
providing system with the governance stability it needs to survive political changes. When the 
former opposition party finally came to power in 2000, the DPP had little to no governance 
experience. It relied on the senior bureaucratic elites to take the driving seat with regards to 
governance while the DPP and KMT ensured there was a semblance of political stability. 
However, in 2016, the DPP government came to power with the intention to contest the 
bureaucratic elites on matters of governance. In any other case this would have resulted in the 
system suffering through gridlock and political fallout, but in Taiwan’s case, the DPP approached 
governance by improving their inhouse policy capacity and ability. In a sense, the DPP built “high 
quality” politicians who were able to not only work with the bureaucracy at their level but also 
provided the autonomy to do so by being political appointees in the system.  
Taiwan’s case supports my theory; to have governance stability “high quality” bureaucracy 
and institutional autonomy are essential. But more importantly it provides nuance to my theory 
regarding the importance of highly trained technical personnel and independent institutions. This 
case highlights how a political party can become a stakeholder in the governance process at the 
policy level by building the same kind of capacity that we normally expect bureaucratic elites to 
have. If a political party can possess those same capabilities, it will not only be able to push through 
its agenda, it will also be able to consolidate governance stability as an important feature of a 
democracy.  
The innovation within the theory that I observed while analyzing how DPP has governed 
since 2016 is the willingness of DPP to work within the system but diluting the influence of those 
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who are pro – status quo. Table 4 highlights how the authority of the bureaucracy is cut down by 
nearly 25% in the second tenure of the DPP in 2016. Meanwhile their centrality within the policy 
making process is minimized but not completely gutted. The interesting lesson from this case is 
the ability of a political party to work within the system by building its own capacity and bringing 
innovation through legislation to better govern. Additionally, with such strong political presence 
in policy making, the bureaucracy is insulated from blowback of policies. For instance, the pension 
reforms backlash was faced squarely by the DPP during the 2018 local elections. During our 
interview, the deputy administrative minister of Labor, the top bureaucrat who oversaw the pension 
reforms, categorically explained how his personal stance over the issue did not play any part in his 
ability to implement the policy. According to him, the politicians made an informed choice and 
they own the policy. He further argued that politicians are the face and hence put themselves out 
there. Their concern is staying in power and winning an election. That frees up the bureaucracy to 
focus on efficiency and service delivery.  
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Table 4. Post 2000 and Post 2016 Network Changes in Taiwan 
 
Taiwan Post 2000  Taiwan Post 2016 
Title  Authority HUB 
Eigen 
Centrality  
Title  Authority HUB 
Eigen 
Centrality  
President 0.41346 0.41345 0.71998  President 0.29906 0.29908 0.501436 
Prime Minister 0.57366 0.57362 1  Prime Minister 0.59538 0.59532 1 
Economic Minister 0.28681 0.28682 0.49959  Economic Minister 0.25388 0.25388 0.425878 
Finance Minister 0.28681 0.28682 0.49959  Finance Minister 0.25388 0.25388 0.425878 
Labor Minister 0.28681 0.28682 0.49959  Labor Minister 0.25388 0.25388 0.425878 
Foreign Minister 0.28681 0.28682 0.49959  Foreign Minister 0.25388 0.25388 0.425878 
Deputy Minister 
Finance 
0.20672 0.20673 0.36027 
 
Deputy Minister Finance 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
Deputy Minister 
Labor 
0.20672 0.20673 0.36027 
 
Deputy Minister Labor 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
Deputy Minister 
Economy 
0.20672 0.20673 0.36027 
 
Deputy Minister Economy 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
Deputy Minister 
Foreign 
0.20672 0.20673 0.36027 
 
Deputy Minister Foreign 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Finance P 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Labor P 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Economy P 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Foreign P 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Foreign P 2 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Economy P 2 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Finance P 2 0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
     Deputy Minister Labor P 2  0.15766 0.15767 0.264578 
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In the case of Taiwan, had the KMT not defanged the military and shut down the secret 
police in favor of handing those powers to civilian police service, Taiwan would have run in to the 
same problems as Turkey as I discuss in the next chapter. The high-quality bureaucracy was 
necessary to govern from day one, but Taiwan was fortunate to end up in a situation where there 
was a disproportionate number of subject matter experts available to even staff the lower levels. 
Most significantly, democracy did not happen overnight or in the short run. It was not like Turkey 
or even Pakistan where the elections are announced in response to mounting local and international 
pressure. For Taiwan, the focus was building a stable political and governance environment over 
the years that ended up with Taiwan democratizing. The governance stability that the high quality 
bureaucracy and independent institutions provided Taiwan, only facilitated the democratization 
further as politicians did not need to worry about delivering on basic human services when they 
came to power, instead they had the space and time to settle in to their political role and provide 
stable leadership.  
5 TURKEY: INSTITUTIONS WRECKED AND A DEMOCRACY LOST 
Until June 2016, Turkey was still seen as a shining example of what a democracy could be 
in the Middle East. The country was not just of interest to political scientists studying democratic 
transitions but also to anthropologists, sociologists and economists. All of whom were trying to 
understand how Turkey was successful in building a vibrant democracy from the ashes of years of 
autocratic rule while maintaining economic growth in a region that is notorious for autocratic rule 
and muzzling free speech.  
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But then in July, the mirage of good governance and political stability in Turkey ended 
suddenly. There was a failed coup attempt allegedly led by the Gülenists48, followers of religious 
cleric Fethullah Gülen, who wanted to seize power from their one-time ally; the AK Parti (AKP). 
AKP had established itself as a political force on the back of years of good governance and stable 
political climate. The July 2016 failed changed all that. The coup attempt failed and President 
Erdoğan clung to power long enough to launch a full-scale counter coup operation that resulted in 
massive purges throughout all government departments, including the military, police, 
gendarmerie, intelligence and even civil services49.  
To most observers, it would seem as if that one fateful night in 2016 paved the way for 
President Erdoğan to gut the system through purges and order a referendum in 2017 that effectively 
granted him the powers to be the new Sultan of Turkey. However, this chapter argues that what 
happened in 2016 was a result of decades long struggle between the politicians and bureaucratic 
 
48 The term ‘Gülenists’ refers to the followers of the cleric Fethullah Gülen. Gülen leads Muslim 
reform movement that focuses on education and social work. The movement believes that 
moderate Islam, hard work and education are the solution to the problems of average Turks. If 
faith was used in a positive manner along with education, the society will be transformed into a 
progressive yet pious place where low inequality. In framing the movement as a community for 
betterment of society, Gülenists became attractive for middle and lower middle-class people who 
wished for a more equitable yet faith-oriented society. At one point, the group ran hundreds of 
schools, colleges and cram schools with hostel facilities across Turkey. This allowed the group to 
train young people from an early age and help them get educated so they were set up for jobs, 
especially in the government. While the group has denied it had political ambitions at any time, 
there is consensus that Fethullah Gülen wished for the movement to influence the state in manner 
where it could achieve its overarching goal of a faith-based society with low inequality. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846 
49 The reporting on the coup attempt is varied. For reference purposes, the reporting I used comes 
from the following sources https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/turkey-failed-coup-
attempt-161217032345594.html, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/07/16/537549673/a-year-later-a-divided-turkey-
remembers-failed-coup-attempt and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36816045 
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elite or ‘Bureaucratic Oligarchy’50 as President Erdoğan calls them. The struggle was over 
governance. AKP built its political brand on being able to offer service delivery more effectively 
than any other political stakeholder in the system. They pride themselves in being able to work 
within the system to ensure there was good governance. This led to AKP impeding on institutional 
autonomy of traditionally independent institutions in Turkey that had operated with complete 
control of policy and implementation since the modern Turkish state was built by Mustafa 
‘Atatürk’ Kemal.   
By exploring the history of modern Turkish state, starting from its origins under Mustafa 
‘Atatürk’ Kemal to its current status, I argue that the tussle between the politicians and bureaucratic 
elite has been an ongoing phenomenon that contributed to series of coups Turkey went through in 
the 70s, 80s and the 90s. I further argue that initially when AKP came to power in 2002, it relied 
heavily on the bureaucratic elites by ceding space on key policy issues like accession to the EU, 
defense management, internal security and appointment of judiciary. The traditionally Kemalist51 
 
50 The term is used by President Erdoğan on numerous occasions to paint a picture of a deep state 
enemy within the state that is blocking the people’s agenda. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-sheds-light-on-turkeys-new-presidential-system-
133609 and https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/04/15/the-vote-that-will-determine-the-
fate-of-turkeys-democracy 
51 Kemalism refers to the ideology of Mustafa ‘Atatürk’ Kemal. The ideology is the foundation 
of the Turkish republic and revolves around the ‘Six Arrows’ or the six core principles of the 
Republic. These principles are: Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Laicism, Statism and 
Reformism. Republicanism is the belief that the Republic is to be run by the people i.e. 
democracy is necessity for the Turkish republic. Nationalism focuses on creating a counter 
narrative to the Ottoman idea of being. For the Turkish Republic, Nationalism is the idea of a 
new Turkish identity that is inclusive. Populism is a variation on the idea of Republicanism i.e. 
the people and their concerns come first and their role in society is crucial. Again, this ideal was 
a counter to the Ottoman idea of Islamism or provincialism as a source of mobilization in the 
society.  Laicism is the idea that the state should be completely secular with no religious 
involvement. Statism talks about the responsibility of the state to provide goods and services to 
its citizens such as education and healthcare. While Reformism was the idea of the revamping all 
institutions left by the Ottomans. What we refer to as Kemalism is now is a mixture of these 
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military and bureaucratic elites, played along with the AKP as they kept the status quo intact. AKP 
focused on areas like economy and infrastructure development, issues that got them elected in the 
first place. Additionally, as AKP was new to national politics, it lacked the experience of national 
governance and a rapport with the powerful Kemalist military and bureaucratic elites.  
It was not until 2007, when AKP had won its second national election in a landslide victory, 
that AKP came to loggerheads with the bureaucratic and military elite on the issue of appointment 
of the President. I argue that this was the start of a critical juncture that saw AKP push back against 
the military initially and eventually against the bureaucratic elites. By 2010, AKP had weakened 
the Kemalist military through series of judicial purges that they were no longer a political threat. 
Once done with neutralizing its only political foe in the country, AKP turned its attention to 
grabbing control of governance in Turkey by weakening the hold of senior bureaucratic elite. They 
did so by building an alliance with the religious group led by Fethullah Gülen, whose followers 
included highly educated professionals serving the military and bureaucracy. The alliance 
provided AKP the replacement cadre they needed in order to continue governing while purging 
bureaucratic old guard. Eventually when the AKP fell out with the Gülenists over control policy 
issues such as dealing with the Syrian Civil War and peace with Kurdish separatists52, it left the 
country in an open fight between the civilian bureaucratic elites dominated by Gülenists and the 
political government led by AKP53 (Taş, 2018). While many would view this as a crisis of 
 
ideas but mostly focused on secularism, Turkish identity and the duty of the state to provide for 
citizens (Ciftchi, 2013). 
52 AKP wanted to take a bigger role in the Syrian Civil War and ensure peace with the Kurdish 
separatists inside Turkey. The Gülenists wanted nothing to do with the Syrian conflict and 
wished to fight the Kurds rather than make peace with them.  
53 The break up between the Gülen Movement and AKP has been well documented. A good 
summary is available at https://www.dw.com/cda/en/from-ally-to-scapegoat-fethullah-gulen-the-
man-behind-the-myth/a-37055485  
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governance, this in fact was a political crisis as the Gülenists operated like a political group rather 
than the traditional senior bureaucratic elites I have mentioned in other cases. This public conflict 
culminated in to the failed 2016 coup attempt that led to the purges in government services of 
anyone suspected of being a Gülenists or more generally against the AKP.  
Based on this, I argue that that the purges in 2010 and 2016 fundamentally changed the 
institutional structure of Turkey and paved the way for President Erdoğan to become an autocrat 
and hurt the political as well as economic stability of the country. In doing so, AKP first hurt the 
institutional autonomy in 2010 by swapping out the old bureaucratic elite with the new pro – AKP 
Gülenists while in 2016 the purges simply dismantled the bureaucracy, replacing it with AKP party 
members. In essence, Turkey’s case is one where the political elites categorically dismantled a 
high-quality bureaucracy by politicizing it first and then revamping its recruitment, training and 
promotions structures to the point it could no longer continue to be a stabilizing force in Turkey 
when the country faced a political crisis.  
This chapter also highlights that the choices made by AKP to swap out the Kemalist 
bureaucratic elite with the Gülenists was a mistake on AKP’s part. The Kemalist Bureaucratic elite 
was sufficiently weakened as a result of the 2010 purges that it lacked the cohesion, resources and 
clout to launch a coup. The focus of most current literature on Turkey’s failed coup of 2016 
distracts from the core issue under discussion in this dissertation project i.e. quality of bureaucracy 
and its aggressive weakening of institutional autonomy under AKP. Throughout this chapter, I 
focus on AKP’s willingness to gut the military and bureaucratic elite and then altering the nature 
of the institutions by stacking them with loyalists. The 2016 coup attempt simply hastened the 
process of AKP stripping and stuffing the bureaucracy in order to create an AKP aligned Islamist 
bureaucratic elite similar to the Kemalist bureaucracy in influence. According to my argument, 
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this has left Turkey more susceptible to political and governance crises, as witnessed in the recent 
municipal elections where AKP lost heavily. Now the opposition Mayors and Governors are 
fighting the AKP led central government that exposes Turkey on issues of not just politics but 
governance as well, while the country now lacks any stabilizing force.  
The chapter starts off with a brief historical background of the modern Turkish republic 
since its formation in 1923. That is followed by a discussion on the institutions the new Turkish 
republic enacted and the focus on creating a professionalized bureaucracy based on lessons learned 
from the Ottoman empire. I discuss the different institutional reforms undertaken in Turkey and 
their impact on governance as well as the changing role of the bureaucratic elite with successive 
governments in Turkey in recent history. I then present two instances whereby the bureaucracy 
was initially politicized and then its quality impacted negatively by the political elites.  
5.1 Historic and Political Background 
The modern Turkish republic was formed in the aftermath of the First World War and the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire. With dwindling influence and a comprehensive defeat in World 
War 1 (WW1), the Ottoman Empire was in shambles. In this chaos, multiple groups were trying 
to get rid of the monarchs in Istanbul to establish a new republic. In 1919, Mustafa ‘Atatürk’ Kemal 
rose to prominence to assume the leadership role in the fight for modern Turkey. A former Ottoman 
commander, Atatürk spent the next four years fighting battles to secure the borders of what would 
be the new state and negotiating with France and the UK to declare independence. Finally, in 1923, 
the modern Turkish republic was born under the leadership of Atatürk.  
With independence secured, Atatürk launched comprehensive reforms to overhaul the 
Turkish society and transform it into a modern republic. Having witnessed defeat as an Ottoman 
commander in WW1, Atatürk was determined the modernize Turkey in every possible way. 
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Secularism became a key principle and Ottoman heritage was downplayed. In the Ottoman Era, 
the military, religious scholars and governors of provinces would butt heads regularly over 
governance issues. Atatürk dismantled the system completely by shutting down all religious courts 
and taking away powers of governors and security forces. By effectively taking apart all 
institutions of the Ottoman Era and replacing them with new ones designed in his own image, 
Atatürk gave the Turkish republic a fresh start with none of the baggage (Kara, 1998; Öğün, 2007; 
Akçelı, 2014).  
To effectively rule and set up a future move towards a multiparty system, Atatürk formed 
the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in 1923. From 1923 till Atatürk’s death in 1938, Turkey 
functioned as a one-party state with former Ottoman elites, who defected early to aid Atatürk’s 
creation of modern Turkey, occupying top positions. Figure 11 explains the governance structure 
and major players in it from 1923 till 1950. The party ruled Turkey from 1923 till 1950 when it 
was beaten in an election by the Democratic Party (DP) led by former CHP Member, Adnan 
Menderes who had developed differences with Atatürk’s successor, İsmet İnönü. And while Adnan 
Menderes was part of elite that led the reforms under Atatürk at CHP, he faced resistance from the 
bureaucratic elite that were firmly CHP and Kemalist throughout his rule from 1950 to 1960. 
As the first elected government of Turkey, DP understood the challenges it was walking in 
to from day one. Having been once part of the ruling coalition, Adnan Menderes understood the 
challenges to his authority as the Prime Minister from military and civilian bureaucratic elites. So, 
as soon as DP took power, it launched a systematic offensive against CHP and its political base 
leading to confiscation of its properties and even dismantling of its offices in various provinces. 
In successive elections in 1954 and 1957, DP continued to go after CHP based on the 
understanding that any opening for the CHP would mean the end of DP and democracy in Turkey 
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(Karpat, 1972; Akçelı, 2014). It is pertinent to note that the way Turkey was formed and ruled for 
the initial 27 years, the CHP was the state i.e. majority of the military leadership and the civilian 
bureaucratic elite were members of the CHP that helped Atatürk form Turkey and strongly 
believed in protecting the utopia they had designed.  
 
From 1923 till 1950, Turkey was ruled as a one-party state. The founding father, Mustafa ‘Atatürk’ Kemal, 
established the modern Turkish republic in what Huntington (1962) calls a 'Revolutionary Coup' that effectively 
defeated the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Since its founding, Atatürk built the country in his image i.e. his 
ideology of adopting Western Institutions and Political Norms of secularism and nationalism without any major 
cultural changes. This ideology came to be known as ‘Kemalism’ (Kadercan and Kadercan, 2016). Atatürk’s 
political vehicle, the CHP, embodied this ideology and so did the bureaucracy as well as the military. Given all 
players in governance originated from the same party, their role was complementary, with a focus on implementing 
and guarding the Kemalist agenda. 
 
 
Figure 11. Major Players in Turkish Politics 1923 to 1950 
 
So, through the 1950s when DP was dismantling the CHP fearing for its own survival, it 
was also antagonizing the military and bureaucratic elite that was essentially rooted in the CHP 
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ethos. Eventually in 1960, the military with significant help from the bureaucratic elites took over 
in a coup d'état. The military rewrote the constitution ensuring it had a role to play in protecting 
the Kemalist values of the republic. They disbanded the DP and allowed for formation of new 
parties before the elections in 1961. The Democratic Party’s remnants formed the Justice Party 
(AP) and contested elections in 1961. As no party won an absolute majority, CHP entered into an 
alliance with AP and nominated Süleyman Demirel as the Prime Minister of Turkey. From 1961 
to effectively 1983, Turkey saw two more coup d'états with new political parties being created out 
of old ones to fulfill the purpose of the Military governments. Although the parties and their 
support base might have been new, the key players like Adnan Menderes, Turgat Özal and 
Süleyman Demirel remained relevant in the system. With the military having rewritten the 
constitution again in 1982, elections were held in 1983 where the Military chosen party, National 
Democracy Party (MDP) shockingly lost to the Motherland Party (ANAP) led by former 
bureaucrat, Turgat Özal (Gözler, 2013; Akçelı, 2014). 
From 1983 till 1989, Turgat Özal introduced series of reforms that helped Turkey jumpstart 
its economy while maintaining peace at home. As a former top bureaucrat, Özal was able to 
maintain amicable relations with the military and bureaucratic elites in the country. As a result of 
these relationships, the tough economic reforms Özal pushed for were implemented and helped 
stabilize the Turkish economy in the long run. Given the trust he had earned from state institutions 
and public, Prime Minister Özal became President Özal in 1989 and oversaw the elections in 1991 
before passing away in 1993. It was during this time that Süleyman Demirel made a comeback as 
the Prime Minister before becoming the President of the Republic after Özal passed away.  
From 1993 till 2001, Turkey underwent various rounds of elections with more political 
parties being formed and seeking office. Similar to the 90s in case of Pakistan, none of the 
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governments completed their terms and the military intervention was heavy handed throughout. 
During this period Turkish society also became more divided on the lines of Islamists and 
secularists. As the military and successive governments since independence had been secular and 
Kemalist in their approach to governance, the conservative religious population of the country felt 
alienated in Turkey. But since the 1980s, the religious conservatives had found a political voice in 
form of first Refah Party (Welfare Party – RP), that was outlawed by military in 1997, only to be 
reborn as the Virtue Party (FP). The moderate wing of the FP would eventually form the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2001 (Akçelı, 
2014).  
As history of Turkey is not the focus of this chapter, a critical element is lost in the 
shortened discussion on Turkish modern state’s political trajectory. That element is how the 
bureaucratic elite kept moving into politics by forming political parties and how the old CHP guard 
continued to hoard power under the guise of protecting secularism and Kemalist values via military 
rule and new parties. For instance, Adnan Menderes handpicked Süleyman Demirel to be the future 
leader of Turkey in the 1960s and promoted him within the party. Similarly, the Generals chose 
Turgat Özal for interim governments in early 1980s based on his performance as a bureaucrat and 
his secularist leaning. İsmet İnönü’s son, Erdal İnönü’s party Social Democratic Party (SDP) was 
the reason Süleyman Demirel’s was Prime Minister from 1991 till 1993. 
And while the old guard continued to wield power, conservative Islamists were kept away 
from the corridors of power as evidenced through the dismantling of successive political parties 
that sought to represent this group. So finally, when, in 2002, the AKP under Erdoğan and Gül 
came to power they were rightly afraid of losing from day one, much like the case of Adnan 
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Menderes was in 1950. The system was stacked against AKP with the military, bureaucratic elite 
and even the judiciary, squarely pro – secular/Kemalist values.  
What has since happened is a repeat of the last 4 decades of Turkish political history played 
out in 16 years with completely different results. Unlike DP and ANAP, the AKP did not challenge 
the military or bureaucratic elites initially. Afraid that their government will be overthrown by the 
military, AKP focused on turning the economy around and development work around the country. 
The party waited till they developed their own expertise on policy and governance issues. They 
established their own model of what a Moderate Islamic political party can be and built a base 
reliant on conservative citizens as well as business friendly communities.  
Allying themselves with moderate religious groups like the Gülen Movement (GM), the 
AKP were able to make inroads in the bureaucratic and military elite circles by placing Gülenists 
in those positions. Once the alliance had been formed, the AKP purged the bureaucratic old guard 
and replaced them with Pro – AKP Gülenists. Over time, the Gülenists wanted more to say in 
policy making and demanded more say in governance, while AKP saw this as a challenge to their 
control54. Between 2013 and 2015, the fight came out in public with Gülenists in law enforcement 
and judiciary going after alleged AKP corruption while AKP purging the government of Gülenists 
and shutting down their education network of schools (Taş, 2018). After winning the snap elections 
in 2015, AKP went after the Gülenists with full force, often addressing them as a ‘parallel state’ 
within the state. Eventually in July 2016, Gülenists in the military launched a failed coup d'état. 
Erdoğan and AKP survived the coup attempt. Their first response was to launch a full-scale purge 
of all government services targeting any person who was even remotely considered to have 
 
54 Middle East Institute details the chronology of the relationship between the two groups that led 
to the eventual coup attempt https://www.mei.edu/publications/clash-former-allies-akp-versus-
gulen-movement 
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sympathies to Gülenists. Over a 100,000 people were dismissed from government service while 
thousands were sent to prison pending cases for sedition and treason55. This created a crisis in the 
civil service as most of the top tier staff was purged and bureaucracy was brought to its knees.  
As I explain in the next sections, the problem Turkey faces now is that AKP was so good 
at protecting itself from systemic challenges that it built a one-party state, like the post-
independence CHP led Turkish state, which is now rewriting the rules in Erdoğan’s image. 
Through two rounds of purges, AKP has cannibalized the bureaucracy and wrecked institutional 
integrity of state institutions.  
But before exploring that, it is critical to review the historical role of military and 
bureaucratic elites in Turkish politics since independence. The next section dives into the role 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have played in modern Turkey since independence.  
5.2 Role of Turkish Military in Politics 
The modern Turkish republic was founded as a result of a ‘revolutionary coup’ led by 
Atatürk and his forces that fought not just the colonial powers, the UK and France, but also the 
remnants of the Ottoman empire. For that reason, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have 
maintained a revered role in the Turkish society. The founder of the republic was a military 
commander, and his experiences informed the Kemalist ideology that is foundation of modern 
Turkey. The military is not just important since day one, it was the vehicle used by Atatürk to 
create the republic (Kadercan and Kadercan, 2016; Gürcan, 2018).  
 
55 Much has been written about the extent of these purges, as I was in Turkey conducting 
fieldwork while these purges were going on, I go in to detail on the havoc they wrecked on the 
public sector in the next section.  https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/05/turkey-
professional-annihilation-of-100000-public-sector-workers-in-post-coup-attempt-purge/ 
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This elevated role of the military gave it the special status of being viewed as the guardian 
of the Kemalist ideals and by extension the Turkish republic. The guardianship status the TAF 
assumed, has driven how the institution has performed and interacted with other organs of the 
state. Turkey has had four coups, three of them happening between 1960 and 1980. The military 
has been a constant player in the political arena until very recently. Throughout, the military was 
able to take charge and alter the constitution under the perceived role of being the guardian of the 
Turkish republic.  
Figure 12 illustrates the various coups and the resulting governance structure of the 
government after the coup. As a result of each coup, the political relationship and actors remained 
the same with slight changes in modality. The military saw itself as the guardian of Kemalist 
republic and intervened each time it saw the republic in danger. With each intervention, the 
military altered the constitution and wrote itself in to politics via the creation of the National 
Security Council; an institution that was to work together with the civilian leadership to maintain 
the sanctity of the republic. The first coup is often referred to as the ‘colonel’s coup’ as it was the 
colonels who conducted the coup as they felt left out of the economic gains happening in the 
Turkish society that somehow bypassed them. The younger cadre felt disenchanted and believed 
the Democratic Party was purposely targeting TAF as it viewed it as a pro CHP/ Kemalist 
institution (Akçelı, 2014; Kadercan and Kadercan, 2016; Gürcan, 2018).  
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Figure 12. Turkish Military in Politics 1923 to 2010 
 
The first coup resulted in a technocratic government made up of senior bureaucrats, who 
at the time were all CHP personnel. The technocratic government gave way to an elected 
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government of a renamed and revamped Democratic Party (DP). Former DP members, under the 
banner of Justice Party (AP), came to power after the elections of 1961 in an alliance with CHP. 
In the next elections in 1965, AP formed a single party majority government under the leadership 
of Süleyman Demirel. The government lasted till 1971 when the second coup happened.  
The 1971 coup was significantly more organized and structured. After years of political 
and economic turmoil that saw the economy stagnate while protesters took the street across major 
cities in Turkey, the military sent a memorandum to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel demanding 
an end to the government. The Prime Minister resigned and ended the government, handing 
military the power. The military reverted back to a technocratic government led by Kemalist 
bureaucracy to run the country and stabilize the economy till 1973 when new elections were held. 
The CHP, the Kemalist political party, won the elections and governed until 1977. New elections 
in 1977 resulted in no party gaining a clear majority and from 1977 till 1980, Turkey went through 
numerous minority coalition governments that further polarized the Turkish society along left- and 
right-wing politics. This period also saw the birth of Islamist politics under the leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan. Eventually in 1980, after worsening political violence and economic 
downturn, the military stepped in (Akçelı, 2014; Kadercan and Kadercan, 2016). Kadercan et al 
have argued that in this case, the military stepped in partly because of the rising Islamist sentiment 
in the society (2016).  
The years of turmoil after the indecisive elections of 1977 had allowed for Islamists to gain 
a foothold in smaller cities in Turkey and become competitive in larger cities like Istanbul. Sensing 
a challenge to the Kemalist values in addition to the political as well as economic issues, the 
military had no option but to step in. I refer to this coup as a ‘guardian coup’ because the military 
revamped the constitution to ensure they would become the figurative kill switch to save the 
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system from any threats i.e. Islamists. Upon taking power in 1980, the military again handed over 
the running of the government to a technocratic set up made up of Kemalist bureaucracy. 
Eventually when elections were held in 1983, former top bureaucrat, Turgat Özal’s Motherland 
Party swept to power. Given Özal already held roles under technocratic governments, his reforms 
were accepted and helped the economy stabilize. Özal became President in 1989 and his 
Motherland Party stayed in power till 1991 when they were beaten by Süleyman Demirel’s True 
Path Party, the third iteration of the Democratic Party that came to power in 1950.  
Between 1991 and 1997, Turkey went through numerous minority governments. In each 
case, the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) led by Necmettin Erbakan kept expanding its vote share. RP 
finally started getting traction during the 90s when it became the largest party in parliament after 
the 1995 elections but kept away from ruling under TAF pressure. Eventually as the minority 
government of CHP and Motherland Party fell in 1996, President Süleyman Demirel invited 
Erbakan to form a government. By 1997, the Kemalists in military and bureaucracy saw the RP 
government as a threat to the republic and swiftly forced RP out of power and disbanded it. The 
bureaucratic elite facilitated the military action by putting together cases and investigations into 
Islamist leanings of RP, followed by swift judicial decisions on disbanding RP. In doing so, the 
military and bureaucratic elites went after political Islamist groups whereby targeting businesses 
and institutions like religious seminaries by passing new regulations that made it harder for 
students to get jobs or go to university. While the Welfare Party was disbanded, it was reborn as a 
Virtue Party that contested the 1999 elections, only to be disbanded under the accusations that it 
was involved in unconstitutional i.e. anti – Kemalist activities.  
From the ashes of the Welfare Party and Virtue Party rose two parties; the moderates who 
formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the hardline Felicity Party (FP). In 2002, 
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the AKP won the elections and came to power on the platform of focusing on the economy and 
working to get EU accession for Turkey. From 2002 till 2007, AKP ruled while building intricate 
alliances with various disenfranchised groups and businesses with a long-term view of not falling 
out of favor like its predecessors. Eventually in late 2007 when the AKP and TAF came to 
loggerheads over the appointment of the President, AKP was ready to take on Kemalist TAF.  
While the military was considering moving forward with a coup, the AKP in alliance with 
its Gülenist allies moved swiftly to neutralize the military by taking Kemalist military elites to 
court on treason charges. During the Ergenekon and ‘Sledgehammer’ trials, AKP relied heavily on 
its newly minted alliance with the Gülenist bureaucratic elite the party had help build over the last 
five years. These judicial decisions were critical in purging the army and civil services of Kemalists 
that AKP viewed as a threat at that time. Hence, the 2010 coup, as Kadercan et al (2016) refer to 
as, was a counter coup. AKP was in charge with the help of the Gülenist bureaucratic elite.  
Post 2011, TAF saw its role in politics diminish. With a vibrant democracy, Turkey no 
longer needed a guardian and the two trials had smashed the notion of the guardian force by 
highlighting how rogue elements could use that against democracy. After years of dominance in 
politics, the TAF have since sat on the sidelines while the bureaucracy took center stage.  
In the next section, I go into details of how the bureaucratic elites have influenced Turkish 
politics since independence. I explore how their role has shifted over time and how the counter 
coup of 2010 changed the nature of the bureaucracy and politicized it. I also explain how the failed 
coup of 2016 led to deterioration in bureaucratic quality, that in turn led to gutting and stuffing of 
bureaucracy with AKP loyalists. In a span of 6 years, AKP not only changed the role both the 
military and bureaucratic elite, but it fundamentally altered the DNA of the bureaucracy by stuffing 
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it with loyalists. This, I argue, has left Turkey without a stabilizing force in times of governance 
crisis.  
5.3 Turkish Bureaucracy and its changing roles 
Modern Turkey was built by a military commander whose focus on efficiency and effective 
service delivery. Much like battle planning, Atatürk’s approach to designing the modern Turkish 
republic was to create a disciplined, ideologically secular and efficient set of institutions staffed 
by professionals who were highly educated and committed to modernization of Turkey away from 
its Ottoman history. For instance, the penal code was adopted from Italy while the civil code of 
the new Turkish republic was taken from the Swiss civil code. The judicial experts from the 
Ottoman era were made redundant through this change and so were the religious scholars who had 
played a crucial part in matters of law during that time (Akçelı, 2014).  
To understand modern Turkey and the role bureaucratic elite have played throughout its 
history, it is necessary to understand that everything was designed in Atatürk’s image and in 
reaction to centuries of Ottoman rule. As the Ottoman rule derived its power from religion, the 
new system of the republic was inherently secular. That meant that the institutions and bureaucracy 
were designed to be secular, purpose driven, impersonal and specialized. In essence, Atatürk 
designed the Turkish bureaucracy based on Weber’s wish list (Halhalli, 2016; Weber, 1968). 
Another factor at play in Turkey during the formative years was that Atatürk was operating via a 
single party system i.e. CHP and the new Turkish Republic’s government were operating as a 
single unit. The armed groups that helped Atatürk formed the Turkish Army while the political 
and social supporters became the CHP and the first set of leaders driven by their disdain for the 
Ottoman era. This had long term impacts because even when in 1938, Atatürk passed away, Turkey 
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slowly moved towards a multiparty democracy, nearly all of the top tier bureaucracy i.e. 
bureaucratic elite came from the CHP and staunchly believed in Kemalist values (Mardin, 2000).  
From an early stage, Turkey had a well thought out plan for training the bureaucracy. This 
was in part down to the fact that the Ottoman empire had lasted for centuries primarily due to 
sophisticated bureaucratic structures that were efficient in tax collection and maintaining law 
across the land. The issue was the Ottoman bureaucratic elites were mostly non-Turkish, often 
brought in from Eastern European part of the empire. The logic behind doing so was that these 
bureaucrats, when moved to Istanbul, were only loyal to the Sultan. They weren’t caught up in the 
familial fights of the Ottoman elites or the politics in Istanbul, they were simply focused on 
effectively running the empire based on what the Sultan wanted.  
For the new Turkish republic that sought to delete its Ottoman past and move away to a 
westernized republic with modern institutions, it was essential to revamp the bureaucracy with 
newer ideals. That is why Kemalism was so influential in the beginning; it served as the foundation 
for putting together a new military and a bureaucracy. As mentioned, initially the bureaucracy was 
based on CHP members who were educated and experienced in their field. Slowly, over time the 
recruitment process and promotions structures were fleshed out, setting up the foundation of the 
modern Turkish bureaucracy.  
Turkish bureaucracy is recruited via specialized exams at the national level. Based on the 
exam results, top candidates go through a series of interviews to determine their capabilities. 
Eventually the chosen candidates are sent to six-month general training at the Public 
Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East (TODAIE), followed by three to six months 
of specialized training within their ministries. The structure, at least till 2016, was very similar to 
the ones in Pakistan and Taiwan.  
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5.3.1 Pre – AKP Period  
Alongside the military, the bureaucratic elite viewed themselves as the guardians of the 
modern Turkish republic. This sense of duty led Turkey down a tumultuous path unconsolidated 
democratization from 1950s till 2002, with the guardians stepping in and taking the reigns as and 
when they saw fit. What this also did was to create a situation whereby the Turkish political 
discourse was devoid of certain voices for decades because they were seen as clashing with 
Kemalist values (Hazal, 2018). Communists and Islamists were kept out of the discussion and an 
effort was made to have low tolerance for religiosity in the society56. The secularism in 
bureaucratic and military elites was a binding force and any other approach was seen as a direct 
threat to not just the governance system but the sanctity of the Republic. Throughout the 50s, 60s, 
70s, 80s, and the 90s, the elected governments were expected to negotiate governance with 
guardians of the state i.e. military and bureaucratic elite, often referred to as vesayat57(Koru, 2017).  
In terms of bureaucratic quality, the Turkish bureaucracy has been of the highest quality 
i.e. it is professional, recruited through open merit, highly specialized and enjoys institutional 
autonomy. From day one, the bureaucracy had a significant role in service provision, policy design 
and implementation. Even when Turkey moved to a multiparty democracy in 1950, the 
bureaucratic elite still maintained their stature and critical role even though the CHP was being 
 
56 Turkey is a Muslim majority country. Muslims make up over 90% of the Turkish population. 
But since its inception, the modern Turkish republic had a constitutional ban on Hijab 
(headscarf) for women in military and public service. Employees were disciplined if they came 
to work in Hijab and even the President of Turkey in 2006 refused to invite members of 
Parliament whose wives wore a Hijab to state events (Gurbuz, 2009). It was not until 2013, when 
the AKP government passed a series of constitutional amendments to allow for Hijab in public 
places. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/turkiyede-basortusu-yasagi-nasil-basladi-nasil-
cozuldu  
57 Vesayat essentially means clique. The word is identical to Establishment in the case of 
Pakistan. Both words basically mean the elite in military and bureaucracy who are a hidden force 
in the government and can interfere to block any elected government if they wish to.  
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targeted by Adnan Menders’ Democratic Party. Then throughout the 60s and 70s, the bureaucracy 
maintained its grip on policy formation and implementation as Turkey moved from one coup to 
another. Eventually in 1980s, when the elections resumed, it was the former elite bureaucrat, 
Turgat Özal’s Motherland Party that won the elections and ruled for nearly a decade while focusing 
purely on policy area of Economy and Development in association with the vesayat.  
5.3.2 AKP Era 
The 90s saw the rise of Islamist parties like Refah Party (RP). But just as soon as it became 
electorally viable, the party was banned and reborn as the Virtue Party (FP) which was farcically 
disbanded under pressure from the vesayat in late 90s. The moderate wing of the FP formed the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) with a promise of only focusing on economy and 
development. After negotiating clear policy areas of influence with bureaucratic elite and rest of 
vesayat, AKP formed a government in 2002. The nature of the relationship between the AKP and 
the Kemalist bureaucratic elite only shifted in 2010, eight years after AKP first came to power. In 
this time AKP had built a popular base and reignited the economy while forming multiple alliances 
with interest groups like the Gülenists and powerful trade associations58. 
For years, AKP was attempting to mainstream its conservative beliefs. They wanted to lift 
the ban on Hijab (headscarf) in public offices as well as lifting ban from religious education at the 
public level. One of the key initiatives Erdoğan launched during his time in the 90s as the mayor 
of Istanbul was building of tens of brand-new mosques around the city. In addition to that, Erdoğan 
supported religious schools and allowing religious organizations to offer social services to citizens.  
 
58 Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD) represent over 80% of major businesses in Turkey. 
TUSIAD is for large industries while MUSIAD is for small and medium sized businesses. These 
groups were critical to the success of AKP and its economic agenda. 
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Initially after coming to power in 2002, Erdoğan’s AKP was focused on economic issues. 
Turkey was still a candidate for the EU and the focus was to jumpstart the economy and stabilize 
it to a point whereby the EU would consider absorbing it. That allowed AKP to build its credibility 
at the national level and allow for party to take root in non-urban areas. However, over time AKP 
moved to having more influence in governance on issues beyond the economy and development. 
It came to head during 2007 when AKP refused to budge on its demand to make Abdullah Gül the 
next President of Turkey. The military issued a memorandum stating that it would be difficult for 
them to continue supporting the AKP government if an Islamist like Abdullah Gül were to be 
elevated to the office of the President. At this stage, AKP put its weight behind two trials; 
Ergenkon59 in 2007 and Operation Sledgehammer60 in 201061.  Ergenkon trial revolved around an 
alleged ultra nationalist/secular group that was plotting a military coup to push AKP out of power. 
Allegedly, the group was made up of influential persons in the private sector and mostly in the 
military, who were working towards dislodging the elected government of AKP in favor of 
bringing back Kemalist values that they saw as being eroded. In 2007, members of the alleged 
organization were taken to court over a coup plot and charges of treason. The move was widely 
seen as a the AKP taking aim at military top command and dragging AKP’s detractors to court. 
However, since then, the Ergenkon trials have been dismissed as political show put on by AKP to 
 
59 More information regarding the trail is available at 
https://fas.org/irp/world/turkey/ergenekon.pdf 
60 More information on Operation Sledgehammer is available at 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/balyoz-case-has-weakened-turkish-armed-forces-80612 and 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/236-acquitted-in-balyoz-coup-case-80408 
61 These two trials effectively broke the Military’s back and its ability to interfere in politics. The 
trials accused top military brass of trying to conduct coups against the AKP government as they 
felt it was not secular enough. The trials were widely covered by domestic and international 
media.  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/turkey-sledgehammer-coup-trial-
verdict 
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weaken the military (Kadercan and Kadercan, 2016). The result of this trial was a powerful 
indictment of how AKP was facing threats from overzealous secularists in the Army. AKP used 
this case to make an amendment that allowed for military personnel to be tried in civilian courts.  
The second trial was the Sledgehammer case and it revolved around an alleged plan by 
some elements in the military. In 2010, as the Ergenekon Trials were coming to an end, Turkish 
media started reporting on another coup plot that intended to create chaos by bombing mosques in 
Istanbul and downing a Turkish plane while blaming Greece for it. In a bizarre series of 
accusations, hundreds of top tier military personnel, including generals and Brigadiers were 
arrested and taken to court. By late 2011, over 150 people, mostly from the military were convicted 
and sent to prison. Eventually their convictions were overturned by the AKP government and 
eventually in late 2015, the government admitted that the trials were based on forged reports and 
all evidence was made up. While the admissions did help vindicate those who were wrongfully 
convicted, it also highlighted how the AKP had used the court cases to deeply weaken the military 
and its influence in politics. The trial targeted more officers in the military including generals. This 
case revolved around an Both these trials led to widespread purges within the military to the point 
where it no longer had any vesayat left on top. From 2007 to 2011, AKP essentially broke the 
military’s back by purging all top leadership that was deemed too secular, Kemalist and elitist 
(Kadercan and Kadercan, 2016).  
Simultaneously, the AKP was working to weaken the bureaucratic elite that had limited 
their ability to roll out their policy prescriptions. Unlike the military, the bureaucracy was deeper 
rooted in the system and not as overt in their beliefs. To tackle the bureaucracy, AKP used a two-
pronged approach. One of these strategies is widely studied while the other one is offered ignored 
in popular discourse. The much-discussed strategy was AKP making alliances with everyone from 
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communists to nationalists to Gülenists to compete against leftist/Kemalist bureaucratic elite. 
While AKP was effective on economic and developmental issues, it lacked the expertise and 
manpower on issues of governance, policy making and implementation. Because Islamist parties 
had been kept away from any level of government in Turkey for decades, they lacked experienced 
professionals and politicians in their cadre. So, when AKP came to power in 2002, it focused on 
building its in house expertise and capacity to become a reliable political force. But to achieve 
their short-term goals and maintain the government, they created alliances with other interest 
groups.  
Starting 2007, when the AKP began pushing back against the military and its failed ‘coup’ 
attempts, they also started inducting Gülenists to important positions in the civil service. By the 
time 2010 came around and AKP purged the military, it also replaced most top tier secular 
bureaucratic elites with Gülenists who were seen as loyal to the AKP cause. The partnership 
worked out initially but as AKP realized between 2010 and 2013, the Gülenists wanted more power 
and influence. As they became powerful elites in bureaucracy, they started going after AKP using 
judiciary and law enforcement services that were firmly under their control at the time. This 
politicization of bureaucracy would later come to haunt the AKP.  
Between 2013 and 2016, AKP identified the Gülen Movement as an internal security threat 
and took over numerous media outlets, businesses and even educational institutions run by the 
organization. By July 2016, the Gülenists in the bureaucracy and military were pushed into a corner 
and launched an audacious coup attempt that ultimately failed.  
2007 onwards, the AKP was using another strategy to break the monopoly of Kemalists in 
the bureaucracy. Unlike the Gülenist alliance, this strategy is under studied and actually played a 
bigger role in AKP’s survival post 2016 coup attempt. Starting in 2007, AKP started actively 
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recruiting senior bureaucrats seen to be religious or sympathetic to AKP’s cause. The strategy was 
to build inhouse capacity of the AKP by bringing in professionals from the system rather than 
training younger cadre. By 2011, the party had weakened the military and attracted a significant 
number of senior bureaucrats into its fold. Effectively, the AKP coopted conservative bureaucratic 
elites into the party and used them to take the fight to the Gülenists by launching inquiries against 
their assets, taking over their businesses and educational foundation in retaliation for the judicial 
inquiries instigated the political party (Government Official 1, 2017). So, after the failed coup, 
there was enough bureaucratic elite left in the system, that was secular and loyal to the Republic, 
for AKP to undertake large scale purges against suspected Gülenists.   
5.3.3 Post 2016 Attempted Coup 
In July 2016, three days after the coup attempt failed, I was in Istanbul conducting 
interviews and heading to Ankara for fieldwork. After the initial 10 days I spent in Turkey right 
after the failed coup, I returned to Turkey for three weeks in July 2017 to conduct more interviews 
in Istanbul and Ankara. During these periods of time I was able to witness the political happenings 
firsthand and discuss these with AKP officials, Ministry of Internal Affairs Officials as well as 
senior bureaucrats at Turkey’s elite civil service training institute, Public Administration Institute 
for Turkey and Middle East (TODAIE). What I present, in this and the next section, are findings 
from key personnel interviews and observations I made in the field.  
 Immediately after the coup failed, the AKP moved to suspend operations of the 
Gendarmerie forces and place their assets as well as personnel under protective custody of the 
Military. These forces were the ones that launched the coup attempt and had used their assets to 
attack Ankara’s Parliament building. AKP also moved to take over all educational institutions, at 
home and abroad, aligned with the Gülen Movement. Initially the government took over the 
 150 
 
150 
institutions and shut them down pending investigations but eventually opened some of them back 
up under the control of loyalist businesses or the local government.  
The most complex part of the post-coup undertaking was the purge in civilian bureaucracy. 
From 2010 till 2016, AKP had aggressively aligned itself with the Gülen Movement and stacked 
the judiciary and civil services with their people. The purge of 2010 had taken apart the Kemalist 
secular bureaucratic elite networks and replaced them Gülenist ones. The politicization of the 
bureaucracy at the time had borne fruit for the AKP as it helped them weaken the military elites. 
However, in 2016, AKP relied on its party members who were former bureaucrats as well as 
whatever was left of the secular Kemalists in the bureaucracy to keep the country running while 
purges were happening (Government Official 1, 2017; Government Official 2, 2017; AKP Official 
1, 2016).  
But by 2017 the purges were nearly complete and what was left of the bureaucracy was a 
skeletal structure. Close to 75% of upper and mid-level bureaucrats had been purged between July 
2016 and July 201762. The shortage was worst at the local government level i.e. city/town 
management and the judiciary. Severe shortages were also present in planning and development, 
infrastructure management, education, health care, agriculture and internal affairs (Government 
Official 1, 2017; Government Official 2, 2017). To fill these shortages, institutions like TODAIE, 
that trained Turkish bureaucrats for various roles were asked to increase their training programs 
and fulfill the needs of newer recruits. The concern about the newer recruits was that as they were 
 
62 Figures based on interviews with Director General of TOADAIE who explained that they were 
having to run p to 6 concurrent sessions to train new bureaucrats who were hurriedly recruited 
mostly based on their loyalty to the AKP.  
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being inducted through a shortened and less strenuous process, their performance and capacity 
would not be the same as someone who was top of their class.  
As the Deputy Governor of Ankara at the time explained, the problem was that most of 
those being inducted were not qualified enough and lacked relevant experience in the government 
service to take up positions of even middle management. What made the situation more complex 
was that most of these people were not being recruited through open calls for applications but 
through ministry’s recommendations (Government Official 2, 2017). This meant that AKP 
ministers were sending lists to institutions like TODAIE of people they wanted trained in order to 
be put on the job. Normal training sessions took anywhere between 9 to 12 months but under 
pressure from the purges, the training was cut down to 12 weeks for up to six simultaneous 
sessions. According to officials, effectively AKP was repeating what they had done in 2010 i.e. 
packing the civil service with AKP loyalists (Government Official 1, 2017). By doing so, what 
AKP effectively did was hurt the quality of training and bring down the overall credibility of the 
bureaucracy. Instead of being professional and impersonal with a focused mission, the new recruits 
are focused on maintaining loyalty to the ruling coalition rather than focusing on their jobs.  
Unfortunately, these concerns played out after the 2017 referendum and the recent 2019 
local government elections where voting stopped and severe election irregularities occurred 
systemically to help AKP win in tight races except in Istanbul where AKP lost even in a 
reelection63 (Klimek et al, 2018).  
 
63 The irregularities were so widespread that even after losing Istanbul and Ankara, AKP 
demanded a recount and refused to accept the results in Istanbul until the relevant authorities, 
which happen to have been mostly hired after the purge of 2016/17. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/europe/turkey-referendum-is-haunted-by-
allegations-of-voter-fraud.html The problem time and time again with studying Turkey is the 
extent to which AKP has turned it in to a one-party state. The fact that elections happens, and the 
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In essence then, what AKP managed to do was to greatly limit institutional autonomy while 
also changing the quality of the bureaucracy to a point they are no longer able to play a stabilizing 
role during times of governance crises.   
5.4 Testing the Theory  
To test my theory in this case, I chose two key turning points in Turkey’s recent history; 
the 2010 purge after the alleged failed coup attempt by Ergenkon64 and the failed 2016 coup 
attempt by Gülenists in the military. The reason I chose these two instances to test my theory on 
was because they reshaped how Turkey was governed and created a new status quo that initially 
was more democratic but quickly devolved into an autocratic regime. And throughout these shifts, 
there was no stabilizing force in place to provide the necessary governance stability needed for the 
economy and political discourse to survive. Instead, as a result of these two instances, Turkey is 
left more polarized while the economy slowed down considerably with the Turkish Lira losing 
nearly 50% of its value against the US Dollar.  
The post 2010 scenario is an excellent example of how the role of the bureaucratic elites 
changed in the national governance as a result of loss of institutional autonomy. The post 2016 
scenario is a unique instance where the government has the opportunity to fundamentally change 
the quality of bureaucracy and chooses to do so by bringing it down instead of improving it. In 
most cases the opposite happens i.e. ruling coalition’s focus on improving or at least sustaining 
 
opposition has any fighting chance is remarkable testament to the Turkish people’s commitment 
to democracy.  
64 The trial has since been assailed as nothing more than a show trial aimed at killing army’s 
influence in politics https://www.amnestyusa.org/inside-one-of-the-most-important-court-cases-
in-turkish-history/  
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the quality of bureaucracy. Instead in Turkey, the AKP revamps the professional system of 
bureaucracy and transforms it into an extension of the party, at least at the federal level.  
The data I am using for to create the network analyses for both these cases is based on my 
fieldwork in Turkey conduced in 2016 and 2017. I visited Turkey twice, once a week after the 
failed coup of 2016 and then after a year in 2017, weeks before the referendum. Both times, I was 
based in Ankara with visits to Istanbul. I was able to interview government officials, including 
senior bureaucrats, retired bureaucrats, academics, politicians and even retired generals. I was 
provided access to the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as the Turkish Institute of Public 
Administration. In addition to this, I had access to official documents relating to the reorganization 
plan after the purges were completed. These interviews and discussions are the basis of my data. 
As in the case of Pakistan, these discussions were immensely helpful in providing nuance and 
context to the political changes Turkey has undergone within the last decade or so. As explain in 
chapter three, the information that was collected through the interviews provided details of the 
relationship between different stakeholder in the governance system i.e. how they are connected, 
what kind of important they have the system and what decisions are they taking.   
While I spent time at a host of ministries, for the purpose of testing my theory, I chose to 
focus on working of five key ministries that make up bulk of day to governance. Ministries of 
Internal Affairs, Trade, Finance & Treasury, Justice and Industry are analyzed for this purpose. I 
chose the five ministries as they run the most critical government functions and their structures are 
replicated across all other ministries. 
5.4.1 Post 2010 
As the Ergenkon trial progressed, the government was reaping the benefits of a more docile 
army. At this stage, AKP held both Prime Ministership and the Presidency, it was in complete 
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political control of Turkey. Emboldened via its new alliances, AKP set out to reorient the 
bureaucracy by chipping away at its autonomy in a unique manner. AKP started swapping out top 
tier bureaucrats by either purging or recruiting existing bureaucratic elite. This created an opening 
in middle level and upper level bureaucracy. These positions were specifically given to Gülenist 
allies already within the bureaucracy. For instance, if a Deputy Governor position was available 
and the next person in line based on seniority was viewed as a Kemalist, they were skipped in the 
pecking order for the promotion. Instead a junior officer, who had verifiable Gülenist leanings was 
chosen to fulfill the role. This intrusion into formerly independent institutions was unheard of in 
Turkish politics before AKP.  
Majority of such positions were at the Department of Justice and Ministry of Internal 
Affairs as well as in the paramilitary forces called Gendarmerie. Figure 6.3 illustrates the network 
of governance in Turkey during this period of time. The Deputy Ministers or Administrative 
Governors are senior bureaucrats in each ministry, similar to the Secretaries and Joint Secretaries 
in Pakistan. During this time, the government had the power to purge or suspend these senior 
bureaucrats at the Deputy Minister, Administrative Governor or Deputy Governors levels, but they 
could not appoint them from the outside. For instance, if an Administrative Governor position was 
available due to the purge, that position had to be fulfilled by a career bureaucrat. The AKP 
government could not recruit someone from the private sector based on qualification 
equivalence65. So, the solution was to search for the next in line Gülenist and promote them.  
 
65 In post 2016 Turkey, the Government can hire professionals from the private sector into the 
government as bureaucrats based on qualification equivalence. The logic is if you have enough 
private sector relevant experience, you are qualified enough to be hired laterally into the 
bureaucracy. This change was necessitated due to the large-scale purge after 2016. Pakistan does 
not have such hiring practices while Taiwan recently allowed for lateral hiring at the Deputy 
Minister level which has caused resentment among the bureaucratic elite. I explore that in the 
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This is where the alliance with the Gülenists was critical for the AKP. The party itself 
lacked the numbers and network of highly educated and technically trained professionals needed 
to fill the openings they were creating through purges or recruitments. AKP was also avoiding 
promoting existing bureaucrats who were seen as a Kemalists/seculars, under fear that they might 
support another coup attempt.  
The green nodes in Figure 13 highlight the Gülenist bureaucrats. As Turkey was still a 
parliamentary system at the time, the deputy ministers reported to the relevant minister and were 
insulated from dealing directly with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s agenda came 
through the Minister and was then expected to be enforced via the relevant Deputy Minister’s 
departments. This insulation gave some semblance of institutional autonomy and integrity to 
bureaucratic elites who had remained neutral albeit secular leaning, throughout the purges and 
AKP’s political power plays. The Deputy Ministers and the Administrative Governors in each 
ministry also controlled numerous autonomous organizations that were constitutionally 
independent and apolitical. Organizations like, Directorate General for Personnel in Justice 
Ministry66 and Internal Auditing Unit in the Ministry of Internal Affairs67, had the power to 
investigate the government at any level and could file references against them. AKP used these 
organizations to investigate and then convict hundreds of senior bureaucrats, serving and retired 
generals between 2007 and 2011. As part of the alliance, Gülenists were handed control of these 
organizations after 2010.  
 
next chapter as it has strained the relationship between the ruling coalition and the KMT leaning 
bureaucratic elite.  
66 Justice Ministry of Turkey http://www.justice.gov.tr/Ministry/resimler/teskilat_b.jpg  
67 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkey http://www.mia.gov.tr/new-organization-chart 
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By the end of 2011, Gülenists in the Justice Department and Internal Affairs started going 
after the AKP and its stalwarts using the exact same organizations AKP68 had previously used 
against the military and secular bureaucratic elites (Taş, 2018).  For the Gülen Movement, this was 
seen as a way to renegotiate the terms of alliance with AKP and carve out clear policy space on 
issues of concern. However, AKP viewed this as an attempt by the Gülen Movement (GM) to 
dictate policy agendas by using autonomous institutions against them. AKP became convinced 
that institutional autonomy means a political threat from bureaucratic elites who are willing to use 
the constitutional space granted to them to challenge the governance policies AKP wished to 
introduce to consolidate its political standing. This tussle lasted essentially till the failed coup of 
2016.  
 
68 The scandals unearthed by the Internal Affairs and Justice Department at the time created a 
serious political crisis for the AKP. This was also the time the Gezi Park protests were taking 
place and AKP viewed these as an attempt by its enemies to sow discord 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-of-all-corruption-scandals-refuses-to-
go-away/  & https://www.dw.com/cda/en/from-ally-to-scapegoat-fethullah-gulen-the-man-
behind-the-myth/a-37055485 
 157 
 
157 
Figure 13. Governance in Turkey Post 2010 Purges 
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5.4.2 Post 2016  
One of the biggest lessons the failed coup attempt taught the AKP was that if any part of 
the government was left autonomous, it would eventually become a threat to the party and its rule. 
Albeit conspiratorial, the party strongly believed this to be true69.  Having witnessed how the 
Gülenists used their positions in the civilian bureaucracy as well as the paramilitary forces, then 
Prime Minister Erdoğan was convinced that the whole system had to be remade with loyalty in 
mind.  
This approach led Turkey to the infamous 2017 referendum on whether the constitution 
needs to be changed to allow for a Presidential form of government to revamp the system or 
whether the existing system should continue. While the referendum was on the validity of the 
Presidential system in a place like Turkey, what the AKP really was seeking justification for was 
creating a one-party state whereby the party and state organs would operate as one similar to how 
CHP was in the early days of the Turkish republic under Atatürk. 
Figure 14 maps out how the governance network changes in once the Presidential system 
was adopted in Turkey. While one of the most obvious change is how the whole governance system 
is under one person with no institutional autonomy on issues of career progression and promotions, 
the other key factor is hard to illustrate in any way; the impact of purges. As seen in Figure 6.4, 
one of the changes the referendum made was to put the President at the center of everything. 
Moreover, the President appoints not just the Ministers in his cabinet, he also appoints deputy 
ministers, administrative governors and deputy governors across the board. As a result of the 
 
69 Interviews with party mid-level party members included repeated mentions of how 
bureaucratic elites, specifically the liberal Kemalists, were out to get the AKP and its 
government. In at least three interviews, party members categorically pointed to how 
bureaucratic elites had always conspired against the AKP, giving examples of the Gülenists 
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purge, the Minister of Internal Affairs was given the added charge of the Gendarmerie forces. 
These were the forces that were used in the coup attempt and even though they were paramilitary 
with their own weaponry to rival the Turkish Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie were placed under 
the civilian controlled Minister with the view they could be used in the future as form of ‘National 
Guard’ or ‘Presidential Guard’ to protect against any future coup attempts.  
By doing so, AKP changed the responsibilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
essentially altered the whole ministry by gutting the existing staff and replacing them with staunch 
AKP supporters. During my fieldwork at Ministry of Internal Affairs in Turkey, all key personnel 
interviewed stated they were against the politicization and militarization of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs by the AKP government. The personnel interviewed included administrative deputy 
governors and director generals, nearly all whom have since voluntarily retired from civil service. 
Similarly, in the Justice and Finance Ministries, traditional bureaucratic elite have either resigned 
or have been purged making way for a significantly younger cadre of AKP loyalists to take their 
place70.  
According to AKP personnel I interviewed, the party was traumatized at how independent 
and autonomous organizations within ministries were able to launch inquiries against AKP 
stalwarts and take them to court during the 2011 to 2015 period. By allowing for bureaucratic elites 
to function with autonomy and professionalism, AKP had allowed the failed coup to attempt to 
happen in 2016. Hence, the party believed that firstly all appointments to head of units within a 
ministry i.e. deputy minister, deputy administrative governor and administrative governors, had to 
 
70 At least 4 senior career bureaucrats in the ministry, that I interviewed in 2017, have since 
taken voluntary retirement. Two of the four have since left Turkey and migrated to Germany.  
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be done directly by the President. Secondly, the Presidency needed protection and placing the 
Gendarmerie under civilian control was an effort to do so.  
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Figure 14. Governance in Turkey post 2016 coup attempt 
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Since the completion of my fieldwork, Public Administration Institute for Turkey and 
Middle East (TODAIE), the elite training school for bureaucracy has been shut down. Instead the 
government ministries are directly recruiting according to their needs. Interviews I conducted at 
TODAIE in 2017, hinted towards the possibility of AKP gutting the process of recruitment and 
trainings for bureaucracy as they viewed it as a limitation for recruiting their support base as well 
as a scion of secular Kemalist values. By shuttering TODAIE, AKP has fundamentally broken the 
back of the bureaucracy by targeting its quality.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Based on the evidence I have presented throughout this chapter; it is safe to argue that 
Turkey is going through a rebirth. Much like 1923, Turkey is being revitalized in the leader’s 
image.  President Erdoğan’s Turkey is not much different from that of Atatürk’s. The republic has 
come a full circle i.e. starting out as a one-party state with a mythologized leader, going through 
bouts of democracy and authoritarian rule to end up nearly in the same position a hundred years 
later. So, what went wrong? But more importantly, why has the governance been hit with one crisis 
after another?  
 What went wrong in this case is that the stabilizing force, or the failsafe for 
maintaining governance stability i.e. bureaucratic elites first lost their institutional autonomy as 
that was seen as a threat to the survival of the AKP and then the senior bureaucratic elite along 
with the larger bureaucracy were gutted in a manner that diminished their quality. By removing 
the bureaucratic elites from their traditional role as a protector of the Turkish republic, the AKP 
government has created a situation where political and governance stability is dependent on them 
reigning supreme. An example of this was the recent municipal elections in Turkey that AKP lost 
handily in most major cities. The losses were hard to digest for AKP and it demanded a recount in 
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Istanbul. And once they lost the recount, they demanded fresh elections. Now had there been a 
potent bureaucratic elite in place, this could have been avoided with the bureaucratic elites stepping 
in to ensure the election results were held up the first time. Additionally, given the way in which 
the institutions have lost credibility and autonomy, even when the opposition parties gain Mayoral 
offices in major cities like Izmir and Istanbul, they are forced to work with a highly politicized 
federal and municipal bureaucracy put in place by the recruitment policies of the AKP within the 
last three years. An excellent example of this was the day after the original municipal elections in 
Istanbul, when the local municipalities unfurled large banners on all public buildings thank the 
public for their vote of confidence in AKP leadership. Even though AKP had lost, they municipal 
level bureaucrats went ahead with the pre – planned celebrations71. How are the new Mayors 
expected to implement their agenda and improve things if a large majority of staff they rely on is 
staunchly AKP?  
It is pertinent to mention here that the failed 2016 coup attempt hastened the demise of the 
Turkish bureaucratic elite’s capacity and influence. The failed coup itself was the not the reason 
for it. The moment AKP decided to fight the military through the court system in 2007, it signaled 
its intention to rework the rules of governance that had been controlled tightly by the Kemalist 
bureaucracy and military. In 2007, AKP bet on institutional independence of bureaucracy coupled 
with aggressive politicization efforts to prosecute and investigate military personnel in civil courts. 
But after 2011 when the new bureaucratic elites the AKP put in place started investigating them 
using the same independent institutions AKP had used against its rivals. Since then, the AKP 
viewed those handpicked bureaucratic elites were seen as a potential threat. The public tussle 
 
71 This was widely reported in the media and points to how deeply embedded AKP party 
members are even at the local levels. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-
02/erdogan-victory-banners-after-istanbul-municipal-election 
 164 
 
164 
between 2013 and 2016 is seen to be a fight between AKP and Gülenists, but it was fundamentally 
also a fight between the bureaucratic elite and the political elite over policy process that governs 
Turkey. It would have taken years before a détente was achieved in this tussle for a suitable 
working partnership. The failed coup changed that and led to demise of influence for the 
bureaucratic elites.  
The table below highlights the growing authority of the President while diminishing that 
of the elite bureaucrats and even the ministers. The post 2010 scenario still allowed for Ministers 
and Elite Bureaucrats to have some semblance of authority, 0.365 for Ministers and 0.091 for Elite 
Bureaucrats. In the post 2016 Turkey, the authority falls to 0.048. This means that even the 
ministers have limited autonomy on how they run their ministries, which in turn means the senior 
bureaucracy has even more limited space to function and perform.  
Table 5 also highlights the changes that make the President the most powerful person in 
the network because he appoints nearly all elite bureaucracy and the ministers to oversee them. 
The table also highlights the diminished role of the bureaucratic elites and their ability to play a 
significant role in day to day governance functions. The centralization of the system, politicization 
of bureaucracy and its diminished quality all have a negative impact on Turkey’s future stability 
in face of a major political crisis like the recent split government vote that puts opposition in 
control of key municipal governments. Because there is no independent bureaucratic elite focused 
on purpose and service, a political tussle can now consume the stability of the system. And that is 
what my theory argues as well. Turkey might not be the worst-case scenario where the governance 
system that is on cusp of a major breakdown if a fresh political crisis were to hit as it now lacks 
the safeguards needed for governance stability.  
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Table 5. Post 2008 and Post 2017 Network Changes in Turkey 
 
Turkey Post 2010 Turkey Post 2016 
Job Title Authority Hub Eigen Centrality Job Title Authority Hub Eigen Centrality 
Prime Minister 0.456435 0.645497 1 President 0.9759 0.218218 1 
Interior Minister 0.365148 0.258199 0.565726 Interior Minister 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Trade Minister 0.365148 0.258199 0.565726 Trade Minister 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Finance Minister 0.365148 0.258199 0.565726 Finance Minister 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Justice Minister 0.365148 0.258199 0.565726 Justice Minister 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Industries Minister 0.365148 0.258199 0.565726 Industries Minister 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Interior 1 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Interior 1 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Interior 2 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Interior 2 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Interior 3 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Interior 3 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Trade 1 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Trade 1 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Trade 2 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Trade 2 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Trade 3 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Trade 3 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Finance 1 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Finance 1 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Finance 2 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Finance 2 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Finance 3 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Finance 3 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Justice 1 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Justice 1 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Justice 2 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Justice 2 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Justice 3 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Justice 3 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Industries 1 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Industries 1 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Industries 2 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Industries 2 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
Deputy Minister Industries 3 0.091287 0.129099 0.2 Deputy Minister Industries 3 0.048795 0.218218 0.223456 
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6 CONCLUSION: GOVERNANCE STABILITY AND LESSONS LEARNED 
I started this dissertation asking a simple question; How can countries manage to provide 
services to their citizens, albeit limited at times, even during times of political crises? The question 
is about understanding governance in the times of political turmoil and throughout this dissertation 
I have addressed this question through my theory of bureaucratic governance stability. I posit that 
the reason a country, any country, keeps functioning even during dire political crises is dependent 
on whether the country has a “high quality” senior bureaucracy i.e. they are professionally trained, 
technically expert in their fields and have merit-based recruitment and promotion system. And 
whether the institutions in a country are autonomous. Institutional autonomy in this case refers to 
whether the institutions are able to make their own objective policy decisions without political 
interference and whether they have the ability to implement the policies they design. My theory 
argues that to have stable governance, even during a political crisis, the answer lies in these two 
elements.  
I chose three country cases to apply my theory on in order to provide evidence for my 
argument. In the previous chapters, I have presented the case of Pakistan, Taiwan and Turkey, 
respectively, to illustrate how my theory works in practice and what its limitations are. The cases 
also provide nuance to my theory, especially in the case of Taiwan, which highlights how a 
political party can play a bigger role in governance by professionalizing itself and bringing in 
technical experts who are objectively willing to work on policy. In essence, political parties can 
become relevant participants in governance even during the most difficult political scenarios by 
modeling their members on the highly qualified state bureaucracy as long as they operate within 
the independent institutions of the state. 
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In this section, I present lessons learned from the application of my theory and its 
limitation. This section also details future research potential in the study of institutions and 
bureaucracies.  
6.1 Lesson #1 – High Quality Bureaucratic Elites: Hard to Develop, Easy to Wreck 
As discussed throughout this dissertation, especially in the cases of Taiwan and Turkey, a 
“high quality” bureaucracy is difficult to develop and a time intensive exercise. It took Taiwan 
decades to develop its bureaucracy to become a technically sound, professionalized group with its 
own set of rules and regulation that is apolitical. Turkey went through a similar period to develop 
their bureaucracy while going through multiple political crises. Pakistan was fortunate to have a 
bureaucracy structure that was left over from the colonial times and had the opportunity to outline 
their autonomy and maintain their professional integrity by writing themselves in to the 
constitution.  
Yet it took Turkey just under three years, in the aftermath of the failed coup of July 2016, 
to wreck its bureaucratic structures. By revamping the recruitment and promotion mechanisms as 
well as altering the training required for bureaucracy, Turkey not only politicized the bureaucracy, 
it neutralized the governance stability mechanism they relied on to safeguard that allowed the 
country to enjoy economic growth and run a developmental state model responsible for modern 
Turkey. By neutralizing the governance stability provision in the state offered by high quality 
senior bureaucracy, Turkey now puts itself at risk of worsening political crises that can directly 
impact levels of governance in the country. This means that next time there is a massive political 
crisis, governance will directly be affected as there is no buffer left between politics and 
governance anymore. And that is what a high-quality bureaucracy really does in essence; it is a 
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buffer between politics and governance. It keeps the figurative lights on in the country and ensures 
things run on time as opposed to everything coming to a halt.  
As authoritarian governments rise across the world, governance in such countries comes 
under stress from these strongmen who wish to alter the character of the state by modeling it in 
their image. Be it Erdogan in Turkey or Duterte in Philippines, the consequences of their actions 
are not momentary but in fact long term. For instance, when Erdogan eventually setps dpwn, the 
Turkish state he leaves behind will have a bureaucratic structure that is politicized and polarized. 
It would take years to bring back the professionalism and objectivity into policy making. What’s 
worse is the institutional autonomy that has been destroyed by AKP will take years to revert back 
to what it was pre – 2016 coup.  
6.2 Lesson #2 – Expectations of What Governance is are Misplaced 
Over the course of this dissertation one of the key lessons I have learned is that in most 
discussion on governance, especially within public administration, there is a lack of understanding 
on what goes in to making it happen. The idea of governance is abstract and grand but getting to 
the specifics and then disentangling those details gives little credibility to the notion that 
governance can be improved in decades let alone overnight. What I mean by this is; our expectation 
of governance is unrealistic in practical terms. We talk about it as a monolithic idea, as if 
governance has a clear definition when in reality it depends on a series of actors and steps taken 
in sequence. For instance, when World Bank talks about need for “good governance” in countries, 
it can mean anything from improving the ease of doing business to clamping down on corruption. 
Yet the perception makes it sound more simplistic than it really is.  
While conducting interviews in Taiwan, I would constantly get two responses with regards 
to policy implementation. One answer was from political parties that decried the slow pace of 
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change and the inability for drastic novel policy ideas to be implemented that would surely improve 
governance while the other response was from senior bureaucrats that were frustrated with the lack 
of understanding by politicians regarding implementation of policy as it ignored institutional 
capacity. This was in a country that has a legitimately high-quality bureaucracy and a strong culture 
of institutional autonomy.  
Now imagine the expectations of policy implementation and change in countries that lack 
institutions, let alone strong autonomous institutions and a capable bureaucracy. How can we 
expect governance to work in such countries? IMF and World Bank often chide countries for 
failing to improve governance based on indicators such as ease of doing business and rule of law, 
but that discussion completely discounts the difficulty of creating the infrastructure to have any 
level of governance in the first place. Take for example an often-discussed issue within the domain 
of governance; taxation. Most experts in economics, public policy and political science agree that 
a state’s control can be measured based on how well it does tax collection within its borders. Good 
governance literature would argue that improving tax collection would mean more money for the 
government and that in turn would mean more policy options. This dissertation adds to this 
discussion by contributing more evidence on the issue of state capacity. Specifically, by focusing 
on independent state institutions and highly trained bureaucracy, this dissertation advocates for 
capacity building as a first step in achieving good governance standards.  
The discussion in this dissertation can aid our understanding on how to make governance 
happen in countries that need it the most. Instead of focusing on tax collection, we should be 
starting with building institutions protected via the constitution to function autonomously.  
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6.3 Lesson #3 – Party Professionalization can lead to better governance 
As mentioned earlier, enough has been written about elections and transition in political 
science to fill libraries. Elections can be won by populist parties on rhetoric. However, governance 
requires skills and capacity to convert the rhetoric to actionable policy interventions. Taiwan’s 
case and to a smaller extent Turkey’s case highlight the need for a political party to build in house 
policy capacity that can greatly impact governance with regards to implementation of the party’s 
agenda.   
Party professionalization helps ruling coalition’s get equal footing with bureaucratic elites 
in the policy process. If political parties can recruit experts and build in house capacity for policy 
works by building formal party structures, they do not have to exclusively rely on the senior 
bureaucratic elites for implementation of their policy agenda. In over 70 years in Pakistan, no 
political party has been able to professionalize fully and build in house policy capacity on any 
subject. Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz came close to building the policy capacity but instead 
chose to politicize the bureaucracy by coopting bureaucratic elites into the party to govern. 
Similarly, in Turkey, AKP carved out space for Gülenists to become part of the bureaucratic elite 
because the party itself lacked the capacity and structure to bargain policy process in their favor 
on certain issues. Eventually, the Gülenists turned on AKP and that led to the failed coup of 2016.  
In Taiwan, the only instance where the two major parties, KMT and DPP, both 
professionalized in a relatively short period of time, governance has operated at a gold standard 
with economic growth following suit. What the professionalized parties contributed to governance 
was a better set of policy proposals and more intensive discussion with the bureaucratic elites that 
translated into better governance. Each time any of the parties comes to power, they come in with 
clearer policy proposals and a highly competent team. DPP’s President Tsai came to power in 2016 
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and installed subject matter experts as ministers and deputy ministers across the board. Because 
DPP had extensive in-house policy capacity, they were able to move swiftly and install two 
political deputy ministers in each ministry to counter the one career bureaucrat deputy minister. 
And what was the impact of this? Instead of abandoning their electoral promises like DPP had to 
after coming to power in 2000, in 2016, they moved quickly to implement major promises like a 
reforming pension and launching an alternative foreign policy. None of this would have been 
possible without having the right people and structures in place before coming to power. Because 
the DPP spent time building in house policy capacity and recruited subject matter experts to policy 
panels, when it did come to power, it was ready and fully prepared to negotiate its promises into 
implementation.  
Party professionalization means more policy focused political parties that still lobby for 
their political agendas to be implemented. This can at least raise the level of public discourse on 
policy issues, with parties clearly laying out detailed policy plans. Instead of relying on rhetoric 
like in Pakistan or Turkey, a professionalized party cadre can mainstream policy proposals to raise 
the level of public discourse on governance and state capacity.  
6.4 Limitations of Governance Stability  
The theory I have presented in this dissertation relies on institutional autonomy coupled 
with high quality bureaucratic elites. What this dissertation addresses just one of the four outcomes 
presented in Figure 1. This dissertation project is a deep dive in understanding what happens when 
the quality of bureaucracy is “high”, and institutions are independent. The other three outcomes 
and their impact on natation building and democratization is something that requires further study.   
This dissertation does not present a silver bullet explanation to why countries have state 
failures or why they relapse as democracies. The purpose here was to unpack the idea of a capable 
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state and what goes into it. I have argued that a capable state would mean autonomous institutions 
and capable bureaucrats that can ensure stability during times of political instability brought about 
by a political crisis. My theory does not address instances where the state ends up in a civil war or 
where there is a total breakdown of the political process. Those situations remain beyond the 
purview of this project.   
And this leads me to an observation I made over the course of this dissertation; good 
governance takes time and resources. Most developing countries lack the resources and patience 
required to build the infrastructure for good governance. Taiwan and Turkey were able to do so 
because of the authoritarian nature of their early years as states. Pakistan just got lucky that 
situations were created early on in its history that allowed the senior bureaucracy to take charge of 
the country and write themselves in to the constitution. This does not mean that the arguments I 
have made in this dissertation are not generalizable, instead what this means is that how we 
measure level of governance globally is deeply flawed and does not take in to account the 
idiosyncratic nature of constrictions countries face with regards to development of institutions and 
bureaucratic capacity. Governance stability as a theory works, as seen in the three cases I have 
presented in this dissertation, but its application is dependent on countries having autonomous 
institutions and a qualified bureaucracy, both of which are necessary for the state to enforce its 
writ.  
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
My theory of bureaucratic governance stability contributes to the larger literature on 
institutions and governance. My theory’s major contribution is disentangling the idea of 
governance and explaining the elements that go in to making it happen in the first place. Building 
on the works of Huntington (1991), Migdal (1988), Johnson (1975) and Allison & Halperin (1972), 
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my theory argued that a “high quality” bureaucracy that is able to operate with institutional 
autonomy will ensure stable governance even in times of political crisis. In most instances, a 
political crisis is assumed to have ramification on public service delivery and implementation of 
government’s policies. My theory argues that can be avoided if a country invests in developing the 
governance failsafe by focusing on bureaucracy and institutions.  
As evidence for my theory, I have presented the country cases of Pakistan, Turkey and 
Taiwan.  I chose these cases as they offered the widest variations regarding political and 
governance structures to test my theory on. I used interviews and data collected during my 
extensive fieldwork to populate data that supports my network analyses of these country cases. As 
mentioned earlier in detail, my intention was to gather data and illustrate it in a nuanced manner 
to provide a holistic picture to the readers as evidence of my theory. I used the data to map out two 
networks in each country case; one before political crisis and one after, to highlight how senior 
bureaucracy takes control of governance as long as its high-quality working in autonomous 
institutions. The intention of this dissertation was to focus on how governance continues under 
crisis and I address that with the evidence I have presented in the last three chapters.  
However, there are assumptions and conclusions that can be made based on the work I 
have presented in here. One of the most crucial one of these is the fact that for a high-quality 
bureaucracy to exist, it takes significant time and requires a concerted effort to first create 
independent intuitions. Doing so, increases the potential for future democratization in such a 
country. Take for instance the case of Malaysia, where years of investment in institutions and 
bureaucracy eventually led to the opposition winning the elections for the first time in 2018. The 
transfer of power was smooth, and governance did not breakdown after decades of one-party rule. 
Compare that to the democratization effort in Egypt in 2011 that saw Muslim Brotherhood being 
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elected to power. The first thing to breakdown was governance because the institutions were by 
design politicized and refused to work with the elected government. While it is not what I am 
addressing in this dissertation, democratization needs a bureaucratic governance stability 
mechanism in place to be successful. I believe future research can explore this question further as 
it was beyond the scope of this current dissertation.  
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Gürcan, M. (2018). A snapshot of the blackbox: a 2015 survey of the Turkish officer corps. Turkish 
Studies, 19, 1, 97-117. 
Haerpfer, C. W. (2009). Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Halhalli, B. (2016) Weber, Bureaucracy and Politics: the case of Turkey. Macedonian Journal of 
Political Science. Volume 6.  
Heper, M. (1985). The state tradition in Turkey. Beverley, North Humberside: Eothen Press  
Ho, M. (2015). Occupy Congress in Taiwan: Political Opportunity, Threat, and the Sunflower 
Movement. Journal of East Asian Studies, 15(1), 69-97. doi:10.1017/S1598240800004173 
Ho, Samuel P.S. (1987). Economics, Economic Bureaucracy, and Taiwan's Economic 
Development. Pacific Affairs, 60(2), 226-247. doi:10.2307/2758133 
Hossain, Ishtiaq (2000) Pakistan's October 1999 military coup: Its causes and 
consequences. Asian Journal of Political Science, 8:2, 35-58 
Huntington, S. P., & Harvard University. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 179 
 
179 
Huntington, S. P. (1962). Changing patterns of military politics. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
İncioğlu, N. K (2009) Türkiye’de Çok Partili Sisteme Geçiş ve Demokrasi Sorunları, Türkiye’de 
Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme, Dora Yayınları, Bursa. Karpat, 1972 
Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human 
development sequence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson, C (1975) Japan: who governs? An essay on official bureaucracy. Journal of Japanese 
Studies 2.1: 1-28. 
Kadercan, P. T., & Kadercan, B. (2016). The Turkish Military as a Political Actor: Its Rise and 
Fall. Middle East Policy, 23, 3, 84-99. 
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